HAITIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
PROCEEDINGS

SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE
JUNE 15-16, 1990

Tufts University, Medford, MA
Guest Editor: Vèvè A. Clark
Editor: Alix Cantave
February, 1991
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to express our gratitude to those colleagues who revised their presentations for the publication of Proceedings of our second annual conference. Several of the talks included here transcribed from audio tapes by Frances DiLeo of Typing Unlimited. Special thanks to Ed Dente of Tufts University Language Lab for recording the entire conference on audio tape. We also wish to acknowledge the assistance of Cast Bailey of Tufts University African-American Center and Tufts University students who volunteered their time again this year to our efforts, namely: Nadia Georges, Allison Jacobson, Natasha Labaze, Joëlle Nazaire and Emma Villedrouin.
WELCOME

Rebecca Flewelling
Special Assistant to the President
Office of Equal Opportunity
Tufts University

On behalf of Jean Mayer, the President of Tufts University, I want to welcome each of you to an event which has turned out to be a very successful collaboration between the university and the Haitian Studies Association. For all of the support that we have given to this project, I believe that the university is really indebted to the Haitian Studies Association for enriching the cultural life here on the Medford campus.

One benefit of holding a first, successful conference is that it then becomes part of the annual traditions that sustain the life of any university. I hope that next year, I will be available and able to welcome you to the Third Annual Haitian Studies Association conference. I am certain that you’re going to enjoy your two days here. I have looked at the program, and the organizers have scheduled the panels rather tightly, but I expect that you will enjoy this important scholarly endeavor. Once again, welcome.
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
HAITI: THE DYNAMICS OF STAGNATION

Jean-Jacques Honorat
Haitian Center for Human Rights
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Much to the dismay of most observers and friends of Haiti, Haitians have found themselves bogged down over the past four and half years in a situation of political stagnation. The situation is characterized by the success of the beneficiaries of the past in continuing to control and manipulate all societal power structures. And conversely, by the inability of those who demand, promote, advocate, and or claim to be fighting for change to actually have any significant impact on the mechanics of socio-political power.

In fact, as everyone now clearly understands, the demise of Jean-Claude Duvalier on February 7, 1986 was not, as believed at the outset, a triumph of the people's drive toward democracy. Instead, it was a political maneuver of the very beneficiaries of the former sociopolitical system embodied and typified by the Duvalier dynasty to eliminate a figurehead that had become an embarrassment for the entire system, and thereby save the latter from being contested, targeted and eventually wiped out by popular unrest. Thus, all the economic, social and political forces of what is labelled "duvalierism" (but actually constitutes Haiti's traditional dominant power structures) remained intact and in command. It is drastically true that the more things were changing, the more they were remaining the same. The succession of military governments and coups d'état, the dominance of military figures created by the Duvalier regime, the persistence of government cronyism, administrative corruption and political banditry are all indicative of the continued control of the forces of the past over the present which impedes the advent of a new future.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, those who claim to be the artisans of a democratic future have thus far demonstrated a distressing incapacity to set up the political conditions of change and progress. Failing to understand that the fundamental demand elicited over the past three decades by the peasant community action movement called for a new pattern or organization within the Haitian body politic, they have confined themselves within the narrow and no longer appealing limits of the traditional system of patronage. Ignoring the fact that after having been betrayed for over 186 years by charismatic political leaders Haitians are no longer desirous of mobilizing behind any new Messiah, these same pseudoleaders have lamentably remained content with offering words and promises where only an articulate platform was expected and would be able to dismantle the general distrust and apathy of the population.

Adding to the political confusion thus created and taking advantage of it, small groups of extremists have had to widen the political vacuum by spreading nihilism and anarchy. By contrast, those from the extreme right use their weaponry and criminal know-how to create and artificial climate of fear dubbed 'insecurity' by Haitians. Those from the extreme left use the violence of words, hoping that through permanent agitation they will finally be able to create some political space for themselves and their ideologies.

In order to compensate for their failure, self-styled "democratic leaders" have resorted to an empty discourse of demagoguery enlivened by the spices of harsh anti-duvalierism. As a result, the contemporary political discourse remains unimpressive and antithetical --all sides simply projecting the two faces of what has become an obsession with the Duvalier legacy as though the political scene were still dominated by the ghost of Mr. Duvalier.

Quite paradoxically, the forces that have displayed the most noticeable qualitative change in the past few years are those from
abroad, that is to say the foreign governments --Sidney Mintz would call them the external trappings of dependency—¹ that have traditionally exercised considerable influence in the making of Haitian politics. Thanks to the revisionist efforts deployed over the past 15 to 20 years by the diaspora, influential foreign institutions and interest ceased considering Haiti for the first time in history as the chasse-gardée of only 25 wealthy Petionville families, and decided to carefully listen to the voice of voiceless and disenfranchised Haitians. The overthrow of General Avril and the advent of the current civilian government is a clear illustration of this dramatic turnaround in Haiti’s geo-political history. Unfortunately, the contradictions within the domestic forces that we have mentioned above have doomed the experience to impotence if not failure.

In the midst of this political quagmire, the question that everyone asks and that constitutes the crux of Haiti’s contemporary politics is the following: are elections going to be possible? Posed in this way, the problem of the upcoming elections encloses the Haitian dilemma in a vicious circle. What we now have in Haiti is a weak government that has thus far shown no capacity, or willingness, to do anything about anything. Can this government organize elections? On the other hand, while the extremists who rely on anarchy continue to disturb the political climate and perpetuate chaos, none of the so-called "democratic" candidates has thus far been able to gather any substantive popular following behind his/her candidacy. Consequently, the population wonders: why risk going to the polls where we might be gunned down again as some of us were on November 29, 1987? That consensus means that none of the candidates has proposed a platform for which people would be ready to risk being killed.

But if elections do not occur, how long can this current lame government last? Can the country continue to pay the economic price of an endless political transition? It definitely seems to me that
elections are our only way out of the quandary. Elections per se would not represent a final solution to Haiti's problems, but they would at least mark the end of a rather long and obscure tunnel and the beginning of a new light. I do not think we have much of a choice. Elections must be made possible, and it is the duty of those who have chosen the profession of politics to see to it that they do indeed become possible. For politics is ultimately the art of making the desirable possible and the possible desirable.

Notes

FREE ELECTIONS AND THE HAITIAN MILITARY

Henry F. Carey
Columbia University

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF EVENTS

This essay analyzes the context for the Haitian general elections, planned by the current Trouillot government before the end of 1990. The elections were supposed to be held by the end of June, then by the end of September. Following the assassination attempts of two members of the Council of State, the elections were finally announced publicly to be held on November 4, if the registration process can begin as scheduled by the end of August. Of particular concern is the Haitian military, generally regarded with cynicism for its antidemocratic history, but has been showing unusual and preliminary signs of reform. Particular attention will be paid to the influence of multilateral election observers from the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS). Haiti’s political problématique seems to defy solution. Worsening destitution and political violence in the post-Duvalier period has not dampened the Haitian quest for liberty from centuries of military-elite corruption and domination. Repression and theft, rather than investment and education, have been employed by various military and civilian dictators to prevent the takeoff of democratic capitalism. The 1957-86 Duvalier family dictatorship created the special brand of terror to complement and control the traditional military power. The theoretical justification for Francois Duvalier’s revolution was entirely ignored in practice. Class and race relations were to be reversed in a society where mulattoes were disproportionately successful. A small percentage did emerge from the heap of society, but not in numbers comparable with his rhetoric. Those that did rise owed absolute allegiance to Duvalier’s person and his new system of corruption and
intimidation. The new security forces, commonly known as the "tonton macoutes," were not a civilian militia needed for national defense, but a new source of terrorism against not only the new regime's actual and potential opponents, but also a good measure of innocents taken for the sake of general intimidation. The Macoutes were a source of general insecurity whose sole raison d'etre was to keep Duvalier in power and to procure funds by and for other system beneficiaries and enforcers. To keep everyone loyal, Duvalier, in Stalinist fashion, sacrificed even his most loyal supporters so that no one dared form a cabal. Lest anyone doubt his resolve, Duvalier never hesitated to pull the trigger himself.

Corruption and terrorism have worsened in the five year, post-'dechoucaj' period, after the "uprooting" that ended the 29 year Duvalier family dictatorship, and modified but failed to end many of its devastating structures. The only difference from the Duvalier period is that some Macoutes have been formally integrated into or made "attaché" with the army, rather than the semi-autonomous force of the Duvalier period. While the power of the Macoutes has declined somewhat, the Army has regained its pre-Duvalierist preeminence while resorting to Macoute terrorism. Yet, since the March 1990 departure of the President Prosper Avril, there have been the preliminary signs, to use the nomenclature of Alfred Stepan of Columbia University, the "military as institution" may have different interests and patterns of behavior out of power that they pursued as the "military as government" before.¹

The armed forces (Forces Armées d'Haiti-FAH) and the Macoutes have not yet accepted the democratic principle that civil society control the state under democratic laws. The consensus view is that desperately needed "demacoutization" is impossible without a violent revolution that replaced the FAH and disarmed civilian Macoutes. Non-violent reform is considered impossible because there

¹ see, for example, "The Tasks of a Democratic Opposition," Journal of Democracy, Spring 1990, p. 41-49
will always be Duvalierist elements willing to kill civilian protestors in cold blood.

Any revolution that somehow replaced the military and the Macoutes would also face the enormous obstacle of pervasive corruption among those connected to what Robert Rotberg has called the "predatory state."\(^2\) Unless that state was cleansed of multitudinous Macoute and other corrupt elements, it would be very difficult to construct an effective government. This would leave Haiti in a situation roughly comparable to Pakistan and the Philippines, where progress is also inhibited by financial favoritism and theft.

Others advocate the electoral route because they could never be deprived of all their arms, which include, after all, machetes, rocks and any other devices at hand. So, a revolution would not necessarily demobilize the Macoute structure, which has few equivalents throughout the developing world. Until such a revolution occurs, there is only one other option, fair elections, which nonetheless is fraught with limitations and risks.

The argument is that prudence dictates that the Macoutes should not be forced out, but made gradually irrelevant with gradualist reforms that could establish an honest civilian government that could encourage the economy to develop. Since the immense entrepreneurial potential of Haitians have never been tapped, it is argued that honest politicians could allow capitalism, not kleptocracy.

Moderate reformers within Haiti and abroad have encouraged really free elections and not the meaningless, fraudulent exercises that the army has control, whether by selecting the winner or limiting his authority. In more recent times it has been thought

\(^{2}\) The Politics of Squalor, 1971
that foreign pressure for fair elections could establish a more
genuine electoral process, such as modified the longstanding
dictatorships in El Salvador in 1982, the Philippines in 1986, and
South Korea in 1987, albeit with some negative consequences. The
February 1990 elections in Nicaragua, observed by the UN, OAS, and
the Council of Freely Elected Heads of State (led by former
President Carter), have been considered the model for Haitian
democratization. All three groups have agreed to observe Haiti’s
elections, fundamentally improving the setting for the 1990
attempt.

November 29, 1987 experiment is a Haitian date remembered in
infamy. The outlawed, but extant tonton macoutes brazenly
terrorized voters at the Rue Vaillant polling station with machetes
and Uzis, causing at least 29 deaths and hundreds of wounded.
During the previous campaign, the independent electoral council
(CEP) was fire-bombed; at least 35 citizens were killed protesting
that attempt to eliminate the CEP; several hundred more during the
course of the campaign; two presidential candidates were
assassinated; and between 34 and 350 or more were killed on the
morning of November 29.\(^3\) As General Namphy said in 1988, "In
Haiti, there is only one voter. The army."\(^4\)

When probable candidate Yves Volel was killed in the summer of
1987, everyone immediately left the streets and boarded up their

\(^3\) 34 dead was the minimum figure reported in the press. Others
suggested many more were killed by couline machetes and Uzi
submachine guns. Anne-Christine d’Adesky, an investigative
reporter for Pacifica Radio, reported, "On Monday, when we went to
the hospital and on Tuesday when we got some of our reports, we
heard that there were more like between 80 and 160 bodies inside
the morgue, the majority with machete and bullet wounds. So, I
believe that the numbers were vastly underestimated." Conference
on Haiti, New York, Oct. 21, 1988

\(^4\) Abbott, Elizabeth, Haiti: The Duvaliers and their Legacy,
stores. Tom Mellin, a Peace Corps volunteer, happened to be near the place where Voley had been reading the Constitution and was shot in the head. The army quickly arrived, not to protect people, but just to disperse any crowd reactions. In the final weeks of the campaign, a second presidential candidate was killed by macoutes who were falsely told that he was a communist. Haitians had been forming vigilante squads to try to offset all of the Macoute violence, but they were unable to stop the terrorism designed to disrupt the elections. After this second murder, almost all campaigning came to an end. Louis Dejoie II and a few others ventured into the countryside, but they were indeed exceptional.

In 1987, the Haitian "powers that be," the Macoutes in the military and society, tried to obstruct an electoral process that they discovered that they could not manipulate. The army complained that it was entirely excluded from the electoral process, including in the appropriate area of security. Yet, the framers of the Haitian constitution did provide a high measure of autonomy for the military in general. The military’s role in the electoral process, however, was unspecified and left to the electoral council to decide.

In 1990, the Haitian military’s role will follow the model used in Nicaragua, where the army was entrusted by all sides participating in the electoral processes to guarantee their security. The Popular Sandinista army, under exacting multilateral supervision, did exhibit exemplary non-partisanship, once entrusted to safeguard security. The Haitian CEP established by the Touillot government plans to reverse the 1987 practice and integrate the army into the electoral process, daring it to behave responsibly.

The CEP’s decision to cancel the 1987 elections was not unreasonable, given the fearful hysteria of the entire campaign. Yet, the killing was largely limited to the Rue Valliant polling station, one of five thousand in Haiti. The cancellation fulfilled the Macoute plan of Frank Romain, Henri Namphy, Williams Regala and
others to destroy the electoral process. Most of the other problems that day were technical, such as the non-delivery of ballots in parts of the north. Had the CEP not cancelled that election, a new government, possibly headed by Gérard Gourgues, might well have been elected, either on Nov. 29, 1987, or in the subsequent second round if he had not won 50% of the ballots in the first. Trying to govern against the wishes of the Macoutes and the army might not have been worth the effort. With its own CEP in place, the FAH established an Orwellian "selection" in January 1988, which was appropriately boycotted by 95% of voters. The FAH’s manipulated process surprisingly chose the respected academic, Leslie Manigat, whose megalomania allowed him to make a Faustian pact with the military. The first civilian leader since dechoucaj took office on the second anniversary of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s departure, but was on a plane to the Dominican Republic only four months later. His attempts to curtail military controlled contraband, as well as to fire General Namphy, the head of the army, produced his quick demise. Namphy was a brutal macoute, not in terms of his light complexion, but in his rise from humble origins which was facilitated by his willingness to use terrorism for his and his allies’ benefit. With Namphy’s own quick departure in September 1988, his successor Prosper Avril reinitiated an electoral process that he never expected to see fulfilled.

THE REINITIATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Avril was able to regain some US military assistance by liberalizing his regime somewhat and reinitiating the electoral process by establishing the third CEP. No one trusted his intentions, though the US was willing to test his intentions, proving aid for the new CEP. A roundtable meeting of many civic and political groups in January 1989 was boycotted by the left and the right, but the process advanced. When the Avril government almost fell in the April 1989 coup attempt, the US provided important intelligence and logistical assistance, though the assistance of
Avril’s presidential guard against the Leopards and the Dessallines battalion proved ultimately decisive.

Those hopes were dashed in the repression that began in Nov. 1989 with the arrest of the three civilian activists and the institution of martial law, 14 months after taking office. By March 1990, the new US Ambassador, Alvin Adams, was convinced that Avril was no longer serious about free elections. As a last, disingenuous attempt to restore US support, Avril invited the UN and the OAS to observe the three rounds of elections, that had been scheduled to begin in June, August and culminating with the October 1990 elections. His idea of inviting the UN resulted from the dramatic success from multilateral observation in Nicaragua. However, the UN immediately balked because Avril was unwilling to include security observers. They had not been used in Nicaragua until after the elections in order to facilitate Contra demobilization. Having just begun the demobilization process several weeks before, just after Nicaragua’s February 25, 1990 election, he UN regarded these military officers as indispensable in Haiti in order to convince the FAH to guarantee security. Without UN participation, Avril’s election process was stillborn. Short of any prospects of restoring US foreign aid, the main source of wealth for Avril as Jean Claude Duvalier’s financial adviser aside from the state monopolies, Avril made the rational decision to leave the country.

After months of passivity, crushed protests and disappointing strikes, Haiti’s first civil uprising since dechoucaj occurred forced out Avril, his the fourth government in thirteen months. was replaced by a provisional government of civilians. The President, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, is the first woman chief executive in Haiti’s 186 years of independence. She shares power in an ambiguous fashion with a Council of State, composed of representatives of the civilian organizations that rallied against the Avril government in March 1990. Like its pre-electoral counterparts in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, the reaction to the temporary government has been
ambivalent: welcomed to replace the prior tyranny but suspected as a self-selected body. Duvalierist violence increased to a worse level than any time since preceding the November 1987 elections. As an electoral calendar of local, national and presidential elections was about to be announced in June, the Duvalierists sent a clear signal that the carefully planned electoral process would meet the same fate as before. One member of the Council of State and an innocent by-stander was murdered.

Two members of the Council of State, Louis Roy, an author of the 1987 Constitution, and Suzy Castor adamantly opposed rushing into elections before adequate preparations had been undertaken. They were initially in the minority, as most Council of State members, the President, and candidates favored holding elections as soon as possible. Faced with the daunting task of managing an election with minimal resources and experience and under threat of violence, the CEP postponed planned elections several times during 1990. With a Constitutionally established deadline of February 7, 1991, the next dechoucaj anniversary, many wondered whether the legal duty to inaugurate democracy via elections was worth the risks.

A heated debate has continued since even before 1987 among Haitian citizens, as well as politicians, academics, and human rights activists, over the desirability of elections. Dispassionate analysis of the issue has been difficult, not only because of the emotions aroused by this important issue, but also because whatever series of options presented is considered seems like a Hobson's choice: all of them are equally unacceptable, or the least undesirable option is still intolerable. Churchill's famous dictum about democracy being the worst option except for all the others does not apply because no definition of democracy is available to Haitians.

A few politicians advocate universal participation, and expect Haitians to be caught up in the process when and if it gets
underway. Others would participate when and if the assassins of the 1987 voters are brought to justice. This prerequisite would offer evidence of good faith that the provisional government has the political will and capability to deter Duvalierist criminality, their prerequisite for participation. Otherwise, why bother holding elections which cannot change the basic complaint of most Haitians?

Some Haitians advocate boycotting the elections rather than condone a false process by voting. Foremost among the opponents of elections is the charismatic, liberation theology priest, Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide. On many occasions and in many different ways, he has argued that elections are impossible so long as the major Macoutes remain at large. The closest that "Pere Titide" (Father Little Aristide) came to endorsing elections, as far as I know, was in January 1990, when he told the BBC that "I would only consider elections possible if the conditions changed."

He was the object of another infamous assassination attempt at his church in September 1988, orchestrated by President Namphy. With the largest civilian following in Haiti's capital of Port-au-Prince if not all of Haiti, Aristide has convinced many that elections cannot change the unjust power structure maintained by armed civilians and soldiers serving the local elites and allied imperialist economic interests. Moreover, most voices speaking on the radio, the predominate Haitian news media, are also cynical of elections. Some, like human rights activist Jean Jacques Honorat, feel that most Haitians are still in favor of voting if minimum safety concerns could be met. It is difficult to say what the electoral participation will be. If insecurity continues, it may be low, but Aristide is probably mistaken to conclude that most Haitians do not want to try to have fair and safe elections. The image of voters at Rue Valliant getting back in line after the shooting remains impregnable.

With the exception of armed struggle and hereditary rule, elections remain the only practical option for choosing the
leadership that might begin to help lead Haiti out of the Duvalierist grip. Obviously, the same risks as before exist that the elections can be destroyed again; their results can be ignored; or there can be a coup or insecurity renewed anytime after the new government takes power. What makes the risks less dangerous than in 1987 and worth taking three years later?

First, the current provisional president and state council are committed to holding fair elections, unlike the Namphy junta of 1987. The first act of the Trouillot government in March 1990 was to invite the UN and the OAS to advise and observe the electoral process, including UN security observers. That government, no matter what its shortcomings in competence and honesty, will be vastly different from Namphy’s 1987 campaign to make the elections at best a farce and at worse the tragedy which actually occurred.

Second, the presence of both these organizations, as well as the Carter group, will vastly change the electoral setting. Both international organizations sent delegations to Haiti for twelve days in early April 1990 to investigate whether they could reasonably assist an electoral process. Both groups filed confidential reports to their respective Secretaries-General, as well as to President Pascal-Trouillot. The OAS immediately agreed to participate, while the UN expressed reservations, apparently encouraging the Haitian government orally to delay the elections until at least December 1990, which is not occurred anyway. Normally, the UN Security Council would have been needed to authorize the UN presence in a sovereign country, an unprecedented situation outside of a decolonization situation, though the UN Charter does allow a General Assembly decision to authorize where the Council is preoccupied. While the UN has more financial resources, the OAS mission, led by the chief electoral officer of Quebec, has been plagued by financial difficulties. During the Nicaraguan elections, more than 95% of the OAS budget of $4 million
was funded by the US, except for a small contribution by a Scandinavian country.

Their efforts will be handicapped by the less time to get organized in all nine departments of Haiti, perhaps only a month, compared with three and five months respectively for the UN and the OAS in Nicaragua. However, the UN will be utilizing mostly personnel with direct experience in Namibia in 1988-1989 or Nicaragua in 1989-90; so that they will be able to use their time more effectively. The OAS delegation will be led by a team with less developing country experience. Pierre Coté, head of the Quebec, Canada election department has organized the OAS mission, because the OAS secretariat lacks French speakers. Despite their shorter missions, the presence of about fifty representatives from each during registration and the campaign and about two hundred each on election day from these prestigious, organizations could still provide crucial reassurance to voters that was not available in 1987 in Haiti, but made all the difference to Nicaraguan voters. The OAS has less than $2 million available for Haiti, while the UN has budgeted $5 million for both its civilian and security teams.⁵

UN security forces will be utilized in Haiti, where the need for them is enormous. They were not used in Nicaragua until after the latter's election, in order to persuade the Popular Sandinista Army and the Contras to facilitate the demobilization of the latter. Officers from many countries were very influential in persuading both sides to support a complex plan that involved the establishment of sanctuaries for Contra forces and the provision by the OAS of supplies for the their reintegration into civil society. In Namibia, the UN established its own army which was armed, in addition to a police force which was not. These forces helped to persuaded the opposing sides who had never spoken to each other in

⁵ interview with Horacio Boneo, Haitian Mission Director, UN headquarters, New York, June 15, 1990
decades in this South African colony known as South West Africa that electoral politics could be relatively balanced.

The Haitian context will be different, as well, but the foreign military officers can be expected to establish working relations with their counterparts in the FAH. Unlike US prodding in the past at the Ambassador to General level, majors will meet with majors and Generals with Generals. There will be regular meetings to ensure that the Haitian military establishes and follows a plan to establish a secure environment for the elections. The Trouillot government’s invitation for UN security forces, in distinction to General Avril’s invitation only for civilian observers, shows that the environment for elections will be much more propitious than three years ago. If the army is not serious about its security plan, the UN security forces can be expected to withdraw, and with it, the Trouillot government’s designs for holding elections.

Third, the current CEP, Haiti’s fourth since the dechoucaj, is the best trained and equipped. While its predecessor, under deposed dictator Prosper Avril, lacked credibility, it did undertake, with the technical assistance of several foreign embassies, thorough planning for the elections and bestowed upon its successor all of its logistics and machinery to manage the complicated process of registration, balloting and counting. The CEP in 1987 had a number of technical deficiencies that never came to light as a result of the massacres; so, greater technical competence will be necessary.

Elections will never solve Haiti’s problems, and they will doubtless cause some new ones. Even a successful transition inspired by elections, however unlikely, would still leave the country with an army resembling a mafia and a government run by bribery, not the rule of law. But, in a country where the economy has sunk to the point where even the military has nothing to steal, this may be as good a time as any to hold elections, and perhaps,
as in certain other countries, make them the surprising success story that Haitians deserve.

Even with these advantages over 1987, there are a number of danger signals that the military and the Macoutes will not behave in a civilized fashion. The most serious was the murder of a Council of State member in June 1990—a clear signal that elections would be opposed by certain Macoute sectors and which led to the postponement of elections that had been planned for September 30. Even a foreign occupation could not prevent a deliberately planned attack on the elections. Even assuming it could ensure public safety, a dubious assumption, foreign control would still generate enormous resentment, as with the US 34 year occupation early in the century. Aside from causing atrocities, rather than improving safety, the effort only reinforced the worst traits of the Haitian military toward elite control. Perhaps, the United Nations would serve more effectively in such a capacity, but its role in conflictual areas like Namibia, the Sinai, and Central America has largely been to observe military conflict, not to use force to regulate it.

From the start, Trouillot had difficulty naming members to the new CEP by her self-imposed deadline of April 20, five weeks after taking power. This was a small omen of the many difficulties that the new government has faced. President Trouillot's governing partner, the Council of State, apparently does not think so. Pascal-Trouillot turned out to be less concerned with human rights protection or put differently, more realistic about what she thought she could accomplish. In her first three months in office, she has taken no initiative to arrest any major violators of human rights, making the Council of State conclude that she is a Duvalierist sympathizer, unwilling to rock the boat which she was using to enrich herself in whatever time she spends in office. While there is no precedent for the FAH to establish rule of law in
Haiti, it will take an elected government before the effort really begins with earnest.

The UN's confidential report to the UN Secretary-General concluded that the Haitian military is unwilling or unable to protect ordinary individuals wishing to vote. Secondly, the CEP was not yet prepared for the complicated task of managing an honest and balanced election. However, it was felt that with more time, until December 1990 at least, sufficient improvements could possibly be undertaken to make elections in Haiti credible. Other international civil servants were more optimistic. Apparently, the German head of the UN Development Programme told the UN and Haitian officials that elections were feasible. Other members of the UN technical assistance staff of the Secretariat also advised that elections could be worth the risk, given that Haiti had no other alternatives for initiating a democratization process. After receiving the UN report, the provisional Haitian government reportedly raised the ante, asking the UN to manage the electoral process instead of the CEP. This is a role which the UN is unwilling to accept in sovereign countries' elections, particularly in a country like Haiti, which could ruin its currently high batting average after Namibia and Nicaragua. The UN has sufficiently ambitious plans in Western Sahara and Cambodia with which to contend over the short term.

Prior to authorizing its involvement, the UN Secretariat wanted assurance that it could bring its own security forces, the casques bleus to ensure the protection of some two hundred UN monitoring staff planned for this assignment, not to mention

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6 based on discussion by third party with Julio Grieco, former Number Two in UNDP in Haiti. Grieco had advised his boss that elections were not feasible, that there would be no security for UN people, and that it would be very dangerous for all concerned.
Haitian citizens and political candidates. Protecting all Haitians from tonton macoute and FAH violence would be impossible.

As a precondition for its involvement in Haiti, the UN asked for more time, as the US Embassy has long advised to the universal dismay of the Haitian "political class," as they are referred, to hold elections as soon as possible. The delay is particularly needed to ensure integrity of registration, voting, and counting, to say nothing of balanced and impartial competition. The Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council, by comparison, had developed its impressive capabilities since before the 1984 election. Without radical and entirely unlikely changes, the UN is not going to find the conditions that it would like to see before Haiti begins its second, serious attempt at holding free elections, beginning with the registration process.

The UN was not willing to accept the provisional government’s unofficial request to manage the elections, an assignment that was not accepted in Nicaragua. The world body, despite its recently improved reputation, or perhaps because of it, had been reluctant to work inside a sovereign member country, where there are no obvious international ramifications. Prior to approval of its Security Council, which is required under the UN Charter, the UN sent a few advisers in order to supplement the efforts of the US, French and Canadian governments to improve the CEP’s preparedness. Almost everyone involved has conceded that Haiti’s standards of electoral fairness will fall short of emerging international standards. The issue then is not whether the Haitian elections will be fair; they cannot. They are probably not even safe enough to even be held. The issue for Haitians is whether the election can be fair enough to launch democratic procedures that have never been practiced, or whether they will accept whatever degree of dishonesty that exists. The answer awaits for election day.

Ironically, the best hope for a successful electoral transition toward democracy might come from a loose interpretation
of Article 291, which apparently prohibits candidates from running for office for ten years who played a major role in the Duvalier administration. The army and the Duvalierists need a candidate that they trust and who has at least some chance of winning. The opposition even more desperately needs a common enemy around which it can unify. Thus, if the CEP rules that Article 291 is not applicable, then the "morally repugnant elites," MREs as they are sometimes called, will able to field a Duvalierist candidate, and the army would be more likely to protect the electoral process. At the same time, the forty potential opposition candidates might unify under one or two candidates, around whom Haitians can feel there is a democratic cause.

Some lawyers, such as Jean Jacques Honorat, feel that Article 291 only applied to the first election after the 1987 Constitution took effect. In the scheduled run-off election occurs, as in France and Brazil, between the top two vote-getters from the first round, then Haitians will have a clear choice about whom they would like to lead the inauguration of democracy in their country.

THE NATURE OF DUVALIERIST MILITARISM

Assuming the elections do come off, can a transition toward something better, namely democracy, or at least less bad than Duvalierism, emerge after an elected government takes power? The most important obstacle are the Haitian armed forces and the Duvalierists. What is then is real purpose of the Haitian military and can that be changed.

Obviously, the FAH is not an army designed for the national defense, as it could never prevent an attack from the far superior Dominican or Cuban armies. It is not well designed for maintaining internal stability or security. The frequent coup attempts during 1988-89 show that the FAH is a major source of instability, even if the fighting has not been like the bloody coup battles of Chile’s Pinochet or Paraguay’s Rodriguez, nor the regular, non-violent exodus of Guatemalan officers. Rather, the attempt on the dictator
portrayed by Woody Allen in Bananas is more like the Haitian situation.

During the April 1989 attack by the Leopards and Dessalines battalions against the Presidential guard, the electricity in Port-au-Prince was apparently turned off so that no one could see that the intermittent shelling was with blanks and not live ammunition. Nonetheless, one soldier was apparently killed, reportedly by one of his own men. President Avril was almost physically removed from the country, but when the rebelling Leopards took him to the airport, a plane could not be found, and the President was saved from immediate exile by members of his Presidential Guard. Avril disbanded both the Leopards and the Dessalines Barracks after the coup attempt, leaving only the Presidential guard of no more than one thousand men in the capital (which was probably more than enough to defend the country from any possible foreign attack).

Some now believe that former chief of Staff and current commander-in-chief, Herard Abraham, is a closet soft-liner, who would take free elections seriously. Few believe that he could hold sway over his forces. Similar statements were made about both Henri Namphy and Prosper Avril after they took power in Feb. 1986 and Sept. 1988 respectively. Both Namphy and Avril started out as reformers, according to the former optimists, only to discover that the institution could not tolerate the clean-up. To keep the loyalty of the troops, both leaders became increasingly repressive, belying their earlier reputations for not being ruthless. Their increasing repression, which pinnacled in July 1987 under the first post-Duvalierist government (Namphy I) and February 1990 under Avril, proved beyond any doubt that the FAH was not prepared to change its behavior and facilitate fair elections.

A more accurate model of the FAH would be a mafia or a praetorian guard. Its bottom line is remaining in power, which is only consistent with causing and tolerating its human rights violations and corruption. Any attempts made by either military
leaders or civilians to end those constants are met by coup attempts or further repression. That was the message to sent to President Avril by the April 1989 coup attempts, partly in response to his attempts to reduce drug trafficking to please the US Embassy.

Except during the 29 year Duvalier family dictatorship, the army has used repression, corruption, and electoral manipulation effectively to hold power during Haiti’s 186 year history, even though there was usually a civilian president. During Papa and Baby Docs’ nearly three decades in power, the army was kept in check by the Macoutes, the civil militia created by Francois Duvalier to take the offensive against the citizenry rather than foreign enemies. That part of the FAH which was not purged by Duvalier was kept rewarded by enjoying whatever sources of corruption it could tap. When the army took power in 1986, it had no intention of changing that practice. In fact, it sought to augment the power lost to the Macoutes. The system of holding power by satisfying military greed, so common throughout the developing world, was now distinguished by the totalitarian pathology inculcated in the army by Father Duvalier.

Both Jean-Claude and the FAH have not had the will to kill quite as ruthlessly as Francois Duvalier, but they are not willing to give up their prerogatives for corruption to any reformist, elected President. They have been willing to apply random terror, when necessary, to maintain those privileges. Prosper Avril, the least repressive of the post-Duvalier, military rulers, was not prepared to allow civil society the right to control the “institution of the Haitian Armed Forces.”

While the FAH now dominated the Macoutes, they have also made good use of their terror for hire. The 6,000 or more uniformed FAH soldiers and policemen are not supposed to be caught killing civilians. It is rather convenient utilizing those Macoutes that
survived the post-dechoucaj vengeance, that lead to some rather ugly, if understandable street scenes. Thus, "Duvalierism without Duvalier," as the expression goes, results from the military's willingness to utilize unlimited terror to protect private and military interests at odds with human rights and free enterprise.

The main new development is the drug trans-shipment business, which emerged when Baby Doc's father-in-law Bennett, helped induce the FAH to force out the Baby-faced dictator. This is the view of historians like Elizabeth Abbot, who question the popular mythology that the civil uprising and the unwillingness to use force led to his demise. Whatever was the real reason Jean-Claude departed, the fact that the military claimed credit for the successful revolution, as in the contemporaneous military mutiny in the Philippines, caused it to make unwarranted claims upon the new government. The situation was even worse in Haiti because the military took control over the new civil-military governing council, from which the only civilian, Gourguès, quickly resigned.

Some diplomats refer to the Duvalierists in both the military and civil society as the morally repugnant elites (MREs). Others refer to them as the "ruling class." Whatever one calls it, this use of paramilitary violence utterly lacks moral justification. Yet, the possibility of mass atrocities could be repeated if there is a second attempt at honest Presidential elections. If election campaign proceeds reasonably, and the election is actually held, is the only way the MREs will support a civilian president would be through a Faustian pact to tolerate the FAH's corrupt, repressive ways? Could the military be forced or persuaded to respect the results of fair elections and allow democratic powers to be exercised?

A final possibility is that a generational difference within the officer corps might produce a different military ethos. In his previous service as Haitian Ambassador to the US, Abraham had been a loyal defender of the military governments, keeping his private
thoughts to himself. As President Avril's chief of staff, Abraham was still no longer in a position to assert his individuality. After Avril's March 1990 departure, however Abraham has no longer been beholden to anyone except Provisional President Trouillot and the Council of State, both of whose priorities were to hold democratic elections. During the Avril administration, chief of Staff Hérard Abraham has been, according to a departing diplomat, "one of only two or three Haitian military officers genuinely interested in democracy."

Writing several months after the new government has been in office, it is too early to tell whether Abraham will be able to live up to his reputation and whether he can maintain control over his troops. Already, Abraham has undertaken a number of reorganizations, disciplinary measures, and promotions that suggest he is serious about changing the military's macoutist nature that has characterized what remains of the senior leadership.

Obtaining definitive conclusions about the FAH is quite difficult, given the difficulty of obtaining interviews. General Abraham became available to the major press after General Avril's departure. In an interview with Lee Hockstader of the Washington Post in May 1990, Abraham's statements supported what I had hypothesized after my own interviews of several officers in July of 1988 and 1989: that Abraham is a true democrat seeking to persuade the younger generation to practice the professional ideals that he and some of his peers had taught them in the military academy. The decade hiatus of instruction there during the 1960s under Francois Duvalier helped to establish a generation gap. The older generals in their fifties and early 60s, with the exception of Abraham, fit the model of the old line Macoute depicted by Dupuy: from relatively humble origins and usually of darker complexion, embracing the Duvalierist ideology of black power as a pretext for the empowerment of his cronies. The education of younger officers was reinstated with the class of 1971 (which follows the British
practice of identifying the year of matriculation, not graduation) and continued with the class of 1974. The former class had Macoute chieftain Roger Lafontant as their graduation speaker in 1974, but his pernicious influence as mentor has been minimized by his 1985 exile after Jean Claude Duvalier dismissed him as Defense Minister. The younger officers have not shared in the graft to the extent of their elders and they appear from several interviews to share many of General Abraham's democratic proclivities. Given the large number of recent senior dismissals and the large number of Class of 1971 officers as colonels managing Haiti's nine departmental commands, the military may be poised for a sudden reversal in its fortunes. On the other hand, Avril's presidential guard has been moved to the empty Dessalines barracks near the palace, where the country's heavy artillery is still located. As in the past, the colonel in charge is more independent of the other younger colonels and may be unwilling to support their reformist project.

One FAH officer told me in the spring of 1990 that there was unanimity in the officer corps in favor of democracy. Other diplomats were more skeptical, suggesting that there were still differences of opinion. However, even if there is a generation gap in the military, with younger officers allying with Abraham against the older, Macoute generation, there is at least the possibility of change, even if many of the older ones definitely will not want to stop playing by the old rules. If the Dept. commanders simply insist that they were going to order their people to do the right thing, then the more senior officers may not have the stomach for a confrontation. After all, very few military officers have ever died in combat, particularly in the various coup attempts of recent years. If the junior officers are really tired of all the instability and want to obtain the advantages for the military that a democratic government would provide them, a miracle could happen.

TWO JOURNALISTIC PERSPECTIVES
Two journalistic models of Haitian military dominance illustrate the differing perspectives on elections in Haiti. They are inferred from the two most prominent, mostly French language newswelllies published from United States about Haiti, the moderate Haïti Observateur and the radical Haïti Progrès. The former, from its pragmatic perspective, argues that properly structured elections are worth the risk, while the latter, from its self-described progressive frame of reference, absolutely discounts their value. Observateur is reformist, but skeptical. Progrès is revolutionary and anti-imperialist. Neither claims to offer academic interpretations, but their influential views represent rival archetypes of the first-wave.

Progrès argues that Haiti's social stratification is similar to El Salvador's, whose social contradictions can only be resolved through revolution. The quest for power is between three social classes: the oligarchy, the bourgeoisie, and the popular movement. The latter, representing 90% of the population, includes the peasantry, the labor movement, and the urban underclass, all capable of overturning the established order if the United States and its bourgeois reformist allies do not preempt this inevitable revolution. The oligarchy consists of the military and their ruthless patrons, the landowners, who repress or kill campesinos, not educate them, a superfluous skill for an agrarian culture. They make so much money off the land that there is no reason to invest in new markets. The bourgeoisie subsumes foreign and domestic investors, multinationals and professionals who oppose feudalism and promote capitalist industrialization. Feudals use repression to inhibit development of new markets because their social status.

Progrès argues any policy short of revolution, like elections, are naively doomed to fail because of oligarchical repression. The

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7 For a representative statement of this model, see "How Do You See Haiti?" Haiti Report, Brooklyn, NY, Sept. 1988, pp. 1,4
only way to empower the popular sector is to eliminate those who will stop at nothing to preserve their privileges, which are based on unjust land holdings and corruption, not production. The conflict between the oligarchy and the bourgeoisie creates conflicts that weaken both and will allow the masses to take power. It is believed that the day that Haiti’s masses will escape oligarchic control is imminent, as they increasingly realize their rights and undertake revolutionary actions.

Progrès also suggests that the FAH has divided allegiances between the more hardline oligarchy and the softline bourgeoisie, which could permit revolutionaries the possibility of a divide and conquer strategy. The bourgeoisie faction exists because some officers have more modern outlooks than others. The oligarchy, however, are preeminent because corruption and repression are more important to this de facto mafia. Occasionally, the bourgeoisie attempts to bolster the softliners, mainly through foreign assistance geared toward social reforms and improved human rights performance. The military’s liberal responses are mostly the response to foreign financial incentives, not a genuine change from its century-long patterns of behavior. The election game has been tried in the past, and the interests behind corruption have always prevailed over any softliners.

Progrès suggested that prior to Sept. 1988 coup that brought Prosper Avril to power, the hardliners were led by Defense and Interior Minister Williams Regala and allied with the "oldline" Duvalierists, Macoutes and the oligarchy. The softline was supposedly associated with then-President Henri Namphy, who was bourgeois. Namphy was just as blood-thirsty as Regala, even though he was soft-spoken and rarely sober. Namphy’s election day massacre had not convinced Progres, but the slaughter at St. Jean Bosco Church of Father Aristide’s congregation shortly after editor Ben Dupuy published his theory, provided ample testimony that Namphy was not bourgeois. More careful study of Namphy’s entire career
shows that he had long been a "Macoute". A Priest who has known him all his adult life told me that Namphy was "the most cruel ruler and officer in Haiti except for Papa Doc. He was a bad person to begin with and was corrupted by the system. The election day massacre went beyond the pale, and he became unpopular with those who continued to support him".  

Similar hopes that General Avril’s bourgeois instincts might prevail over his Duvalierist background were also put to rest a year after he took office. This supposedly brilliant General with a doctoral degree in public relations was adept at duplicitous public relations. Namphy took office and also started slaughtering civilian activists and other innocents.

The Haitian bourgeoisie is largely located in Port-au-Prince, after Francois Duvalier centralized his control. Some of the professionals are idealistic, though history has not offered them many opportunities to show it. Minister of Social Affairs of the Trouillot government, Claudette Werleigh, has indicated that following dechoucaj, many professionals offered volunteer time and raised funds to help clean up the capital. Some of the bourgeoisie, such as the Syrian owners of supermarkets, are apparently not so enlightened, buying into the Macoute system of extortion, to maintain their monopoly status in certain markets.

For the most part, however, the Haitian bourgeoisie is very small. As 80% of Haiti earns less than $200 annually, there are not enough people in a working class with capitalist employers. The "Madame Sarahs" in the markets, the small farmers, and the smugglers of imported goods are the country’s capitalists. Few of them remotely resemble the bourgeoisie of Marx. The most frequent targets against whom Progres and Father Aristide inveighs, are the factory owners in the two industrial parks, divided roughly between foreign and Haitian capital. They provide about 60,000 jobs, which feed about a quarter of Port-au-Prince’s population. These are

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8 Name withheld for speaker’s protection.
important to those families, but they hardly represent a large exploiting class in any macro-economic sense. Some of the bourgeoisie are in bed with Macoutes, but many only buy into that system because they may have no choice, given the Macoute terrorism that results from non-cooperation.

Perhaps, the best hope to limit Macoute influence in both society and the military is through development of markets, where the Duvalierists have not established control. The few workers earning between $3 and $6 daily (between $600-$1200 per year) have been decreasing in number due to the curtailment of foreign aid and the gradual exodus of multinational corporations seeking political stability.9 There are only an estimated 5,000 employed workers in the four major union coalitions, out of the estimated 700,000 partly employed in industry and services.10 With such massive underemployment, the bourgeoisie must be very impotent indeed. What is left of the diminishing bourgeoisie is unlikely to have much influence over the military.

Furthermore, the putative powers of the oligarchy are overrated by Progrès. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot demonstrated in his recent book, the great plantations ended in sugar soon after the end of French colonialism and in coffee by the turn of this century.11 Some sharecropping still exists where there is production, and because of continuous erosion, Haiti increasingly lacks arable land. Most farming is subsistence. Landlords ignore the tenants, except during the occasional fertile harvests when

9 The political instability may have recently become more threatening to business. An executive and a diplomat told me that army factions attacked facilities in the industrial park near the airport during the April 1989 coup attempt against Avril.

10 Statistics are from US-AID, the World Bank, and the IMF.

they extract exorbitant rents. Farming has been increasingly
difficult, with the consequence that most of the million or more
economic refugees to the US and Canada in the last decade have come
from rural Haiti. In short, Haiti does not remotely resemble El
Salvador, with masses of oppressed, landless campesinos, which may
help explain why Marxist movements have never found much enthusiasm
in Haiti.

Progrès does correctly argue that an oligarchy exists,
particularly in fertile areas like the Artibonite valley. Corrupt
local section chiefs enforce or sell illegal land titles to ruling
class thieves that were fabricated while no reliable land records
existed. Peasants who complain discover that the section chief’s
forces will use whatever force necessarily to stop their
complaints. But Haiti’s ruling class is so backward that they are
not even agricultural landlords or producers. They just steal from
small farmers whenever they are productive, often claiming that
their land is theirs. Compared with much of the rest of the world,
Haitian farmers have more land, though erosion from burning
firewood has reduced its value enormously. Haiti could use larger
land owners, if they were capable of irrigating and equipping the
arable acreage in order to increase output. But that would require
the MREs to become bourgeois.

Despite Progres’s insistence, there is little evidence of an
FAH soft line. As in all complex organizations, specialization and
division of labor do indeed exist, but this differentiation is more
functional than attitudinal. In most countries, the security forces
associated with interior ministries are the most ruthless. Those in
other parts of the military hierarchy may not be charged with
suppressing opposition, but they remain the beneficiaries of those
policies.

Some Marxists would acknowledge differences in class structure
throughout the world. Progres does not. Haiti’s does not exhibit
the characteristics imported by editor Dupuy from Central America.
His doctrinaire Marxism, was well expressed in a speech in New York
while the Chinese army was shooting students in Tianamen Square on June 4, 1989. Both Dupuy and his program introducer proclaimed, "The US complaints about the massacre are crocodile tears, considering what it did at Kent State".\(^{12}\)

The reformist view of *Observateur* holds that Haiti’s problems can be resolved if political control can be established over Haiti’s anarchic, stateless political structure. A July 1989 editorial noted, "The acts of terrorism against the population by the Namphy-Regala regime and which culminated with the electoral massacre of Nov. 29, 1987 finished the ‘zombification’ of the country which killed all spirit of initiative among citizens. This feeling of abandonment on a national scale is not the result of chance, nor a phenomenon linked to the fall of the Jean-Claude regime. It follows from the absence of responsible authority. Haiti needs a government committed to taking charge to gain everyone’s confidence".\(^{13}\)

Raymond Joseph, *Observateur*’s former editor and currently an official in the Haitian Embassy to the US, advocates a non-revolutionary approach, building a responsible government; utilizing foreign pressure for human rights; and promoting economic development through foreign loans and trade. What the country needs is businessmen interested in opening more factories, promoting the gradual development of an economically stable middle class that could begin to take the lead in politics away from the military. The newspaper would prefer more businessmen to the abundance of foreign volunteers, with more Americans in Haiti than in Brazil,\

\(^{12}\) Tape recorded at public meeting in New York on June 3, 1989 (June 4, 1989 in China).

\(^{13}\) Emphasis added; author’s translation from the French, *Haiti Observateur Magazine*, July 1989, p. 14 The author also interviewed Joseph in his office in April 1988 and some of the analysis here is based on that interview, in addition to my reading of his newspaper.
according to some estimates. Providing such assistance is only short-term relief for hunger, but does not increase agricultural production.

A decent government could draw business to Haiti, and responsibly held elections is the first step to establishing a decent government and inducing the potential return of more than a million, expatriate, educated middle class Haitians. Those remaining abroad could also become potential trading partners. To hold responsible elections, a key ingredient, argues Observateur is more effective foreign pressure. "If the US had not been so naive by trusting the former governing council, the tragedy of November 1987 could have been avoided," asserted in Joseph in a March 1988 interview in his office. "The US can condition its assistance in a way that transforms elections from a foolish, naive, and reckless process to a constructive step in building democracy".

The liberal newspaper criticized the electoral calendar established in Sept. 1989 because the Avril government-controlled CEP had not demonstrated independence from the army and the subsequent, premature restoration of some US foreign assistance to the Haitian government. Observateur agreed with the Rev. Silvio Claude, the leader of the Haitian Christian Democrat Party, that the electoral commission acted unilaterally in establishing the new electoral calendar, after a charade of regional "consultations with the Haitian people." In fact, the CEP scheduling was in direct response to pressure from the Embassy to hold multi-stage election, beginning with local election, then parliamentary, and finally with presidential, each with a subsequent run-off vote where there was no majority. The concept of stages was a sound one for technical reasons. But the CEP was worrying about technicalities before the average person felt secure in voting.

Observateur was redeemed its condemnation two months later, President Avril's "Anti-Gang" police division trumped up show
charges and tortured three opposition leaders for allegedly plotting assassination of the President, and then foolishly displaying the battered leaders on television. The intimidation ploy backfired by igniting a successful day-long strike and singularly decimating the government’s improving human rights reputation. Avril reached the point of no return, and ensuing protests over the next three months made it impossible for the Avril government to continue. Yet, the conditions for an campaign free of violent intimidation have not been established.

Observateur expressed cautious optimism until President Trouillot’s tolerance for Macoutism became manifest by May 1990. She took limited initiative to control the military, who must be convinced to protect, not subvert the electoral process. The FAH might still take a chance on a civilian administration, particularly if it took a slow approach toward Duvalierist corruption. The new government could then begin the long, difficult process of promoting economic development to replace Haiti’s corrupt, feudal system.

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES

A second approach to understanding Haiti’s problems is to apply academic models of the military. Generally, there are three perspectives, one which emphasizes the military institution alone, another which emphasizes the society at large of which the military is only a reflection, and a more complex one which examines the military as a separate sub-system that interacts with the larger political system. In effect, the perspective of Progres is embodied by the second view, which argues that the FAH’s actions simply reflect the conflicts and exploitation in society. It will be argued that the third, more complex view of Observateur is more correct.

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14 The first perspective is associated with Morris Janowitz of the University of Chicago; the second with Samuel Huntington of Harvard University; and the third with Alfred Stepan of Columbia University, among others.
The first view, that the FAH is an autonomous force not influenced by societal events can be rejected on its face. But external factors, including narcotics, arms, and contraband trafficking, foreign assistance ebbs and flows, and world political reactions have also affected the rise and fall of various factions and political leaders. Baby Doc and Avril's ouster were the direct result of civilian protests and strikes. Nevertheless, a direct focus on the military will explain much of Haiti's political vagaries. Though interacting with society at large, the FAH is a highly autonomous state within a very weak Haitian state, protected from prosecution for its human rights crimes and effectively exempt from any civilian control that might evolve from elections. There have been many internal reshuffling of the FAH over the past century. While the leadership faces have changed, its corruption-repression syndromes have never altered. Even the rise and fall of the Macoutes with respect to the military during and after the Duvaliers did not change a reformer's chances of liberation from the brutality of section chiefs or Macoutes. The more recent intrigues between the Leopards, the Presidential Guard and the Dessalines Barracks, however, made it more difficult for President Avril to repress civilians.

The best hope for Haitian citizens is that the FAH self-destructs. Its small size of only 6,000 men, mostly soldiers and policemen is likely to suffer continued ineptitude, rivalries and power plays. There are almost no democratic elements.

The possibility of an internal revolt from below cannot be discounted. There are still many soldiers who resent the brutality and corruption of officers, such as the "little army" (ti lame). Sergeant Joseph Hebreux and his followers were so appalled by Namphy's butchery at St. Jean Bosco's church in Sept. 1988, that they conspired with Avril in a successful coup. They remain resentful because Avril later arrested many of them. The Little Army could rise again, only this time without President Avril or any other officer as their mentor. The phenomenon was not
necessarily ephemeral, but the power asserted from below has escaped no one’s memory.

It is necessary to place the military institution’s structure within the context of Haitian society at large. The military’s activities reflect both societal and internal conflicts. The military is somewhat less anarchic than the political system, and has had more durability. There are regular and periodic uprisings, which usually have not been successful. Yet, foreign pressure combined with sustained uprisings and military internal instability have occasionally forced out highly unpopular rulers. All three factors have to be synchronized to have a chance of overturning and permanently subjugating the military to civilian authority.

THE ROLE OF US PRESSURE

Part of the ambivalence regarding elections is that they do not offer any immediate prospect of controlling military behavior. In most societies, electoral rules and norms have strong normative influence over civil-military relations. The army respects the results, and sometimes ensures that elections are not stolen from the winner. The ambivalence is also connected to the role that the US has been playing in encouraging elections. Foreign pressure may be required to ensure that the FAH respects the results, but it is not welcomed by all.

The Haitian love/hate relationship with the US may be less visceral and extreme than it is currently in other regions of Latin America. Haitian patriots have seen their country’s interests forsaken by misguided US involvement, even if they would admit that not all of Haiti’s problems are caused by the US.

Some have advocated that the US eliminate the FAH, as suggested by former Congressman Walter Fauntroy. The 19-year US Marine occupation that began in 1915 under President Wilson has only produced bad feelings among Haitians. Of course, this begins with the US occupation until 1934, but there are recent roots. It was the US that reorganized the Gendarmerie d’Haiti into the Armed
Forces of Haiti. The marines' blatant bigotry did nothing to change the Haitian military's longstanding military greed or to institute professionalism.

US concerns appear to be more with maintaining stability than benefiting Haitians. The embassy deals with educated elites, sometimes MREs, not average people. Yet, even if the US withdrew from the Haitian picture, these same elites would continue to repress as they do now. There is not much gratitude for its reputed role in instigating rebellion in 1985, as well as possibly convincing the military not to shoot the civilian demonstrators. There is an underlying suspicion that the US placed the army in power after flying Baby Doc out of the country. It may well be true that Henri Namphy arranged the coup with Colonel Regala and the blessing of Macoute Chieftain Madame Max. The then US Ambassador Clayton McManaway claims that the US role was largely reactive, promising to support the new military government as long as it kept its promise to hold free elections. The memory of the misplaced trust placed in the Namphy junta makes most want the US Embassy to let local events take their own course.

The US invaded neighboring Dominican Republic in 1965 with somewhat greater success in stimulating democracy, though there is much resentment there as well. In theory, the US could try again to train and develop a strong, institutional army, though the chances of success are not much greater than early in the century and the current fear of instability and communism is much less. US interests in Haiti have been partly motivated by fear of Castro in neighboring Cuba, though communism has never been very attractive.


16 telephone interview, June 1988
to Haitian activists. The rural uprisings of 1985 that produced dechoucaj may have appeared the precursor of some type of local insurgency, and many felt the US aborted a process that could have eliminated the FAH from Haiti, whether or not the new civilian junta would have been interested in establishing a revolutionary state. Ironically, the US might be more apt to ensure democratic elections if the communists were effectively promoting violent opposition to the regime. Ending the waves of refugees and drug trafficking is not quite as strong a motive as stopping leftist guerrillas.

For the US, the fact that Avril did not deal in drugs was worthy of protracted support. By firing Colonel Jean-Claude Paul, who had been indicted in Miami for narcotics trafficking, the US felt that Avril assisted US drug control efforts and was therefore valuable. The US evidently helped Avril with some logistical or intelligence advice during the attempted coup in April 1989.

Nonetheless, the US resumed its policy of pressuring for free elections. Until Ambassador Adams’ 1990 arrival, the US Embassy wanted to give President Avril the benefit of the doubt that it had also misguidedly offered to General Namphy and the CNG government before the 1987 elections. Adams understood that a former Duvalier financial adviser could become unalterably violent as well as corrupt.

Cutting foreign aid is the other policy available to foreign governments. After the 1987 election massacres, the nearly universal aid cutoffs produced an immediate budget deficit equal to two-thirds of revenues. The gap has only been partly closed, and the Bank has had to print money causing some inflation, though not to Latin American levels. Since the army is apparently willing to continue without foreign aid if necessary, its use as a US policy modifying device is limited. It is hoped that the military cannot endure indefinitely without foreign assistance. The consequent suffering does not suffice and may only strengthen the army’s will
to resist. Without US aid to balance the budget, the army may be bound to confront some dispossessed soldiers in the not too distant future—unless he actually does relinquish power to the next courageous and hapless civilian President.

CONCLUSIONS

The cycle of periodic violence against civilian organizing or protesting, followed by assassination, incarceration, torture and starvation has continued since the 1987 elections. Initial optimism proved ephemeral as each of the four leaders exposed their true agendas, or at least those of the army which they could not or did not restrain in a remotely civilized manner. There probably were attempts at reform by civilian President Leslie Manigat and military President Prosper Avril. However, genuine reform proved unsuccessful because the FAH was incapable of tolerating the development of human rights. No matter how many purges, relocations and exiles of the most degenerate officers occur, there are too many other officers who blossom to take their place.

Barring an unforeseeable change in attitudes and values, there would only be three ways for the FAH to change for the better: an evolution in military norms and expectations because gradual economic development replaces traditional systemic corruption; a revolution eliminating the military; or an election held under foreign monitoring and peacekeeping for several years after the campaign ended. The latter was attempted by the US in 1915, and after 19 years failed. Revolutions have been attempted in many countries, with debatable results, but in any case appear unlikely without an armed opposition tolerated since Charlemagne Peralte was betrayed to a US assassin. The only solution is for Haiti’s economy to start improving, a remedy which appears least likely of the three scenarios, though ironically the proliferation of contraband has been the most beneficial impact on the economy, eliminating the nonsensical restrictions on imports and reducing consumer prices and increased choices, for those with any funds. Unfortunately, the
military has been most involved in contraband trade, making it
difficult to liberate foreign trade with Haitians generally.

The improbable chances that UN peacekeeping forces and
electoral monitoring units can bring law enforcement to Haiti even
during elections casts doubt on the value of the process. Even if
successful, elections bring no probability of establishing legal
order afterwards. Yet, without elections, there is no hope that
eventually, the enlightened might be able to enact laws that could
begin to combat Haiti's brand of corrupt feudalism.

Elections remain the only option for those who eschew extreme
political methods or goals. Assuming an election were held under
not disastrous conditions, the first order of business after the
election would be for the new president, under UN protection, to
begin disarming the Macoutes. If the implicit alliance between
6,000 armed men in uniform and roughly the even larger number of
armed, civilian Macoutes were ended, the former might no longer
continue holding the country hostage.

Dupuy is certainly correct that elections are no panacea for
Haiti's problems. Those most in favor of the electoral line are the
so-called political class, consisting of a few politicians and
their small number of followers. Haitians generally favored
elections prior to 1987 by demonstrating for the independence of
the CEP and other political rights. Demonstrations since then had
largely been directed toward isolated economic issues such as
gasoline prices, which only affect the middle class. Suddenly, with
the arrests of three civilian leaders in Nov. 1989, the renaissance
of social movements began. What course it takes, in the face of
inevitable military repression, remains to be seen.

The poorest country in the Hemisphere now has an intolerable
crime wave, known generally as "insecurity" that matches the
decades of Duvalier terror against perceived political enemies and
ordinary citizens. With great bitterness, some staunch opponents of
the Duvaliers candidly told me in the summer of 1989 that life had
been better under Baby Doc. One could stay out at night then, even
if one did not have much to spend.

Haiti remains the largely despondent, illiterate, but friendly
country in which the US hopes to plant the seed of democracy in
elections in 1990. Haitians are in the habit of being disappointed,
so much so that few are optimistic about elections. The litany of
presidents in Haiti's 186 years of independence is staggering, and
it is difficult to think in terms of democratic stability there, no
matter how prevalent its prospects elsewhere in world.

The elections in 1990, if they do take place, will be more
closely controlled by electoral authorities, and the FAH will be
under greater pressure to behave. Fearful skepticism nonetheless is
justified because of the uncontrolled terrorists inside both the
army and civil society. They are bound to protect the traditional
system of corruption.

Unfortunately, in much of Haitian history, a second electoral
round simply did not occur whenever the military decided that an
appropriate candidate was still in contention. The much-maligned
CEP, mistrusted by all for its $4000 monthly salaries, may be
taking the kinds of careful steps to increase the chance that
Haiti's majority will elect the kind of civilian President that
they want. It is paradoxically this democratic prospect that makes
everyone nervous because, deep down, they all know that it makes
the old guard army nervous too. Since its 1804 independence, a
nervous army has almost always proven fatal. Perhaps, the younger
generation, in the context of the post-1989 world and the presence
of multilateral miracle workers, may just prove, like Nicaragua,
that years of agony may take a breather.
Comments

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When Alix Cantave, the president of the Association, conceived of something which would eventually lead to the creation of this conference last year, he was concerned that we try to bring together people who studied Haiti, not simply for the purpose of studying Haiti, but so that Haiti could become a better place. Cantave hoped that aggressive change in Haiti could be looked at in an association and by large groups of people sympathetic to, and interested in, Haiti. At this second conference, and during this first panel, the two speakers are focusing directly on issues which Cantave hoped almost two years ago that we would begin to discuss. It is a tribute to him that we are here, and doing what he hoped, we would do.

Our two speakers have been, I think, comparatively optimistic about Haitian elections, and it’s in that spirit that I think we should analyze the optimism and look at some of the issues concerned with the political aspects of an election in Haiti in 1990.

The first condition, and possibly the most important condition of having a fair election in Haiti, is the belief by people taking part in the election that there will be a second election. Too often first elections lead to either to no result, or to a military interference, or to something as in 1958 to a rapid a gathering-in of the spoils.

The zero sum approach to political life has been apparent in Haiti for a good century, probably a century and a half. The issue is whether, in the 1990s, Haitians-- and you are all part of that collective--can break the iron vice of Haitian political reality.
The auguries are good, as the first speaker has indicated. There seems to have been a qualitative change in the last six months. It is not coincidental, of course, that events occurring during the last six months have taken place within the context of the most important revolutions in political thought the world has seen arguably since either 1917, or more likely 1830 and before. If there can be elections in Bulgaria, and Rumania, presumably there can be elections in Haiti. That is one way of looking at the situation. Another way of looking at it is that Haiti has been down this road many times before. But are conditions different? Do we have a changed political culture?

Many of us have argued for some time that change in political culture would come with the modernization of Haitian politics, and most of you are a part of that process. We have come to believe, since the 1960s, that the outpouring of Haitians and the involvement of Haitians in the rest of the world, and the return to Haiti of Haitians should make a qualitative as well as a quantitative change. The question is: has that happened? We hoped for that before Manigat, and it did not occur. We hope for that now.

The first speaker said that elections are the only way out for Haiti. That's true, but they are only a way out, and they are the only road to change, if the election results in a using of the results of the election for the benefit of all of Haiti. Until very recently, and perhaps until now, the elections in Haiti have been elections for control of the major cities or the capital only. In Papa Doc's period, and to a lesser extent subsequently, there was no government (and I would say that as an oversimplification) in the countryside. The government was of the city, especially because governments of Haiti have been extractive. I think the comparisons, from a political science point of view, are with Zaire and with the predatory state. Is Haiti still a predatory state? I think many of us would say, yes, that the 1990s will mark a major change, and that the pessimism of the past --the zero sum mentality-- has been
altered. But can we prove that? The elections may be successful; the result of the election may be more of the same.

I think there is a hope among those who are passionate about Haiti that the 4 1/2 years of stagnation that have been discussed would have persuaded everyone that there must be the kinds of changed attitudes that have swept Eastern Europe. And that is why I have put less credence in the OAS and the United Nations, because it is not really the conduct of the election, but what happens when the government is elected, and how it is composed. It is significant to note that one of the panelists at this conference was in the cabinet. It is important that friends of the Association are involved. But we have seen our friends and colleagues swept out of power very rapidly on more than one occasion. So I think that we must be cautious.

A technical point or two and then a conclusion. There will be, I think, a role for outside observers to indicate the fairness, or the lack of fairness of the elections. I think it was very important for the Rumanian and Bulgarian peoples, for voters in Nicaragua and elsewhere, to have outside observers. And the same is true for Haiti so long as they have a legitimacy within Haiti so that the results are regarded as credible there.

The U.N., in fact, did not run the elections in Namibia; South Africa ran the elections. South Africa was the implementing power. The U.N. was there to watch very closely. That was part of the bargain of the transition, and whether South Africa would have run the elections in Namibia fairly or not without the U.N. is a moot point. The fact is that it wanted to get out; it ran the elections fairly, and ran. Everything worked well.

It seems to me less important who runs the elections than that they be perceived as not perpetuating a zero sum mentality. Then there can be hope that there can be a second election down the
road. Once elections result in an alternation of the spoils, as in other places in the Caribbean, then we can finally develop a faith in a new political culture, and a belief that it works for Haiti to have alternating sources of power, a division of the spoils among several groups or many groups, and then a development of government for all the people, not just for the elites or the city folk. Participation is the crucial issue.

One final point. Neither speaker addressed the problem of political development in the rural areas. If the contending groups debate the issues throughout Haiti, that's important, particularly if they develop political followings in all parts of Haiti, not just in the cities. The process of broadening political culture is going to be crucial to the future of Haiti. So we look forward to that, and we look forward, in the remaining time, to your questions to the two panelists, and their discussion back and forth.
HAITIAN CREOLE
LANGUAGE POLITICS IN HAITI

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The term language planning seems to have become the standard one used by many linguists to refer to the creation and implementation of an official policy about how the languages and linguistic varieties of a country are to be used (Crystal 1987). However, following Marlis Hellinger (1986), I prefer to use the term language politics, especially in reference to a developing country such as Haiti, where politics govern practically every aspect of life. Language politics designates the social, political and class problems related to official policies adopted by governmental institutions regarding linguistic structures and use of a language variety.

Strictly speaking, in Haiti’s history there has never been an official policy set up by an administration in order to create and implement conscious language development measures. There have been writing systems developed by individuals (McConnell-Laubach, Pressoir) and taken up by government agencies in the course of literacy campaigns. Since 1980, Haitian Creole has even been equipped with a standard official writing system, however, the activities of traditional language development (codification, selection of a particular variety of Haitian Creole, modernization, implementation) were never initiated by Haitian governmental agencies. To explain the absence of an institutional framework, we need to take a brief look at the language question in the country.

For years after the Independence in 1804, the utilization of French as the standard language of Haiti was never questioned. French was accepted willfully as the language of education, justice, religion, and politics. It was only during the American Occupation (1915-1934) that French became legally the official
language of the country with the enactment of the 1926 Constitution. In fact, throughout the entire history of Haiti, the situation of French as an active language has evolved very little. The number of native Haitian speakers fluent in French has always been extremely low (perhaps between 2 and 5%). At the same time, all native Haitian speakers were completely proficient in Creole. The knowledge of French was one of the prerequisites for social advancement, and guaranteed prestige and social status. In Haitian society, where unemployment has been chronic, persons of low socio-economic status came to perceive acquisition of French as indispensable and strived to master it. Despite some remarkable individual successes, the failure to do so has been almost general.

On the other hand, the reproduction of French among the members of the socio-economic elite has continued smoothly. The relationship between social class and language became clear to any observer of the Haitian speech community. Despite the fact that all native Haitian speakers do use Creole in their day-to-day activities, that language became generally associated with low education, poor socio-economic status and a certain lack of sophistication.

The 1979 education reform, which permitted the utilization of Creole in education, was not welcomed by some monolingual Creole speakers, most of whom were from the poorest sectors of the population. According to Devonish (1988), these monolingual Creole speakers perceived the reform as another ploy to keep them in their places, and to restrict their access to social mobility. In reality, the introduction of Creole into formal education in Haiti has activated the language question in Haitian society and permitted progress toward language development.

In 1980, for the first time in Haiti's history, the Haitian government gave official recognition to a spelling system -- the one that was introduced a year before by the Institut Pédagogique
National (IPN). With that decision, the long debate about the proper orthography for Haitian Creole was finally over. Today, the official spelling system is adopted by almost every individual or organization publishing materials in Creole.

Official recognition of the IPN writing system was a major accomplishment and prepared the way for more pertinent decisions related to politics and education. In 1987 a new Constitution, ratified by an overwhelming majority of Haitians, recognized Creole as one of the two official languages of Haiti, the other one being French. Although Creole has been granted official status, the different political administrations that ruled the country after the fall of the Duvalier dynasty have not implemented that decision. Written Creole has not entirely penetrated some decisive avenues of communication in Haitian society, such as advertising, road signs, street signs, and so forth. Several prestigious schools have been reticent to use Creole in classrooms; moreover, there is no daily paper publishing totally in Creole, although Bon Nouvel, a Creole monthly magazine, has been in existence since 1966 and has a circulation of at least 25,000.

THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE PLANNING IN HAITI

The development of languages in society is a highly political process. Generally, the activities of language planning are carried out by government agencies, official committees, and sometimes language academies. The interests of the different bodies involved in these activities may conflict with the very interests of parts of the population. The establishment of a standard language in most countries is the history of the triumph of one language variety over another. For example, in France, the Ile-de-France dialect adopted by the Parisian bourgeoisie eliminated all the other competing regional varieties and became the standard variety spoken throughout the country.
Language planning activities must receive government support to have a fair chance of succeeding. It is rare that individual scholars can permanently influence languages. For instance, in the late 1970s in Haiti, government support aided in the standardization of the writing system recommended by the Institut Pédagogique National (IPN). In reference to English-lexicon Creoles of the Commonwealth Caribbean (but it applies certainly to the French-lexicon Creoles also), Hubert Devonish writes: "The promotion of Creole is a deeply political task, involving as it does the promotion and defense of the language rights of the Creole-speaking mass of the population" (Devonish 1986:44). In practice, how do agencies or institutions carry out the activities of language planning? And how can we ensure that governments promote and defend the language rights of the Creole-speaking mass of the population?

The field of language planning is relatively recent in language studies. According to David Crystal, it dates only from the 1960s; in the interim, however, a rather extensive literature has developed on the subject. The most well-known linguists who have written on language planning (Ferguson 1971; Fasold 1984; Fishman 1968; Haugen 1966) appeared to share a consensus on the dimensions of the planning process. Following these linguists, we can identify at least three of these dimensions:

1) standardization
2) modernization
3) implementation

We shall analyze the politics of language in Haiti in light of these traditional dimensions of language development. It is understood that some aspects of these dimensions have never been carried out in Haiti or may be in the process of being carried out; however, we shall examine the prospects for such a program dependent upon the Haitian government's willingness to adopt some or all of these approaches.
STANDARDIZATION IN HAITI

Most sociolinguists refer to standardization as the process of a particular dialect cutting across other regional or social dialects to become the accepted language variety and the official norm among the entire speech community.

Language standardization seems to be a universal phenomenon that has affected many languages in the past and continues its course today. Some languages, such as English or French that have been in existence for centuries, have developed their standard variety through a long process that has been termed relatively "natural" by some linguists (Trudgill 1982). In reality, in most cases, standard varieties have been modeled on the speech of educated and socially dominant classes.

In the case of the Creole languages in general, which are "relatively" young languages, government intervention is practically inevitable because of the pressures, the conflicts and the controversies that may arise within the speech community. Since January 1980, there has been a writing standardization in Haiti. It occurred when the writing system proposed by the Institut Pédagogique National in 1979 was adopted by the government which decided to allow the use of Creole as a medium of instruction. The history of the Haitian Creole standard writing system is indicative of the future role that the Haitian government can play in establishing a successful language policy in Haiti.

In 1944, when the Irish Methodist Minister Ormonde McConnell and the American educator Frank Laubach introduced for the first time in Haiti a spelling system based on international phonetics, the Haitian bilingual elite strongly expressed its disapproval. They associated the notations devised by McConnell and Laubach with English notations, maybe because the two authors were Anglo-Saxons, and Haiti, for almost 20 years, had been occupied and humiliated by Americans. But more importantly, the Haitian bilingual elite wanted
to preserve the French origins of Creole lexical items and believed that the orthography devised by McConnell and Laubach was too far from the conventions of French spelling. Consequently, in 1951, a Haitian journalist named Charles-Fernand Pressoir devised a somewhat modified version of the McConnell-Laubach orthography closer in his view to French spelling conventions. For example, the nasal sound [E] noted as â by McConnell-Laubach was replaced by Pressoir with in, like the French vin, fin, brin. For about 25 years, the Pressoir orthography was used by Haitian writers, religious organizations and government literacy agencies, and became somewhat semi-official.

However, in the late 1970s, the Institut Pédagogique National (IPN) introduced a new spelling system, which is in fact a slightly modified version of the Pressoir orthography. Later, the Haitian government granted official status to that spelling system. Since then, the official orthography has been widely accepted and used by almost all sectors of Haitian society.

Standardization cannot, however, be limited to the writing system alone. Other aspects of a language, such as grammar, vocabulary, and pronunciation must also be informed by the process of standardization. In the Haitian speech community, the official and accepted norm that exists for the writing system does not have its equivalent in other fundamental components of the Creole language, such as its pronunciation, its grammar or its vocabulary. Can the government in Haiti provide legislation that would require people to use Creole in one way instead of another?

There are two factors that must be considered: Firstly, people tend to conform more easily to instructions directed at the level of written language; they are much less inclined to do so when standardization involves a spoken form. Potentially, it could be very difficult for Haitian speakers to change their usage of Creole in their day-to-day activities; it is less problematic to write for
example *bwa* instead of *boua*, or *pye* instead of *pie*. Secondly, one must consider the question of variation in Creole. Although rare, most studies of linguistic variation in Creole (Valdman 1984; Etienne 1974) reveal that the language is not particularly affected by regional or social variation. But, it is generally admitted that there are three principal, geographical dialect areas: North, Central and South. Each of these regions seems to have some specific local features largely used by the majority of the speakers who live there. For example, at the lexical level, there are dialect variants that can surely identify the geographical origin of a speaker. Someone who says for example: *Ake* instead of *avek* (with); *Kinamm* instead of *pa’m*; *disèl* instead of *sèl* (salt); *tayo* instead of *malanga*; *bilga* instead of *ble* (wheat); *amizman* instead of *pistach* (peanut) will be rapidly identified as coming from Cape-Haitian.

Valdman (1984) made an excellent point when he suggested that *pe*, the progressive aspect mark among many residents of the southern region, may not only signal the speaker’s geographical provenance, but may also reveal other variables in relation to his education, his socio-economic level, and his rural origin.

There is a tendency among students of Creole analyzing the sociolinguistic situation of Haiti to oppose an urban variety, specifically the so-called Port-au-Prince variety to a rural variety. Addressing that very issue, Valdman contends that:

> In Haiti language planners, that is to say those individuals who have striven to endow Creole with a stable written form, rapidly came to an agreement on the variety of the vernacular that should be reduced to writing. A consensus rapidly formed around the central (Port-au-Prince) variety... (Valdman 1984:88).

Is there really a Port-au-Prince dialect, clearly identifiable, that could constitute the standardized written form of Creole? I
have to be very reserved on that question. Firstly, the Port-auPrince area is not at all homogeneous. We find there people who come from all regions of Haiti and who have recently migrated to the capital city. Secondly, there is a high degree of illiteracy, thus a lack of uniformity in the production of speech, and no special vocabulary that could identify a speaker's origins.

In most modern societies where a standard form has triumphed over competing varieties, the resulting uniformity was the consequence of either the spread of education or the influence of the spoken media (radio or television) sometimes both. The so-called Port-au-Prince dialect does not benefit from such influences. There may be some tendency to follow the pronunciation of people who are perceived as representing a higher socio-economic standing: for example, more front rounded vowels, more postvocalic "r," but one should be careful not to conclude that these are distinct marks of a Port-au-Prince dialect. Individual speakers do not always, in every situational context, realize the linguistic variants that might symbolize to them a superior socio-economic standing. Most of the time, in their day-to-day interactions with their peers, they make use of verbal exchanges that are free of those phonological differences mentioned above.

MODERNIZATION

Chiefly, there are two dimensions in the process of modernization: the expansion of the vocabulary and the development of new styles and forms of discourse. Both aspects are crucial in any politics of language development in Haiti. For years, the vocabulary of Haitian Creole has served the strict needs of an oral society where learning was practiced mainly by listening, memorizing, repeating words or acts. Interactions among people within the country were limited to small groups -- very inward-looking and largely unfamiliar with writing. In these conditions, the resource-base of Creole vocabulary has not been considerable (only a few thousand words and expressions). Now that Creole has
penetrated domains which were previously reserved for French and is being used more in writing by large sectors of the Haitian population, the vocabulary of that new expression needs to be expanded. New realities and foreign material have been introduced into traditional Haitian society, and they must be identified. In order to name them, language planners can use either loan words or the characteristics of word formation in Creole. French, the traditional source language for Creole in terms of lexical expansion, has been seriously challenged in the last fifty or sixty years by new English technical terminology coming from the United States. However, since the fall of the Duvaliers in 1986, new political vocabulary directly borrowed from the French political scene has been largely used in the Haitian speech community. Words like magouille (graft), dérapage (skid), bavure, brigades de violence (vigilantes), seem now to be part of Creole vocabulary.

Like the adoption of the standard writing system, the modernization of Creole in Haiti will require an institutional framework. Official agencies need to be created by the Haitian government to prepare glossaries, new terms for school materials, specialized vocabulary in a serious and devoted manner. Works created by individuals without the support of the government, however useful they may be, will arouse suspicion and create controversy.

More than lexical expansion, the development of new forms of discourse for Creole constitutes the central point of any efficient plan of modernization. The forms of discourse characteristic of Creole correspond to the needs not of a primitive society, but of an oral society where communication is not impersonal and refers most often to concrete matters. The domains where Creole is more and more used now no longer rely on references to a particular person or to concrete objects. Consequently, new styles of discourse have to be elaborated. These styles must respect the syntactic structures of the Creole language and reject the tendency
to translate from French. Once again, it is the duty of government institutions to engage in serious work that can provide the necessary modifications.

IMPLEMENTATION

The last stage of a successful language planning process is implementation. Taking serious steps to implement language planning decisions may reveal how interested the Haitian government is in establishing a new status for Creole. What can they do and how can they do it?

They can start with radical changes in the way Creole is to be used in schools. The government can recommend that it be taught in schools both as a subject and as a medium of instruction. The first aspect -- teaching Creole as a subject -- is crucial in helping to alter the diminished status of Creole in the minds of vast numbers of Haitians, both monolingual and bilingual speakers. Nothing would benefit all classes of Haitians more than formal study of the structures of Creole, the codification of the pronunciation, the standard spellings, for example.

As the status of Creole in the classroom is raised to a higher state, the government should use Creole as a medium of written communication for all its official publications, in law courts, in the print and broadcast media, in pamphlets, etc. Also, the government should require mastery of the standard writing system as a prerequisite for civil service employment. This stipulation would encourage certain segments among bilinguals or semi-bilinguals to take the study of Creole seriously. Remember that in a country of chronic unemployment, the State is the most sizable employer. To carry out all these planning decisions, the government should rely on a variety of agencies and committees composed of people with backgrounds in linguistics. Such measures would likely dissipate the resistance to Creole in most formal situations.
A fundamental question to be asked is the following: what kind of government can carry out these activities in Haiti? It goes without saying that none of the post-Duvalier administrations could be expected to develop such a program. The promotion and defense of Creole is a highly political agenda, and only a government firmly determined to struggle against social and economic injustice can create and implement successfully a new language policy in Haiti. For decades, the Haitian speech community has been seriously damaged by language inequality which is one aspect of the social and economic injustice in the society in general. A full development of Creole and the implementation of an effective language policy will not instantly change negative attitudes toward the Creole language nor reverse economic and social inequalities in Haiti. However, if accompanied by profound and positive social transformations, a new language policy based on a commitment to the elevation of the status of Creole can bring real change in Haiti, not only in the minds of people but also in their daily interactions.
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CREOLE HAITIEN ET LANGAGE

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(The following presentation was delivered in Haitian Creole during the 2nd Annual Haitian Studies Association Conference)

Du point de vue de son extension, de sa diffusion et de sa fonction dans l'espace socio-culturel haïtien, le créole s'est imposé comme la langue prédominante, la langue essentielle du peuple haïtien, son principal véhicule de communication quotidienne.

Nous n'allons pas nous attarder à spéculer sur les origines du créole, vu que la diversité des opinions et la pluralité des thèses n'ont jamais contribué à résoudre tout fait ce problème. Toutefois, nous avons choisi de mentionner brièvement deux approches théoriques absolument différentes. D'abord, celle de Jules Faine qui fait du créole "une langue néo-romane issue de la langue d'oïl, en passant par les anciens dialectes normand, picard, angevin, poitevin, et composé en outre de mots emprunté à l'anglais, à l'espagnol, et dans une faible mesure à des idiomes africains".¹ Puis, vient la thèse de Suzanne Comhaire-Sylvain qui a plutôt insisté sur l'importance des bases africaines du Créole.²

Sans entrer dans des considérations de nature polémique, nous reconnaissons avec le Docteur Pradel Pompilus que le créole haïtien est une langue mixte avec une vocabulaire français à 80% et une morpho-syntaxe à dominance africaine. Évidemment, compte tenu du fait historique que l'espace haïtien a été pendant longtemps une creuset fabuleux où se sont brassé différents éléments ethniques et linguistiques, le créole haïtien comporte de nombreuses traces et influences de l'anglais, de l'espagnol, du portugais, et des survivances lexicales des langues indo-américaines.

La pratique de la langue créole en Haïti remonte, selon
certains chercheurs, au 17ème siècle où elle a joué, dans le contexte colonial de l’époque, rôle d’instrument de communication entre les maîtres blancs et les esclaves noirs venus d’Afrique. À ce stades, nous sommes en présence d’un parler créole plus ou moins primaire axé sur des structures simplificatrices, et reductrices en fonction même d’un discours élémentaire dont l’efficacité pragmatique exigait l’élimination des parties non essentielles au fonctionnement de la communication immédiate. Le créole a ainsi fonctionné pendant tout le 17ème siècle et durant la première moitié du 18ème siècle.

Mais, à partir de la seconde moitié du 18ème siècle, un phénomène important a marqué considérablement l’évolution du créole à Saint-Domingue: l’arrivée de plus en plus massive des bosses, c’est-à-dire des nègres fraîchement venus d’Afrique. En vue d’accroître la production des denrées coloniales (café, canne à sucre, coton, cacao), les colons propriétaires ont augmenté non seulement l’étendue de leurs terres, mais encore et surtout le nombre de leurs esclaves. Or, les esclaves, venus de différentes souches ethniques, culturelles et linguistiques, pouvait difficilement communiquer entre eux par le biais de leurs dialectes respectifs. Le créole embryonnaire s’est donc offert tout naturellement comme la seule plate-forme de communication linguistique à un double point de vue: 1) entre maître et esclaves; 2) entre les esclaves eux-mêmes.

Avec d’une part l’intensification de la Traite Négrière, entraînant ainsi une extraordinaire poussée démographique des masses serviles, et d’autre part la pratique du culte vaudou, le créole s’est développé, s’est enrichi progressivement pour devenir à Saint-Domingue un important lieu de rapprochement idéologique des groupements noirs, à la veille de 1789. À cette époque, la colonie de Saint-Domingue, du fait de sa prospérité légendaire, constituait un terrain d’affrontements pour les puissances colonialistes et bouillonnait tel un volcan tant les contradictions sociales étaient

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profondes et irritantes. À ce niveau, le créole et le vaudou ont joué un concept de liberté des noirs qui devait plus tard déboucher sur le projet d'indépendance. La langue créole et la religion vaudou ont facilité à ce moment là la diffusion des messages et des mots d'ordre revolutionnaires au sein des communautés noires qui travaillaient dans les plantations et les ateliers. Il est extrêmement intéressant de noter qu'à l'extérieur même du créole s'est développé ce qu'on appelle chez nous en Haïti le "langay" dont la traduction française "langage" rend imparfaitement la nature et le sens d'un tel phénomène linguistique. Le "langay" n'est ni du jargon, ni de l'argot. Il remplit, à l'intérieur de l'espace créole, une double fonction:

1) Une fonction subversive basée sur l'ambiguïté et la redondance baroque. Le "langay" créole apparaît alors comme une forme de marronage culturel et politique, face à un système répressif qui n'a jamais disparu en Haïti. Pendant la période coloniale, les masses serviles ont subi la violence inhumaine des blancs esclavagistes. Après 1804, la machine répressive a simplement changé de conducteur. Les gouvernements haïtiens, noirs ou mulâtres, ont continué les pratiques de domination et d'écrasement des masses urbaines et rurales, en instituant et en consolidant une longue tradition de tyrannie meurtrière, aliénante, obscurantiste, anti-populaire, anti-nationale. Face à un tel système politique, les masses populaires, marginalisées tant du point de vue économique que du point de vue social, ont aménagé leur propre espace culturel, un espace de marronnage où la langue créole charrie de manière sourde et voilée toutes leurs protestations, leurs refus et leur colère masquée.

2) Une fonction d'équilibre basée sur la spontanéité et l'automatisme du langage créole. Et cela traduit tout un mode de fonctionnement surréaliste dans le système de pensée du peuple haïtien. De nombreux aspects de notre vie, de notre existence quotidienne, de notre histoire, de notre religion, de notre vision
du monde, de notre sensibilité, de nos manières d’agir et de réagir relèvent de plus pur surréalisme. Nous avons été des surréalistes bien avant l’ocident. La catharsis, le défolement psychanalytique, l’automatisme, le libre jeu des images surréalistes, la dynamique des pulsions creatrices, ce sont des notions inhérentes au mode de fonctionnement de la sensibilité haïtienne. Le créole haïtien, ainsi que l’art haïtien et tout le système culturel du peuple haïtien offrent une dimension profondément surréaliste. Et nous comprenons aujourd’hui tout le sens du regard qu’un André Breton a porté sur notre pays. Nous comprenons aussi les réflexions de Malraux sur la richesse de l’art haïtien. Nous haïtiens, nous évoluons dans un imaginaire débridé, dans un onirisme sans frontières. Pour nous, le rêve et la réalité, la vie et la mort, la lune et le soleil, le visible et l’invisible se forment qu’une seule et même dimension. Et nous vivons en permanence en étroite communion avec l’âme des morts et l’esprit des dieux.

La culture haïtienne, dans son essence, est fondamentalement une culture androgyne qui participait du mariage fabuleux de l’eau et du feu. Dans l’inconscient collectif, haïtien, l’imagination se présente comme un vaste champ de liberté, un espace inaliénable, une mémoire fabulatrice contre l’invivable. Le rêve présuppose alors la liberté de l’esprit qui est la vraie liberté, car l’imaginaire est ce qui tend à devenir réel.

Le merveilleux vaudou, le rituel vaudou et la sensibilité vaudou ont profondément marqué la genèse et l’évolution du créole haïtien, non seulement du point de vue morphologique mais encore du point de vue de la formation des images. La richesse métaphorique du créole est infinite.

Vous me permettez maintenant, en guise d’illustration, d’aborder quelques aspects pratiques du créole haïtien en ce qui concerne la formation de certains mots et expressions, ainsi que la
formation des images à caractère surréaliste. Je m’excuse à l’avance auprès de tous ceux-là qui ne parlent pas le créole et qui de ce fait auraient des difficultés à bien comprendre cette partie de l’exposé.

Nous noterons tout d’abord l’aptitude et la souplesse de la matrice populaire à absorber, à créoliser les entités linguistiques étrangères. Nous noterons aussi la saveur des images et expressions créoles formées par agglutination.

**Exemples**

**Bennderzwèl** = coq dont les plumes de cou et de la queue ont été enlevées pour le rendre plus apte au combat dans les arènes. Cette désignation provient du mot espagnol vénézuélia qui est le pays d’origine de cette pratique.

**Lamanyann** = boisson alcoolique que l’on a l’habitude de prendre au réveil, la mañana (le matin).

**Maryanman** = C’est le grand amour. À la fois mari et amant.

**Anpichmiding** = en cachette, à la dérobée, de manière furtive. Pinch my thing.

**Zoboukechen** = (zo=os; bouke=fatiguer; chen=chien) = irrécupérable, incorrigible, tel un os dur qui fatiguait et découragerait même un chien.

**Chenmanjechen** = atroce, horrible. Un conflit "chenmanjechen" est un conflit où domine l’individualisme forcé, chacun pour soi.

**Tatezoflando** = personnage légendaire réputé pour sa férocité. Il battait chaque jour sa malheureuse épouse. Personne ne connaissait son vrai nom, même pas son épouse. Il maltraitait sa pauvre femme, jusqu’au jour où celle-ci lui révéla qu’il s’appelait
"Tatezoflando". Alors, il éclata comme une bombe et son corps déchiqueté disparut dans les airs. Le mot Tatezoflando renvoie à une symbolique des sons: Tâtez les os des flancs et du dos. Démarche consistant à sonder avec patience les mystères de la vie jusqu'à la découverte de la vérité.

**Tatemiwèzo** = Personnage réputé pour sa patience à décrypter les éléments enchevêtres de la réalité. Tâtez les murs jusqu'à en voir les os, c'est partir à la découverte des grands secrets dans l'exploration des profondeurs ténébreuses.

**Jamèdodo** = Noctambule. Ce mot désigne surtout les prostituées qui ne dorment pas la nuit, à cause de la pratique nocturne de leur profession.

**Grennvant** = La graine du ventre pour désigner le col de l'utérus. Vantmennen = Diarrhée, c'est-à-dire que tes boyaux, tes intestins te mènent, et te conduisent souvent aux cabinets d'aisance.

**Djesèlmevwa** = Masturbation. Ce mot traduit la solitude de l'acte masturbatoire, car seul Dieu en est témoin.

**Pyepoudre** = qui aime flâner, qui aime errer ça et là. C'est un aventurier aux pieds recouverts de la poussière des chemins parcourus.

**Masisi** = Homosexuel masculin; mot qui vient de l'anglais; my sissy (ma toute douce, ma poule chérie). Le mot qui désigne la lesbienne est: madivin (ma divine) ou madivinèz.

**Wayalèfòs** = mot désignant un sandwich local constitué d'une cassave contenant du beurre d'arachide et du pickliz et réputé pour sa consistance. C'est un mets de résistance qui rappelle l'efficience et les prouesses de la Royal Air Force au cours de la seconde guerre mondiale.
Un autre phénomène important à signaler est ce que l'on appelle les glissements phonétiques progressifs. Phénomène que l'on rencontre dans plusieurs langues et en ce qui nous concerne, dans la formation de certains mots créoles.

**Exemples**

Tifi-fisèl = fille pucelle, fille vierge, Le mot ficelle traduirait les dimensions exiguës de l'orifice vaginal.

Timinè-pwèlpis = Jeune homme inexpérimenté en amour (mineur aux poils de puce, c'est-à-dire avec le duvet au visage, sous les aisselles et au pubis.

Otopèdi = Salle d'orthopédie à l'Hôpital où l'on retrouve le plus souvent les malheureuses victimes des accidents de la circulation, par la faute de certaines automobiles dont le mécanisme des freins aurait été défaillant. De toute façon, de l'avis du peuple, ce sont des autos perdues, c'est-à-dire égarées et folles.

Kannal-ofelen = C'est un canal de drainage des eaux de pluie construit à Port-au-Prince dans un quartier populaire. La construction de ce canal en 1944 a été rendue possible grâce à la générosité du millionnaire américain Rockefeller. D'où la dénomination initiale de canal Rockefeller. Par glissements successifs, le canal Rockefeller est devenu "kannal Ofelen" du fait même que les eaux du canal, en période de pluie, emportaient hommes et femmes et faisaient ainsi de nombreux orphelins dans la zone.

Donnons maintenant, avant de terminer l'exposé, quelques exemples d'images surréalistes, tout en rappelant que le meilleur exemple de langage surréaliste est celui du vaudouisant qui, en pleine crise de possession, est capable de vomir spontanément un texte dont les qualités littéraires et le fonctionnement automatique n'auraient rien à envier aux œuvres des plus grands écrivains surréalistes.
Exemples

Otopsi tonmat merilan = C’est l’autopsie des tomates pourries, qui se révèle une opération extrêmement difficile et périlleuse.

Rale trip foumi lan blakawout = C’est tirer les intestins des fourmis dans l’obscurité; ce qui est extrêmement difficile et même impossible.

Figi ou pôtre youn alfabè lan bounda mò dimanch maten = Ton visage ressemble à un alphabet sous les fesses d’un mort, un dimanche matin. (Si vous me demandez ce que cela signifie, je vous répondrai tout simplement que je ne sais pas).

Marasa jouke chwal
marasa monte bwa.
Anpil nywaj vire lanvè
lan wonn lago totalito.
Flonn lavalas bouyi desann
ak youn rado dezagreman.
Mwe pran fre youn loray
k’ap pwoche andezo
M’ap rapousywiv lobray zwazo
lan fofigay siyay zèklè

Les loas jumeaux ont enfouché leurs chevaux.
Les loas jumeaux sont juchés jusqu’au plus haut sommet de la terre. Les nuages chavirent dans la métamorphose d’un voyage interminable. Les torrents et les fleuves dérobées emportent tout dans leur colère inapaisable.
Je flaire un orage qui se rapproche entre deux eaux.
Je poursuis l’ombre d’un oiseau dans le sillage sinueux des éclairs.

A mon avis, c’est ce mode de fonctionnement culturel sur la base d’un langage poétique surréaliste qui a permis au peuple haïtien de survivre malgré les répressions et les crimes de toutes sortes dont il est victime. Le marronnage demeure une constante dans le comportement de l’haïtien. Le marronnage peut-être pourrait, sinon disparaître, du moins se modifier, s’atténuer le jour où le peuple haïtien aurait, nous le souhaitons, la gouverne de son propre destin. En attendant, à travers les arcanes de sa culture, il continue inlassablement à remuer la terre et le ciel
jusqu'au saignement des pierres et des lointaines étoiles.

Notes


HAITIAN IMMIGRANTS
VOODOO AND MIGRATION: COSMOLOGY, RITUAL LEADERSHIP AND REMITTANCES IN A TRANSNATIONAL HAITIAN COMMUNITY

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Transnationalism has been defined as the networks, activities and patterns of living that link home and host societies in a single field of social relations and that permit members of communities dispersed across national boundaries to be active participants in one another's lives.¹ This emerging phenomenon has increasingly drawn the attention of students of international migration. Scholars are examining how transnational social, economic, and political networks are developed and sustained by migrants and their home communities as forms of both accommodation and resistance to forces of asymmetrical economic development. The various transnationalist responses of Haitians--both at home and abroad--to these controlling forces, are also becoming the subjects of sustained research.²

This paper explores a transnational ritual network which links Léogane, Haiti to satellite emigrant communities in the Caribbean, the United States, and Canada. I will suggest that certain putatively "traditional" elements of Léogane's ritual system have responded pragmatically to the recent mass exodus of the younger generation. The ancient, ancestral spirits, symbols of unchanging values, currently manage interactions between the emigrants and their families back home and exert their influence upon migration decision-making and investment strategies. Migrants' remittances, which finance ritual expenditures, are reproducing the "traditional" religious system and those who stand to benefit most from it.
HAITIAN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Significant numbers of Haitian workers have been crossing international borders ever since the second decade of this century, when Haiti, along with several other Caribbean "nations," was becoming a periphery of the United States. As consequences of that entangled (and continuing) transformation, Haiti became a net importer of U.S. products and a net exporter of people destined primarily for the center--the United States. Today, American food surpluses account for more than half of Haiti's imports. Meanwhile, at least one out of every six Haitians lives outside the country. Funds remitted by Haitian emigrants, conservatively estimated at $125 million annually three years ago, attest to the unswerving allegiance of those who have left to their home society (Hooper 1987:33).^3

The patterns of outmigration from Léogane echo those of Haiti generally (Allman and Richman 1985). Although by the early nineteen-seventies the desire to leave had affected all social strata, the ability to emigrate was limited to the better-off families who could afford the costs of securing visas and buying plane tickets. The flow of out-migration over the next decade to such places as Guadeloupe, Martinique, Montreal, and New York would probably have continued at the same rate were it not for the discovery that it was possible not only to sail from Haiti to Miami, but also to be allowed to stay and work there. Once emigration by sea became an option, young people left en masse in their own 15 foot sailboats. Between 1977 and 1981, as many as seventy-five thousand Haitians debarked in South Florida (Stepick and Portes 1986:2) and the Western Department, of which Léogane is a part, was the second most important source of emigration (Buchanan 1981:86). My survey in the Léogane community in 1983, revealed that three out of every four households (among 124) had at least one close member (parent, child, spouse, or sibling) living abroad. More than two thirds of the total emigrant population left for Miami between 1978 and 1981.^4
Measures carried out by the Reagan administration beginning in 1981--interdictions at sea and deportations--effectively curtailed the flow of Haitian "boat people." Congress' 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act granted residency to the vast majority of this population, most of whom have since returned to Haiti for visits. They have also begun to take advantage of provisions for the immigration of family members in the new law.

Having provided an all too condensed picture of the patterns of migration among this community, I will now briefly explore features of Haitian cosmology, ritual, and kinship that will figure in our discussion of the relationship between religion and migration.

TRANSCATIONAL LINKAGES BETWEEN IMMIGRANT AND HOME COMMUNITIES

Because the majority of this migrant community reside in Florida, when someone speaks of "over there" (lòtbò), the listener knows that the unmarked term means "Mayami" (anywhere Florida). Despite their geographical distance, "here" (isit) and "over there" function as a single--but not unified--"transnational" community (c.f., Sutton and Chaney 1987). The gods and the ritual specialists, as we shall see presently, play crucial roles in perpetuating transnational ties between the two locations. Other factors include:

1. People from the village tend to remain together in the U.S. and to form conjugal ties with fellow Haitians;

2. Messengers of the migration travel regularly between these Florida cities and Haitian villages, carrying money, gifts, and news (typically on cassette tapes) (Richman 1987);

3. Migrants repatriate their savings; fully three fourths of the home community depends upon remittances;
(4) Migrants send funds to finance the construction of homes;
(5) Migrants return for visits and they establish conjugal unions with local spouses (who will remain there at least for the short term);
(6) Many of these emigrants have carried out or will engage in what has been termed "cyclical," "circular" or "recurrent" migration (Rubenstein 1982a:11); and
(7) Emigrants sponsor the voyages of other family members, whose, strategies and decision-making, in turn, are guided by a transnational orientation.

COSMOLOGY, LAND AND KINSHIP

The key figures of the spiritual world of the Haitian are anthropomorphic gods, or lwa. The lwa can be seen as exaggerated symbols of human personalities, in all of their contradictions (c.f., Brown 1987). People say that they can be jealous and "mischievous" (malfezan). They can work against one another as when Agwe, Master of the Sea, "gives you fish" (ba ou pwason), and then his wife, Ezili, steals them from your lines. On the other hand, it is said that the lwa can protect you and give you "strength" (kouray, fôs) to work. They can "stand with" (kanpe avèk) you and also "guaranty" (garanti) whatever wealth or property you have.

The way Haitians talk about their relationship to the lwa is through the idiom of "service". When Haitians say that they "serve the gods" (sèvi lwa-yo), they imply, above all, offering food. Although rituals also involve spirit possession, prayers (many of which are from the Catholic liturgy), song, drumming, dance, and processionals, feeding is the encompassing metaphor (Richman 1978). Feeding is a symbolic means of control. People can direct the forces of well-fed lwa to do good, but "hungry" or undisciplined gods are said to be able to "hold" or "grab" (kenbe) people, causing them harm. To "release" the victims, families perform
rituals which are aptly classed as "feedings of the gods" (manje lwa) and "services for the gods" (sevis lwa). Performance of these ritual feasts requires knowledge of the ancient traditions taught by the African ancestors and passed down through the generations (and access to this expertise is changing, as we shall see presently).

The costs of sponsoring these public occasions, of course, increase along with the expectation of "serving" the lwa, the dead and the living with generosity and good taste. This value is best communicated by copious offerings of imported foods and beverages served in fine china and cut glass to satisfy the increasingly sophisticated transnational appetites of the ancient "African" gods (lwa Ginèn). These rituals necessitate the cooperation of kinsmen in huge expenditures of time and, above all, money, and migrants' remittances have become the exclusive source for these funds.

Since they often cannot personally attend the services, they participate indirectly by listening to cassette tapes of the rituals. On these tapes the emigrants hear not only the sounds of the performance itself--drumming, singing, prayers, and chatter--but also the voices of narrators describing what the listener cannot see: the flow of possessions, offerings, sacrifices, prayers, conversations, etc. (The anthropologist was by no means the only one tape-recording the ceremonies. I am told that since my departure, video cameras are being used to record rituals.)

In Léogane, and in peasant Haiti generally, kinship, land tenure and religion constitute one another. This mutually reinforcing and substantializing web of relationships is symbolized by the term eritaj. Very briefly, an eritaj is a bilateral descent group which includes anyone who is descended from the "first owner of the estate" (prenmye mèt bitasyon) and, since most of these peasant lands were settled before the turn of the century, fully half of the active membership is deceased. Members of the eritaj
not only inherit the family land, but, according to the same principles of bilaterality and partible inheritance, they also inherit the African lwa served by the first owner and all of the ancestors. At the beginning of each "African" ritual on the family land, the descent group meticulously recites the entire genealogy of the spirits and the ancestors who belong to the eritaj.

This genealogy provides the framework upon which hangs the well-being of (putatively) every member of the descent group. Typically, when a member falls sick, it is divined that the offending spiritual agent is a lwa who is inherited through such and such line of descent. When one emigrant woman fell seriously ill, for example, a ritual specialist back home divined that a god on her mother's father's "side" (read: eritaj) was "holding" (kenbe) her. This lwa (a zando) belonged to a maternal ancestor of five ascending generations. It was no accident that a member of the youngest generation was the victim. Gods control parents by afflicting their children. When a parent neglects to feed a hungry lwa, the latter typically retaliates by "holding" a child, while leaving the parent unharmed. A father or mother might take risks with his or her own health, endlessly delaying payment of a "debt" (dët). But a parent will go all lengths to protect a child, and will lose no time in performing the offerings required to release the child from the grip of a lwa.

Everyone in the descent group inherits the entire complement of family lwa and each member is said to be "loved" by a particular god. By no means everyone accepts this intimate relationship, however, precisely because it is a relationship, which, like any other, is affected by status, personality, and competing relationships. As among any community, there is a wide range of belief, varying from self-described "fanatics of the lwa" (fanatik lwa), to such people as evangelical Protestants who publicly renounce "serving the lwa," to individuals who refuse to acknowledge the existence of the lwa altogether. Non-believers do
not threaten the allegiance of those who serve; indeed the
diversity among the "society" of lwa validates the heterodoxy among
people.

**LWA AND MIGRATION: A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION**

Although they stand as symbols of immutable African tradition, the lwa have shown that they can be most adaptable to change. (We will turn presently to how the ritual leaders are involved in managing this contradiction to their own benefit.) The lwa have thus made themselves indispensable to the migration experience. With so many members of the community now living "over there," the lwa are busier than ever, attending to their "children." In the words of one lwa, Ezili Dantò: "Every three days I am in Miami...I have to keep watch over everything that goes on." (Tou le twa jou m Mayami. Fò m veye tout sa k pase.) "Miami is where the cocoon is" (Se Mayami koko-a ye), said Ezili Dantò, distinguishing south Florida from other host communities of North America and the Caribbean that she also frequents. Like all of the spirits, whose movements are said to be like the wind, Ezili Dantò can instantly traverse these international boundaries.

The series of events which leads to intervention on the part a lwa follows a fairly typical scenario. The episode often begins when the migrant sends a letter (or cassette tape) with news of an illness, a failure to find employment, an accident or a troublesome dream--the crisis is usually poly-symptomatic. (By the time the family receives the message, the person has probably attempted to find relief from western or Haitian "folk" medical remedies.) After receiving the news, the family usually goes to the shrine on their inherited land, where the ritual specialist (gangan), "calls the lwa" (rele lwa). The lwa, speaking through the gangan, divines the cause of the affliction and what the family can do to remove it.
The gangan usually gives one of the following explanations. The victim may be under the "hold" of a lwa or (an agent of) a sorcerer. If the offending spirit is a lwa, a family member, usually a parent, lights a candle, and asks for temporary relief until payment of the "debt." They send word to the migrant and, after however long it takes for the person to raise the funds, months or even years, they sponsor a public ritual feeding on the family land. If the source of the affliction is sorcery, the family deals privately with a gangan. We will return to this second type of treatment below. There is a third kind of explanation: the affliction has nothing to do with either the gods or nefarious magic. Gangan occasionally attribute cause to something beyond their control, temporarily forfeiting revenue, while promoting their long-term credibility among clients.  

KINSHIP, LWA AND MIGRATION

When parents perform a "ritual feeding of the gods" on behalf of an absent child, they fulfill their present obligations to the lwa and release their child to be productive again. By demonstrating their generosity as genial hosts of the entire eritaj--lwa, ancestors and descendants alike, the parents also create what Gregory (1982) has termed "gift debt," and increase thereby their social capital among relatives and neighbors. A person's social rank is ultimately confirmed at death, and with children in the land of opportunity, parents can expect a prestigious funeral at which no expense is spared, followed by burial in an elaborate multi-chambered tomb that is more costly than the home of the deceased (c.f., Murray 1980:315).

Relationships with the lwa also reinforce the kinship norm of giving to your capacity. Migrants are seen as the kinsmen with the "biggest wrists" (ponyèt), and are expected to contribute accordingly to the family's obligations, ritual and secular alike. Parents may resort to petitioning a lwa to intervene by "holding"
a recalcitrant migrant who can, but will not, take responsibility for his or her increased burden."

Because emigrating members of the eritaj remain susceptible to the activity of the lwa, they are dependent upon their families back home (as well as the gangan) to carry out ritual obligations required to maintain their health and continued productivity. I would suggest that by acting as the managers, in effect, of their emigrant children's well-being, parents insure their own social and economic reproduction. By keeping their children dependent upon them, they keep them from getting lost "over there," from forgetting their family and from forming competing relationships with "strangers." They also guaranty that the emigrants' wages keep flowing back to them.

**GANGAN AND MIGRATION**

The other party concerned with the negotiation of migrants' relationships with the gods is the professional, the gangan. Léogane's gangan have been involved in virtually every stage of the migration process, from the departure itself, and their "businesses" are prospering. Gangan specialize in manipulating the wills of human beings, and when a client needs a visa, for example, their magic can influence a foreign consul to act in that person's favor. Once the migrant settles in the host country, the gangan can also help him or her obtain legal residency. Until passage of the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, virtually the entire population of Haitian boat people carried the tenuous non-immigrant "entrant" status, and some of these migrants solicited the services of the gangan to help them obtain resident immigrant status.

I have described how gangan function as intermediaries between dispersed members of the descent group and their inherited lwa, first by divining the source of affliction and later by conducting a public "feeding" or "service" for the lwa on the inherited land.
The services of the gangan also involve personal and private magic on behalf of migrants, indeed, as one gangan admitted to me, "the money comes in more clearly" (lajan-an rantre pi kle) when he performs this kind of "work." As the migrants' productivity increases, so does their patronage of the gangan, because they are likely to become targets of sorcery sent by envious competitors, and they will need the gangan's help in healing, protection and, perhaps, taking revenge. Migrants also share their success with the gangan by bringing them foreign clients who pay foreign rates for their services. By the time of my research in Léogane, it was no longer remarkable to see a foreigner patronizing a local gangan.

**ANALYSIS**

The gangan's new role of mediating transnational relationships between people and their lwa both results from and reinforces processes of religious transformation occurring in Léogane and elsewhere in Haiti, namely, the professionalization of ritual leadership and the increasing emphasis on heavy ritual expenditures (Murray 1980 and Smucker 1982). Based on the oral testimony of the oldest members of the community, it appears that before about the nineteen thirties, most persons were thought to have inherited most of the "knowledge" they needed to communicate with the spirits, and the lwa, in turn, made themselves accessible through dreams and through possessions of family members. There were ritual specialists, but, like most persons, they relied on inherited spirits to instruct them in healing and magical work. Then a few professional gangan rose to prominence whose authority was based upon a new source of power.

As Murray (1980:300) has described for the nearby Cul de Sac, this power derived from a lengthy and expensive initiation ritual under the guidance of a well-established gangan ason. During the rite of passage, the initiate "took the ason" (pran ason), the sacred gourd rattle and bell used to "call the lwa" (rele lwa). The professional gangan ason incorporated formalized performance roles associated with urban shrines and they introduced new rituals that
were nevertheless classified and perceived as unchanging "authentic African" (fran Ginèn) traditions. The increasingly elaborate "services for the lwa" required the participation of initiated "servitors" (hounsi) along with drummers, singing, flag bearing, processionalists, animal sacrifice, and copious offerings of costly imported foods and drinks.

Although the gangan ason's power was something purchased, it was substantialized by reference to kinship ties to the descent group, the inherited land and the lwa. An inherited lwa, for example, was said to demand that a man "take the ason." As the oracular function of possession declined, calling the lwa with the ason (to speak in a govi) came to be deemed necessary for any interaction with an inherited lwa (Murray 1980:300). The gangan ason thus positioned themselves as managers of the shrines for all of the large eritaj. Having become indispensable to the relations between the lwa, and members of the descent group, no matter how far afield, the gangan were well situated to prosper from the "new migration" (Bryce-Laporte 1983) of the last two decades to the United States.

CONCLUSION

Murray (1980:316-317) has argued that "the functions of the cult...appear to have varied over time, adapting themselves to the specific problems of a given generation of practitioners" and he has suggested that there has been a shift toward a "resource-circulating function" in response to a rural economy on the verge of collapse. Today, the ritual system plays an active role in the circulation of what has become Léogane's only viable economic resource: labor. Ritual innovations provide new meanings for the decline of the internal economy, the increased dependence upon imported products, and the continued exportation of labor. The lwa, the very symbols of peasant tradition, the gangan ason who monopolize communication with them, and the families of emigrants
have collaborated to insure the continued flows of people, money, and products back home.
NOTES

Acknowledgements This paper is part of a larger study of how Haitians in both home and host communities construct and perceive the experience of migration. For the past eight years, I have followed a group of Haitians who, between 1979 and 1981, sailed from their village of Léogâne to South Florida. During 1983 and 1984, I lived with, studied—and was studied by—families in their home community of Léogâne. I am grateful to the Inter-American Foundation and Organization of American States for sponsoring my field research in Haiti. An earlier version of this article was presented to the 88th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C., November, 1989. I thank Gerry Murray and Nina Glick-Schiller for their comments.

1. This definition of transnationalism is from Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Blanc-Szanton (in press). A similar conception, that of a "transnational socio-cultural system," is put forward in Sutton (1987:20).


3. The value of Haiti's imports is twice that of exports (Dupuy 1989:183). Haiti's rural decline during the nineteen seventies alone can be seen in the rise of food imports from $10.7 million in 1970, to $62.1 million in 1976. The value of food imports in 1987, according to a USAID report, was at $89 million (cited in Hooper 1987:33).

4. During my field research, I was impressed by how many people resided in the village simply because they had failed to complete the voyage to the U.S. Many of those who successfully emigrated made more than one attempt to leave. Some were arrested before they embarked; others sailed their boats back home after getting lost at sea; still others arrived by mistake in the Bahamas. The fates of the latter group varied. Some were arrested and promptly returned to Haiti; some remained; still others managed to secure passage to Miami. Because of the limited opportunities for employment in Bahamas, those who remained there have been unable to help their families back home (See Marshall 1981).

Finally, there were individuals who reached Florida after the Reagan administration's new policy was put into effect, had languished in detention centers for up to nine months, and, believing that they had little chance of release, chose repatriation. They could not have foreseen the judgement by Justice Spellman in 1982 ordering the administration to release the detainees.
5. See Larose's (1975) analysis of religious tradition and change in Léogane and Murray's (1980 and 1984) studies of theology and ritual change in Cul de Sac. My own discussion, of course, owes much to their important contributions.

6. Although the Haitian custom of partible inheritance has rendered the family land too small to support even a fraction of its inheritors, the eritaj concept remains potent. According to Lowenthal (1987), the lwa, rather than the land, motivate allegiance to the eritaj. Indeed the eritaj only assembles as a corporate group on the inherited land for the purpose of carrying out services for the lwa. See Lowenthal for a comprehensive and insightful analysis of this "single most important sociosymbolic construct of Haitian peasant culture" (1987:194).

7. The type of illness varies with the category of god. Such chronic, debilitating, but non-lethal, problems as headaches, weakness, weight loss, fever would be attributed to the "cool" and "foreign" spirits (lwa blan), for example, Ezili Freda and Danbala. Seizures, and life-threatening afflictions are caused by "hot" spirits including Ti Jean and Marinèt and Simbi.

8. Each member is said to be "loved" (renmen) by a particular god and this choice is said to depend as much upon your "heart" as upon the personality of the lwa. The character of the lwa complements that of the person in complex and subtle ways (c.f., Ravenscroft 1965 and Brown 1987). These special relationships are passed down from generation to generation within the descent group. After the individual dies, the lwa may eventually "claim" another heir, but one or more generations may pass before the lwa claims another member and reveals him or herself through possession. Until that point, the lwa is in effect lost to the eritaj. The prolonged absence of a migrant who is the "horse" for an inherited lwa is also a source of regret to the eritaj because the lwa cannot appear "in person" until the migrant returns home.

9. The ritual leader is at once priest, shaman, healer and diviner. Men are called gangan. The term hounan, common elsewhere in Haiti, is most often cited in the literature. A female ritual specialist is called manbo. I use the masculine term in this text because in the community I studied all of the ritual leaders were male. Exploring the reasons for this masculine emphasis goes beyond the scope of this discussion.

10. On one occasion during my fieldwork in Léogane, for example, a family received word that their emigrant daughter and her husband of one week had been injured in a car accident. They went to their shrine, the gangan summoned the family lwa, and one of the lwa said that the accident was "nothing," i.e., it was not caused by a lwa
or a sorcerer. They left the shrine, relieved that "nothing" would interfere with their daughter's recuperation.

11. A commonly uttered expression, which carries these expectations, is the phrase "doing for the family" (literally, "sending to do for the family") (voye fè pou fanmi-a). Migrants are quite explicitly ranked according to who has "already done" and who has "not yet done" for their family.

12. This activity is called "work" (travay), in the sense of wage-labor. The "worker" is thought to be the lwa who possesses the gangan. The lwa typically negotiates the terms of the contract with the client and the parties may agree to defer all but a token amount of the payment until the magic yields positive results. Clients who fail to meet the terms of this contract, of course, pay dearly. To "work" this magic, the gangan typically manipulates spirits of the dead (zonbi) and a special category of purchased spirit (pwen).

13. Among the "new" ritual forms were expensive and time-consuming rites of passage, including mortuary rites ("sending" and "retrieving the dead from the water" (voye/wete mò nan dlo)) and the initiation of women (kanzo).

14. Murray (1980), who conducted research in the nearby Cul de Sac, found that the sale of land financed these heavy ritual expenditures. He argued that because buyers and sellers were of the same economic stratum, this religious innovation indirectly resolved the peasants' problem of access to land.
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EDUCATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND RURAL MOBILIZATION
HAITI'S EMERGING PEASANT MOVEMENT

Robert E. Maguire
Inter-American Foundation
Rosslyn, Virginia

"Depuis toujours, le paysan a été 'bourik k'ap travay pou chwal galonnen'; il a toujours été considéré comme une sorte de 'zonbi', qui n'a jamais le droit de lever la tête, qui n'a jamais droit à la parole." Chavannes Jean-Baptiste

MULES, HORSES, AND A PEASANTRY IN CRISIS

In Haitian Creole the proverb bourik travay pou chwal galonnen, or the mule works for the benefit of the horse, has been used for generations by small farmers and agricultural laborers to sum up their plight. Before independence in 1804 from French colonial rule, slaves of African descent toiled in fields of sugarcane and in forests of coffee to make Saint-Domingue's French masters among the wealthiest of any eighteenth-century European colonial rulers. Following independence, the peasantry that emerged to dominate the nation's agricultural economy served a new elite, the urban merchant and political classes. Although the peasantry "did the work and furnished almost all the country's wealth" the rulers and merchants developed intricate methods, largely excessive taxation and processes of uneven commodity exchange, to siphon off the riches produced in the countryside and accumulate them in their coffers (Trouillot 1990: 84-86).

Views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Inter-American Foundation, whose support he wishes to acknowledge.
Haitian peasants have coined an expression for this unceasing extraction of the fruits of their labors over the past 185 years: *pesé-sousé*. In English it means squeeze and suck. Much as a locally-produced popsicle that comes in a plastic tube and bears this name is eaten by squeezing from the bottom while sucking from the top, Haitian peasants have come to view their abject poverty as a result of an historical process where they have been squeezed and sucked through the transfer of their surplus into primary and secondary urban centers and, eventually one could argue, beyond Haiti's shores (Maguire 1987). The resultant crisis of uneven development and impoverishment of the poorest in the hemisphere's most impoverished nation has been widely documented. Suffice it to cite here two statistics: the annual average income of Haiti's rural poor has been estimated at less than $130, whereas approximately one percent of the country's population garners roughly half its annual income.²

Yet, despite of its poverty and increasing off the land migration, the Haitian peasantry has somehow survived, composing an estimated three-quarters to two-thirds of Haiti's population (CEGET 1985). The size and social resilience of that peasantry remain "important aspects of the uniqueness of Haiti as an American nation" (Trouillot 1990: 229). Indeed, as Trouillot writes in his important recent work on Haiti, any possible solution to the Haitian crisis of uneven development and poverty:

must face the peasant question. It must find its roots in the resources of that peasantry, the very same resources that have contributed to the fortunes of thousands of
Haitians and foreigners during a century and a half of unbridled exploitation (229).

At least to some extent, Trouillot's plea has already been heard. For several decades a plethora of international, governmental, and private organizations with mandates to promote economic development have made the Haitian peasantry the target of their interventions. Beginning in 1946, a "parade of acronyms" descended upon the country to seek solutions to its economic crises (Trouillot 1990: 140). By the mid 1970s, the parade had turned into a carnival of over 150 agencies, making Haiti a "veritable gallery of the forms of rural development activities" (Girault 1977: 4).

Given all this attention and corresponding resource expenditure, one would imagine that the plight of Haiti's poorest citizens would have improved. In fact, however, the opposite has occurred, as pesé-sousé has continued unabated and the peasant economy has continued to decline with today's production only equal to that of 1843 (Trouillot 1990: 84). If anything, external interventions have simply resulted in the mules working a little harder for the benefit of the horses. The aforementioned statistics attest to the ineffectiveness of international, state, and private agencies endeavoring to lead the Haitian peasantry out of crisis.

In a recent paper, a geographer, Lakshman Yapa, has effectively argued that what he calls the First and Second Systems, or formal institutions of political power (states and international agencies; corporations and banks, respectively), have failed generally to alleviate conditions of third world poverty. Indeed, his analysis points to these formal institutions as largely responsible for current crises of uneven development. A Third System, which "represents the politics of social movements where members strive to reach certain objectives through a process of their own empowerment," is posited as a clear alternative for constructing a new eco-political economy to begin to overcome causes of entrenched poverty (Yapa 1989: 26).
Also recognizing the failure of formal institutions in Haiti, Michel Rolph-Trouillot calls for the creation of "institutional channels through which all sectors within the peasantry can participate in a political debate from which they have been too long excluded." This, he continues, will require "that intellectuals, politicians, and planners--foreign and Haitian alike--talk less about (and "for") the peasantry and begin listening more attentively to what its diverse sub-groups have said in the past and have to say now about their own future" (Trouillot 1990: 230).

THE EMERGING THIRD SYSTEM

As this paper outlines below, the Haitian peasantry is not waiting for the First and Second Systems to initiate processes of reform. Rather, it is moving forward on its own, taking steps to confront causes of persistent poverty. In this, Haitians are not alone. One observer estimates that an expanding global "latticework" of grassroots organizations can count "hundreds of millions" of the poor who have already mobilized to confront causes of their impoverishment (Durning 1989A: 6-7).

In his aforementioned treatment of this issue Yapa characterized emerging Third System social movements as:

... organized around specific subjects, hav(ing) substantive goals, and territorially based. They do not seek to capture state power through revolutions nor are they driven by a desire to create utopian societies starting on a clean slate. They seek revolutionary changes in those areas of life that engage them, but the form of the struggle is specific, routine, every day, and organized. This provides some assurance that the initiative for social change will remain with the people who are directly affected by change (or lack of it), and it reduces the likelihood of a technocratic elite or a revolutionary vanguard directing a movement (26).

Another student of global grassroots social movements, Alen Durning, cites them as "generally pragmatic; they tend to operate more as political pressure groups than as an ideological vanguard. Their goals are economic opportunity, wise resource management, and
a voice in policy debate" (Durning: 1989B: 81-82). As evidence of their increasing importance as players in local and national political economies, grassroots movements throughout the world have become the focus of a growing body of literature as academics and experts seek to understand them. Little has been written about Haiti's emerging peasant movement. Durning, however, has identified Haiti as one of a handful of countries where the scale of grassroots organizing is such that the groups have assumed an increasing, national political importance (Durning 1989B: 80). An overview of the evolution of peasant movements in Haiti will both confirm this conclusion and enable us to place Haiti's emerging peasant movements within the general framework of global Third Systems outlined above.

HAITI'S EMERGING THIRD SYSTEM

I have written above that Haitian peasants have come to view their abject poverty as part of an historical process of extraction and accumulation, i.e., pesé-sousé. The action verb in this sentence has been used deliberately. It implies that Haitian grassroots mobilization has been an evolutionary process.

We have already touched upon Trouillot's recent characterization of Haiti's prevalent system of surplus extraction as one organized such that "wealth could be pumped out of the peasantry without the urbanites ever coming into contact, or even seeing, them. The nation met its masters only through intermediaries, and only at points of exchange" (Trouillot 1990: 81). As a result of this arrangement, he elaborates,

...the peasantry never directly confronted the system's ultimate beneficiaries - the top state officeholders and, above all, the merchant bourgeoisie. Hence, even though the peasants might have wondered about the causes of their poverty, they knew few individuals on whom to place the blame. Indeed, they were more likely to accuse a fellow villager of worsening their lives than an exporter or an official they had never met (1990: 86).
By the 1970s, however, primarily through the work of indigenous Catholic clergy and laymen, Haitian peasants began to be exposed first to analyses that helped them understand the structural causes of their poverty, and then to programs encouraging them to do something to address them. Influenced by the Freirian concept of conscientization, encouraged by the 1968 conference of Catholic Bishops in Medellin that reoriented the church's social mission toward the poor, and working under the premise that social and economic change could come from the bottom-up, these church-linked catalysts of change developed innovative programs for training grassroots leaders, or, in Haitian, animatè. Their working hypothesis was that these agents for change could catalyze the formation of local grassroots groups that would serve as structures for change initiated from below (Maguire 1981).

Among several leadership training programs launched in the 1970s, two have been particularly instrumental in helping to train the human resources needed to work in their communities and to organize family, friends, and neighbors into action groups. The Institut Diocésain d'Education des Adultes (IDEA) in the Cap Haitien area and the Centre Emmaus at Papaye in the Central Plateau developed leadership training programs that counted the participation of natural leaders from villages throughout these two important regions of the country. Later both training centers expanded to accept participants from locales beyond their immediate geographic purview.

The impact of these programs in stimulating today's peasant movement in Haiti cannot be overestimated. Over a 14 year period beginning in 1973, IDEA has trained approximately 500 animatè who, in turn, have catalyzed the creation of some 1,500 small development groups, or, gwoupman, located primarily in Haiti's North and Northeast departments. Today, the Institute works directly with the grassroots leadership of these now-established
groups to help strengthen them and to stimulate the creation of associations and federations of groups for more effective mobilization of human and material resources. Concurrently, IDEA continues programs to help create new, community-based grassroots groups.

The Centre Emmaus has been equally active in training community grassroots leaders, having worked with individuals from throughout the country who are also stimulating the creation of thousands of grassroots groups. Results of the Centre Emmaus' work will be explored further in the next section.

In general, IDEA and the Centre Emmaus have been guided by the following premise: bottom-up development can come only when people at the base have access to information to analyze and understand their situation in the society and economy, and are organized to be able to take steps to improve their situation both economically and socially and to protect their interests against external forces limiting change. Operationalized, this has resulted in a process approach to social mobilization and grassroots change based on formation, organization, and implementation or action (Maguire 1984).

This approach is based on the belief that:

to achieve and sustain goals of social and economic development, funders, promoters, and the poor, alike, must seek change along a continuum that commences with formation, or the development of leadership and knowledge capacities among the poor through interventions of non-formal education. Following involvement in non-formal education programs, based, in large part on a Freirian, conscientization and self-actualization approach, community development promoters, or animatè, catalyze the organization of community groups capable of beginning to confront problems of uneven development. These local organizations then provide the institutional framework and local capacity for planning, managing, and implementing specific, concrete program activities. This step along the continuum embraces both the implementation of development programs by the poor and investment in them by funders (Maguire 1989B: 18).
Given the aforementioned tendencies of the rural poor not to understand the root cause of their poverty, but rather to identify local manifestations of the problem as its cause, the work toward creating a network of grassroots groups evolving into an emerging social change movement has been tedious in Haiti, as it has been around the world (Durning 1989A: 18-19). Not only has what Haitians call a chen manje chen, or dog eat dog mentality of suspicion and distrust kept the poor from working together to solve mutual problems, but an overall environment of paternalism and of fear and violence perpetuated by the authoritarian, predatory Haitian state has presented overwhelming obstacles to those working for change.5

In this negative atmosphere --dominated by the enforcement of the omnipotent squeeze-suck system by all levels of state authority as a means of control and enrichment-- grassroots organizing work prior to the 1986 fall of the Duvalier dictatorship focused almost exclusively on education and social formation to create and then strengthen nascent peasant groups. The formation and strengthening of gwoupman has been a tedious process, taking years in many cases as groups came together and broke apart and reformed a bit stronger. Because of the high-risk atmosphere for independent grassroots organizing that dominated the Duvalier period, many groups adapted a strategy of mawonaj (marronage), where they were loosely organized to facilitate the necessity of rapidly blending in with the woodwork to protect themselves from violence and repression. When local conditions permitted, the mawonaj gwoupman would again raise their profiles ever so slightly and attempt to move forward to consolidate themselves.

Following the landmark events of late 1985 and early 1986, when some weaknesses in the continued maintenance of the surplus extraction system began to appear, established grassroots groups wasted little time to abandon mawonaj and surge forward, initiating action programs designed to confront - and resolve - fundamental problems that keep them poor (Maguire 1986). One common initiative
undertaken by groups has been the launching of small farmer programs of food grain storage and marketing aimed at breaking a cycle of poverty through increased control over harvests beyond the farm gate (Maguire 1989A). Concurrent with these initiatives of established groups, numerous new grassroots groups have been emerging and are reaching the point where they, also, are launching action programs.

Given the emergent nature of Haiti's peasant movement it is not, to date, a national movement, per se, but rather an amalgam of local groups, regional groups, and associations or federations of groups. It is practically impossible, therefore, to quantify the extent to which the peasantry is currently mobilized. Tables One and Two, which present information on grassroots groups known personally by the author, demonstrate two important points that support the contention that Haiti's peasant movement is still in its early stages. First, many of the groups are relatively young, having been founded in the mid-1980s. Indeed, 11 of the 21 groups on Table One were established between 1985 and 1987.

Second, data indicate that many organizations are either local groups or clusters of groups that are not effectively associated or federated either regionally or nationally. The crude scale that accompanies the tables, and was developed to provide some indication of differentiating levels of organization shows that 18 of the 21 groups fall into these categories. Few of Haiti's grassroots organizations have a regional character, although, as the next section indicates, there is growth in that direction.

The fact that the loosely defined 'movement' is becoming omnipresent in Haiti is also demonstrated by data in the tables. Merely the fact that one small grassroots development funding agency (the Inter-American Foundation) is supporting or considering support of the 21 separate local and regional grassroots membership
TABLE I

GRASSROOTS GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEMBERS</th>
<th>FOUNDING DATE</th>
<th>TYPE OF ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL PLATEAU</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Association of groups</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHEAST</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Association of groups</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>600</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Association of groups</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTIBONITE</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Community organization</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Association of groups</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Association of groups</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHWEST</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Group</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Association of groups</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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TOTAL: 41,075
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<th>LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION*</th>
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<td>22</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:**
The various levels of organization are:

1 - Local group
2 - Local association of groups
3 - Federation of local associations
4 - Regional association of local federations
5 - Regional cooperative
6 - Extra-regional association, federation, or cooperative
groups shown on Table One, with a combined total of approximately 41,000 people provides some idea of the magnitude of grassroots organizing in Haiti. This one funding organization also has some link with the six associations of community development workers, totaling some 325 animatè, shown on Table Two. These associations of development catalysts are playing an important role in stimulating the building of associations and federations of grassroots groups. To support a point made above, it should be noted that 237 of these grassroots leaders received their formation at the Centre Emmaus and the remaining 85 were trained by IDEA.

In addition to these contacts, through its funding of the work of IDEA, that single funder indirectly provides support to a network of approximately 1,500 peasant groups, with a total membership of approximately 20,000 people. The grand total of some 61,000 individuals who are direct participants in the grassroots development groups known to one funding agency represents approximately one percent of Haiti's population. When considered that often an individual's enumerated membership in a group includes others in his or her immediate family, plus the fact that there are other funding agencies, such as Oxfam (U.K.) and Cebemo (Netherlands) that also have vibrant programs of direct support to groups and associations of the rural poor, a clearer idea of the impressive magnitude of Haiti's emerging peasant movement comes into view.

To put some flesh on this skeletal outline of Haiti's emerging peasant movement, we now turn to a broad examination of one of its largest, dynamic components.

ORGANIZASYON OUBYEN LANMO: THE PAPAYE PEASANT MOVEMENT (MPP)

In a political economy that siphons off so much from the peasantry that it has forced the majority into abject poverty, the motto of the Papaye Peasant Movement (MPP)-
organization or death -- reflects "the grim reality for millions of Haitian peasants who face only that choice and who are learning from the lesson of MPP that there is hope for survival in working together" (Korb 1989: 5). Certainly, that reality confronts the MPP's 12,000 members, who are primarily farmers seeking out a living based on animal husbandry and the harvests of corn, sorghum, beans, and cassava on farms of four acres or less near the settlements of Papaye and Los Palis in Haiti's Central Plateau. That reality is also faced by the estimated 60,000 members of an additional 4,000 grassroots groups in and around the plateau who are loosely linked with the movement.

Although the MPP has become known beyond the plateau only in recent years, it did not suddenly appear in its current configuration. Rather, it has evolved gradually, from 1970 when the parish priest sponsored a modest program in leadership training and community organization for a handful of small farmers near Papaye, which is about four kilometers from the departmental capital, Hinche. That initiative expanded in 1973 to cover the entire Hinche diocese when a grassroots leadership training program was inaugurated at the aforementioned Centre Emmaus, a heretofore religious retreat center run by Caritas for the Bishop of Hinche. In 1973, the first peasant gwoupman in the Plateau, at Papaye, was formed. Before long, the Centre Emmaus' leadership training program had inspired the formation of the small groups of 10 to 15 that compose today's movement.

By the mid-1980s, the process of building a human infrastructure throughout the plateau for bottom-up, participatory community development had reached the point where a mechanism for coordination and unification became a logical next step. Hence, the Papaye Peasant Movement came into being as an umbrella to cover and unify the growing number of groups
affiliated with this blossoming peasant movement, including a cooperative with 3,500 members.

In recent years, the MPP has developed ties with grassroots groups beyond the Central Plateau catalyzed into existence by animate trained at the Centre Emmaus. As such, the movement has become a lead voice speaking out on issues effecting the country's rural poor. The MPP's national profile was fortified in 1987 when it sponsored Haiti's first national congress of peasant groups. Approximately 1,700 men and women, representing some 600 grassroots groups from throughout the country, traveled to Papaye to participate in the congress.

In today's context of sudden and often chaotic political change in Haiti, the objectives and characteristics of grassroots mobilizations, especially when they are called gwoupman or mouvman, have been widely misunderstood, particularly by foreigners and urban elites who, as we have seen, are isolated from the peasantry. Further, grassroots organizations like the MPP have often been misrepresented by those of the previously mentioned First and Second Systems who are seeking to protect their interests within the current order of extraction and control. In short, pronouncements and interpretations about grassroots movements made by the traditional community of urban-based experts are often either inaccurate and/or clouded by self-interest. Hence, depending on who you talk to, you can hear the most frightening things about the MPP, including the worn-out allegation that it is a 'communist' movement bent on fomenting change through revolution.

Having evolved from Christian teachings stressing non-violence, justice, and equality, violent change through revolution is far from the movement's goal. Indeed, having been influenced by important international non-violent struggles for justice in this century, including the nearby recent and ongoing
struggle of African Americans for civil rights, the movement's leadership identifies demonstrations, petitions, marches, and press releases, "conforming with the Haitian law," as its primary vehicles for action (Jean-Baptiste 1988).

Durning has identified two differing philosophies, or approaches, as basic to grassroots organizing throughout the world. One is action-centered, which emphasizes production of a tangible product as rapidly as possible. The other concentrates on consciousness-raising to foster awareness of predicaments of poverty and often views adult literacy as a springboard to development (Durning 1989A). Having evolved from the work of the Centre Emmaus, the MPP clearly has its roots in the consciousness raising approach. Indeed, the organization's stated ultimate aims are:

- (To) Defend members under injustices, abuse from all types of authority;
- (To) Fight for authorities to respect the laws of the country;
- (To) Demand state services that never reach the peasantry even though they are the ones who pay the most tax" (Jean-Baptiste: 1988).

These aims are all firmly linked to consciousness-raising to mobilize social energy for change. As evidenced by the fact that one of its current major initiatives is a dynamic program of adult literacy, the MPP continues to be firmly rooted in what is, essentially, a Freirian approach.

Even from the days of the formation of the first peasant groups in the early 1970s, however, the approach to grassroots organizing for change adapted in Haiti's Central Plateau has been a combination of social organizing to change the political economy and action implementation for self-help,
economic change. As part of the overall approach to organizing for social and economic change promoted by the staff of the Centre Emmaus, peasant groups were encouraged to begin group savings funds for investment in small projects. Out of this has evolved a credit union that has thus far mobilized approximately $45,000 of group member's savings. Other tangible economic activities undertaken by groups affiliated with the MPP include honey production for export, cassava processing, and grain storage and marketing. These micro-enterprise activities have received support from external funders and have been largely carried out under the aegis of Kombit Sevo Min Ak Kè Ansamm (KOSMIKA) a cooperative that is now the economic branch of the MPP, but which actually organized and received its legal status prior to the formalization of the movement.

By seeking to defend member's rights, the MPP helps to ensure that small farmers have the political and economic space in which to undertake self-help programs such as those sponsored by KOSMIKA. Given the pesé-sousé system in which Haiti's peasants (including the MPP's members) function, the struggle for change within the local political economy for conditions more favorable to small producers is crucial in combating fundamental causes of persistent poverty. Because constraints in the control over and access to resources for production, transformation, and marketing present an important obstacle to small farmer prosperity, improved access to and control over credit for agricultural activities has been a priority goal for the small farmer members of the MPP since its creation.

Traditionally, when the plateau's small farmers needed agricultural credit, they often had no alternative other than to seek a loan from a private money lender. Given that these loans carry monthly interest rates of at least 20 percent, and
corresponding annual interest rates reaching above 200 percent, the MPP sought a more favorable credit alternative for members.

Precisely because of their poverty the MPP's members have been typically excluded from participation in whatever First and Second System credit institutions exist in Haiti. Given this obstacle, the option that remained was for the small farmers to create their own credit mechanism. Unable to mobilize all the necessary capital among members to establish a revolving credit fund large enough to break the hold of the usurers, KOSMIKA sought, and received, a development assistance grant to augment member's modest savings. The grant of $75,000 for a revolving loan fund from an international funding agency in 1984 was added to KOSMIKA's member's savings. As a result, the cooperative had the capacity of making short-term agricultural loans of up to $150 to group members. Subsequently, the fund was increased by an additional grant of $25,000 (Inter-American Foundation 1984/1987).

As the credit program grew into an increasingly effective mechanism for providing small farmers with an alternative to the high-interest loans of the money lenders, it became the target of attempts at destabilization by not only money lenders, but their allies, including the local military chieftains, who, as it turns out, were often money lenders themselves (Maguire 1989A). At one point, in an effort to destroy the program, local military commanders instructed their troops to spread the word that KOSMIKA's credit money was 'communist' money. Therefore, they announced, anyone respecting its terms, particularly for repayment, would be aiding and abetting communists, the dire enemy of the army. The thinly veiled threat, made in 1987 at a time when Haiti was under the rule of a maniacal military dictatorship, was meant, of course, to frighten peasant group members into not paying their loans and, therefore, to destroy the fund.

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The money-lenders and their allies, however, did not realize the strength and tenacity that the MPP would have in dealing with the attack on KOSMIKA's program. Coming to the defense of the cooperative, the MPP took several key initiatives that ultimately helped to save this important program. First, the elected leadership and the movement's technical staff visited all members of the cooperative to reassure them that the army's allegations were false. Ironically, the source of non-member KOSMIKA credit funds was the Inter-American Foundation, an agency of the United States government!

Second, the founder of the MPP managed to arrange an interview over a local radio station during which he disseminated accurate information about the program and advised those participating in the program to remain calm. Third, the MPP's leadership and allies throughout Haiti mobilized national and international support which put pressure on the military authorities. This continued pressure coupled with the movement's tenacity eventually contributed to the removal from Hinche of several military commanders who were instigating actions against the peasant movement.

Since this incident, the MPP's leaders and group members have been the subject of repeated harassment, intimidation, and arrest. On occasion, its programs have been threatened again either by attempts at destabilization or, in one instance, armed attack. Yet, the organization is managing to survive and face yet further tremendous challenges: adapting skills of social mobilization to economic mobilization, and acquiring new skills in management and administration needed to plan, operate, and sustain micro-enterprises and economic endeavors. Both of these steps must be taken to enable the members of the groups to achieve tangible and sustainable improvements in their household economies.
While a recent study has indicated that the micro-enterprises encompassed by the movement are theoretically profitable and sustainable, it also points to the urgent need of improved management in each case (Geers 1989). Durning has noted that grassroots efforts fail more frequently in the area of economic development than in areas of social development (Durning 1989a). The MPP, like all social movements, and in particular, it seems, those that have evolved from church-linked origins, will have to work very hard to develop the reflex needed for sound micro-enterprise planning and management.

Since the March 1990 ouster of self-proclaimed president Prosper Avril, there is yet another glimmer of hope that positive political change to help to broaden the space in which the Papaye Peasant Movement and its grassroots cohorts undertake their programs can occur. Bitterly disappointed with the setbacks of the past four years since the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier, the MPP has thus far taken a cautious position, stressing that before participatory democracy can become a reality in Haiti, local state officials, particularly section chiefs (chef de section) and magistrates, who are the enforcers of the system of injustice and violence, and who are, for the most part, still wielding power at the local level, must be removed from their positions of power and influence. Once that objective is achieved, the MPP sees itself being able to move forward rapidly in its quest to defend the rights of the poor of the Central Plateau and to help bring about a non-violent resolution of generations-old problems of exploitation and injustice that are an inherent part of a political economy where the mules work only for the horses to get ahead.

FINAL COMMENTS

In the beginning of this essay, two sources were cited to identify important, general characteristics of contemporary, grassroots social change movements. To conclude, I
wish to return to those points and reflect them against the organization used as an example of Haiti's emerging peasant movement. This review will provide us with some indication of the fit of those characteristics on a particular organization that should be considered part of a more global grassroots movement.

Yapa posits that these movements are organized around specific subjects, have substantive goals, and are territorially based. The MPP, with its Central Plateau focus, discreet social and economic programs, and particular programmatic goals, would appear to fit within these parameters. Next, he states that social movements do not seek to capture state power through revolutions, nor are they driven by a desire to create a utopian society. Again, from the description provided above, the MPP appears to fit into the mold. It is neither out to capture state power through revolution nor to create a utopian state. Rather, using concepts of non-violent change through grassroots mobilization, it is out to achieve revolutionary change for its members - if initiatives for credit at honest rates, fair market prices for farmer's produce, and adult literacy can be thus considered. Further, this change is sought through organized, daily, routine struggle, which corresponds to Yapa's next contention.

Finally, Yapa states that an organization thus inclined will help to ensure that the initiative for change will remain with those most directly affected by it, and that this commitment will reduce the likelihood of a technocratic elite or vanguard directing the movement. It is curious that the Papaye Peasant Movement is currently experiencing a complicated internal crisis, in large part due to its own successful growth as a movement. That crisis appears to stem primarily from the need to ensure clear lines of responsibility emanating from the grassroots membership to the movement's technicians and its leadership. The ultimate outcome of this current internal
reordering will certainly have a major impact on the future effectiveness of the MPP as a leading player of what promises to be a growing and coalescing peasant movement in Haiti.

Durning's characterizations of grassroots, self-help movements as pragmatic, pressure groups that seek economic opportunity, wise resource management, and a voice in policy debate also seem to fit the MPP very well. Certainly, as evidenced by the aims of the movement set forth above, it views itself as a pressure group endeavoring to influence certain policies while sponsoring pragmatic programs for its members.

Given the misunderstandings and misrepresentations of the Papaye Peasant Movement alluded to in the text, as well as Trouillot's point that intellectuals, politicians, and planners (foreign and Haitian alike) must begin listening more attentively to what the peasantry has to say about its own future, another of Durning's observations linked to grassroots bears mentioning in this context:

U.S. policymakers need to recognize that grassroots groups have become national political actors in a growing number of countries. In the search for a Third World policy relevant to an increasingly multipolar world, U.S. policymakers must now recognize that community movements have become too powerful to ignore any longer (Durning 1989B: 82).

While the tenor of this paper has been to point to the emergence of a Third System of organization for needed change in the eco-political economy of poverty, I do not wish to suggest that the ultimate answer to the crisis facing the poor - be they the peasantry of Haiti or the disenfranchised and underdeveloped elsewhere - rests solely with the emerging movements of the Third System. There is equal need to continue to push for needed reform of the First and Second Systems among the states and international agencies, and the corporations and banks so that
they better respond to, and address the needs of, the majority of the world's population.

This reform is extremely important in view of the following conclusion, drawn several years ago by a respected student of grassroots development:

Obviously, local organizations and the internal and external resources they mobilize cannot solve the massive problems of rural poverty without effective state action and policies conducive to participatory and equitable rural development. However, the evolution and strengthening of these local organizations can help create a future framework in which State political and economic action aimed to satisfy the basic needs of the rural masses can be more effective (Healy 1982: 40).

Considering that "despite the heartening rise of grassroots action, humanity is losing the struggle for sustainable development" (Durning 1989A: 50), urgent action is needed from all corners not only to support the movements of the Third System, but to push for these needed reforms. The 12,000 members of the MPP, indeed, all the mobilized peasants in Haiti, can only accomplish so much unless certain change also comes from the top.

We live in a world house where, increasingly, actions in one part of the globe cannot be divorced from their impact elsewhere. As Haitian scholars, experts, and otherwise interested and/or committed individuals attempting to understand the nature of poverty, development, and underdevelopment in that country, we have the responsibility to try to put our skills, talents, and resources to work to help alleviate the tremendous burden of human suffering and environmental degradation caused by political economies that have not functioned to serve the majority of Haiti's citizens, let alone the majority of the world's population. We are not being asked, nor are we needed, to control or direct local efforts of change. We are being
challenged, however, to respond to them on their terms and to work in helping to find new and sustainable solutions to age old problems, both locally and globally, that relate to man's inhumanity to man.

NOTES:

1. Cited in Haiti Progrès/31 Août au 6 Septembre, 1988:12 in an article entitled "Barrer la route au train de la mort: Une entrevue avec Jean-Baptiste Chavannes, dirigeant du Mouvement Paysan Papaye." Translated, the passage reads: "Forever, the peasant has been the mule that works so the horse can get ahead; he has always been considered as a kind of zombie who has never had the right to raise his head, who has never had the right to speak." Chavannes Jean-Baptiste is the former Director of Caritas of Hinche and founder of the Papaye Peasant Movement (MPP).


3. See, for example, the bibliography in Durning (1989A) and in Annis and Hakim (1988).

4. Other countries identified by Durning (1989B) are the Philippines, Brazil, Guatemala, India, and Peru.

5. I use the label authoritarian even though Trouillot effectively argues that Haiti under Duvalier became a classic totalitarian state (1990: 238n).

6. This point is amply demonstrated by Wilentz (1989) who often juxtaposes almost totally inaccurate or deliberately misleading 'factual statements' by 'experts' or 'informed sources' against the often completely opposite actuality of grassroots reality.

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Trouillot, Michel-Rolph  


Wilentz, Amy  
PRIMARY EDUCATION IN
A PREDATORY STATE:
PRIVATE SCHOOL TAKE
OVER IN HAITI

Uli Locher
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THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

Extraordinary things are happening in the field of Haitian education. The number of students, schools and teachers is increasing at a phenomenal rate despite the inability of the labor market to absorb the better educated graduates. Private investment in education remains high despite a decline in economic activity and per capita income. Finally, the rising enrollments of the last decades are by no means limited to the wealthier social classes; rather, this movement has touched disproportionately the poorer classes, both rural and urban. Is there any economic sense in all of this?

From a more general viewpoint, there is no mystery. Incomes are directly related to the level of education. But how can the positive link between schooling and income be explained? The traditional explanation given by the "human capital" theorists centers on increased productivity due to the technical skill acquired in school. But this explanation conflicts with a number of very obvious characteristics of the Haitian educational system, for example its elitist ideology, its frequently outdated curriculum and pedagogical methods, its linguistic dualism and the enormous variations in accessibility and quality. In fact, numerous indicators suggest that Haitian schools play primarily the role of a social filter, that diplomas are more important than the knowledge acquired at school and that schools offer a restricted access to certain monopolies, rather than opening a door to an open

The expansion of the primary education system has been much more rapid than the increase of the general population and of school age groups. Based on official statistics, the number of students has risen from 238,000 in 1958 to 883,000 in 1984. After correcting for under-reporting and other problems our present estimate stands at 998,000 for 1988/89. The increase in the number of teachers and schools during these thirty years corresponds to that of the student population. We estimate that there are now nearly 28,700 teachers in 6,200 schools.

Table 1: Schools, teachers and students, and percent of enrollments in the private sector, 1959 to 1988/9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>% in the Private Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>5,265</td>
<td>238,304</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2,418</td>
<td>10,265</td>
<td>431,607</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>13,401</td>
<td>580,127</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>3,731</td>
<td>20,302</td>
<td>882,875</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988/9</td>
<td>6,279</td>
<td>28,753</td>
<td>998,054</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Haiti as in other Third World countries, the recent expansion of school enrollments has been much more rapid than that of the population in general. What is even more interesting in the Haitian case, is the great part played by the private schools. The private sector grew from only 48,000 students in 1959 to 302,000 in 1979: a six fold increase in twenty years. In the nine following years, there has been another increase of 138% to reach a total of 719,000 students in 1988. If the private sector accounted for only 20% of the student population 30 years ago, it comprises today the vast majority, with 72% of all students.
The trend has been very different in the public sector. Between 1959 and 1979, the number of students has increased by 42%, i.e., faster than the general population which expanded by 29% over the same period. Since 1979, there has been a stagnation, with an increase of only 0.4% compared to a general population increase of 14%. During the last decade, the public sector has absorbed neither the increase in school age population, nor the relative growth in demand for primary education.

Table 2: Net enrollment ratios among children aged six and eleven, by rural/urban residence and sex, 1971 and 1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male</td>
<td>fem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 11</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other towns (5000 people and more)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 11</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas and small towns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 11</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IHSI, 1984: 21

The rural population has always been less educated than its urban counterpart. In 1971, a net enrollment ratio of less than 9% among children of age 6 could still be found, and the whole population of ages 6 to 24 had spent, on average, less than 3 years in school (IHSI, 1984: 21). This situation has obviously improved since 1971, as can be seen in Table 2.

But the rural world remains behind. In 1988, 47% of the students live in rural areas, a year for which the rural population is estimated to stand at 70% of the total population. We estimate the gross enrollment ratios to be 143.0 in the cities and 59.6 in
rural areas. These numbers not only inform us that the "average rural child" still does not go to school, but also that primary schools must absorb a large number of "over-age" children, especially in cities.

Given recent figures on the global net enrollment ratios--47.8 in 1981/82 and 61.0 in 1984/85--it is easy to fall prey to unjustifiable optimism. One expert at UNESCO thinks that the objective of universal education can be reached in Haiti between 1995 and 2000; he foresees a gross enrollment ratio of 100% for 1992 and a net ratio of 100% in 1999 (Bensalah, 1985). Such snapshot forecasting should not remain unopposed. Firstly, it is obvious that the final ten percent increase will be the hardest to obtain. Secondly, the basis of this extrapolation, the period of 1981/82 to 1984/85, was not typical of the general trend since 1971. Thirdly, it is not very useful to analyze the enrollment ratio without considering the numbers of drop-outs and repeaters. Finally, the situation in certain schools makes us wonder about the meaning of the term "school enrollment". A short and irregular appearance in a place which is a school in little more than name might deserve a different label.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The Haitian state --which we take to mean the complex of governmental institutions-- is the country's largest employer and largest enterprise and apparently still has monopoly decision-making in such fields as fiscal policy and the use of violence. Why has such a powerful conglomerate of leading personalities, financial resources and political muscle lost ground so dramatically in the field of education? Has the state lost power, or interest, or both? Before going into this question let us examine some aspects of the functioning of the state in respect to education.
The first indicator of government interest is the budget. Since 1981, government expenditures for education have generally averaged about 14% of the total budget, which is higher than the mean for low-income countries. However, since government expenditures amount to only 10% of national production, the GDP share going to public education has been barely 1.5%, or less than half of the Caribbean, Latin American and Third World averages (IEES, 1987: 2-23). These figures have changed somewhat over the last 3 years and government sources have recently claimed that the GNP share of public education currently stands at 2.5%. The precipitous decline of the public sector share in primary education is thus not a function of declining government resources allocated to education.

A second indicator of government interest refers to administrative measures taken. Given the increased private school enrollments, has the government provided curricular guidelines, programs, teacher training facilities, school inspectors, national examination standards or any of the other functions one would normally associate with a Ministry of Education? The answer is generally negative. There have been several attempts to make the Ministry responsible for all schools within the national territory and as recently as 1989 a presidential decree imposed a uniform, modern program on all schools, public and private alike (Draper, 1990: annex). There have also been periodic attempts to modernize programs and to install administrative systems capable of enforcing rules. But there has never been any political willpower commensurate with these idealistic designs. Most often the reforms were actually curtailed and sabotaged from within, by civil administrators, directors and inspectors, before ever reaching students (Locher et al., 1987).

If the government had neither the financial resources nor the administrative capability to take charge of primary education, what was done to prevent anarchy in the educational sector? Not much,
one might say, given today's chaotic situation. Nevertheless, a few positive elements are worth remembering:

- The government acted as a conduit for bilateral and multilateral assistance funds which have financed most of the educational research, curricular development, teacher training and retraining, school inspection, school construction and even simple administrative recordkeeping at the Ministry and in extra-ministerial institutions such as I.P.N. and I.N.F.P.. While much of this money was no doubt wasted there is little doubt that it is the pressure of external assistance and of Haitian professionals connected with international agencies which has put in motion a large modernization movement. This movement is now starting to bear fruit.

- Starting in the early nineteen seventies, the government ordered all religious organizations active in the country to operate primary schools as part of their regular activities. The price of saving souls in Haiti was to teach kids to read and write. Three hundred thousand students are presently enrolled in "Mission" schools and while many of these schools are quite miserable by our standards, they are still educational institutions linked to larger organizations and, therefore, open to communication, improvement and incorporation into a national system of pedagogical supervision.

- Even during the darkest years of the Duvalierist "predatory state", many individuals of exceptional quality and devotion were allowed to operate in schools, both public and private. They have
prevailed against the political and economic odds and have built a human resource which sets Haiti apart from many other low-income countries. It may not be saying much in favor of the tonton macoutes, but they were not in a league with the Khmer Rouge. A rather large pool of educated Haitians has lasted out those "darkest years".

These positive elements are admittedly few. Letting other people do what is properly government work is hardly a great achievement of the Haitian state. It may actually make sense at this point to reverse the way we ask questions about the state's role in education. Instead of asking about resources, administrative capabilities and political willpower in a conventional way, maybe we should be asking about those characteristics which make the state an obstacle to the provision of high-quality educational services on a large scale. Among these characteristics we may count the following:

1. The state continues to concentrate, not distribute resources. The two principle growth industries of the seventies and eighties, the export assembly industry and the foreign aid industry, did not produce widespread increases in real income. Rather, income growth in these leading sectors was being captured by an elite of high-ranking officials and owners of assembly plants who had little interest in channeling the new resources towards the expansion of a public school system. Haiti is no Cuba.

2. A vigorous educational policy demands the existence of a strong state. At no point in time did conditions exist in Haiti for the emergence of a strong state. There has not been a great dislocation of traditional social structures. There has not been a sizeable external threat
serving as a catalyst for national sentiment and collective action. There has not been a strong modernizing leader or a class of young turks who would have found their personal fulfillment in implementing the leader's visions (Migdal, 1988:173). As far as the leadership of the past decades has made any attempt at consolidation of social control in a strong state, their actions strengthened de facto only the extractive capacity of the state. Haiti is neither Jamaica nor the Dominican Republic.

3. The decline in importance of public schooling is not only due to the fact that various factions of the "political class" have treated the state as a private enterprise, to be used and plundered for their own ends. Even those ministers of education who have excelled by their vision and competency have usually had to treat public schools as a series of problems and crises rather than as a national resource of the highest priority. The everyday behavior of the "predatory state" has so far blocked any "pockets of efficiency" within the bureaucracy. Haiti is no Brazil.

4. The personal choices of those in charge of the public system are most revealing. Without exception they will send their children to private schools. They will maintain close links to private schools during the short interludes of their holding cabinet ranks, and they will continue to see model character in private institutions like Saint-Louis de Gonzague - rather than in the constructs of the Institut National de Pédagogie. The ostensibly developmentalist ideology of the ministry of education conflicts with the true beliefs of its advocates.
Summing up these various elements we come to the conclusion that the public school system in Haiti is run by individuals whose personal interest does not lie in expanding and improving that public system but rather in improving their own working conditions within that system. This interpretation fits well with the data provided above. Stagnating enrollments are combined with great budget increases. Salaries have more than doubled in real terms and very lucrative positions have been provided, including travel, titles, jeeps and offices, for the few dozen specialists whose job ostensibly was to make the public school system grow in both quantity and quality. We therefore reject the interpretation that the dramatic loss of ground experienced by the public school system is due to historical accident, administrative bungling or lack of resources. The Haitian state has a public school system in its image; it has the system it deserves. The interests of the state and the interests of the nation are still a world apart.

WHO BEARS THE COST OF EDUCATION?

The best figures currently available on the cost of primary education are those contained in the AMESED (1987) education sector study concerning the 1984/85 school year. I have brought these figures up to 1988 by adjusting for annual inflation at levels estimated in the sector study (5% per annum in rural areas and 9% in cities). Better and more up-to-date figures may become available during the summer of 1990 through a research effort funded by UNESCO.

Costs included in our analysis cover such items as school fees, books, other materials and uniforms, items which in many cases are covered entirely by parental contributions. Also included are the capital and recurrent costs of governmental budgets and external aid agencies. Cost items are not always carried under the same headings. E.g., we can assume that school fees cover teacher salaries in private schools while in public schools, salaries fall under the recurrent costs of the ministry of education. The most
important omission from the table concerns opportunity costs. Peter Easton, one of the authors of the AMESED study, and Simon Fass have recently shown that such opportunity costs can be considerable in relation to the household budgets of the urban poor. Even though children may only earn a few cents a day, these small amounts do sum up and do enter into parental cost/benefit calculations (Easton and Fass, 1989).

Public schools are financed by the government, or so we would assume. But table 3 shows that the government's share in the cost of public primary education is well below 50%. The rest of the cost is borne in part by external donors and in part by parents. Even at 43% it may well be that the government's share in public schools is actually overestimated. External donors will inevitably insist upon Haitian government counterpart financing of their education projects. In some cases such counterpart financing may be arranged quite responsibly, but in many cases it is fictitious. The same civil servant's contribution may be carried on two or four different projects. Audits of foreign assistance projects frequently conclude that while all the foreign money has been spent or even overspent, only a fraction of the counterpart contribution has actually been disbursed. General budgetary support grants and food assistance programs are two more common ways by which foreign assistance money is laundered into governmental budgets and counterpart financing. But such finesse carries a risk. The fluctuations in foreign aid are one of the factors responsible for the regular occurrence of budgetary crises in the ministry of education. In theory, a temporary decline in foreign aid should affect only extraordinary expenses for new programs and capital expenditures; in practice, however, teachers will simply not get their salary checks - as has happened several times already this year.

The financing of private schools depends almost entirely upon parental contributions. The only significant exceptions are PVO
schools which generally receive the largest part of their budget from foreign donors. It is interesting to note that school feeding programs make up anywhere between 15% and 55% of the cost of PVO schools. Food items usually consist of U.S. surplus production channelled through large PVO's such as Save the Children and CARE. Table 4 relates the unit costs to income levels. Its message is really quite simple. It appears that the cost burden of primary education, especially in public schools, is simply overwhelming for the majority of the population. How can anyone expect the urban poor to pay 7% of total income for the schooling of a single child in a public school? And how can we expect those same parents to spend 40% of total income for the schooling of that child in a private school, once access to the public school has been denied? These figures apparently prove that more than one half of the population will have to remain illiterate.

Yet these figures conflict with reality. Net primary enrollment rates for 11 year olds are around 80% in cities and over 50% in rural areas (table 2). In fact these rates have improved markedly precisely among those classes which according to table 4 should be excluded from schooling altogether. Either we must have underestimated external contributions or there are benefits to schooling which make it desirable for even some of the poorest
Table 3: Unit costs in primary education (in 1988 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Private</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rur</td>
<td>Urb</td>
<td>Rural Prop</td>
<td>Comm Chur</td>
<td>Urban Low PVO</td>
<td>Urban High PVO</td>
<td>Urban low PVO</td>
<td>low stat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>stat stat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School fees</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other materials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov't expenses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donor expenses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students/par.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% share</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% share</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% share</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Estimates based on IEES (1987: 2-94)
parents to send their children to school. As it turns out, both of these explanations are true. Virtually all social-scientific studies of the past 15 years have pointed to the significant role of foreign remittances in financing educational expenses. If unit costs of primary education are related to average incomes in the way it is done in table 4, then these incomes should be reflecting income from all sources, including foreign remittances. An even better solution would be to include a second "foreign donor" category in table 3 since many of the remittances appear to be earmarked specifically for educational purposes. The parental share in the unit costs would then be significantly less than what is calculated in table 3 and assumed in table 4.

The argument concerning benefits is an equally convincing one, given the large proportion (over two thirds) of students who receive a regular daily meal in school. If the cost of such a meal is estimated at $0.20 and if a student receives 200 meals per year, then the school feeding program by itself appears to finance the major part or even the totality of the parental share of costs in the types of schools attended by most children.

Whatever the figures and arguments used, it is most likely that external contributions in the form of remittances by expatriate Haitians and school feeding programs explain the recent increases in net enrollment rates. These increases have occurred primarily among the rural and urban poor, i.e., among those groups which according to tables 3 and 4 would not be able to send their children to school. Haitian families appear to have resources somewhat larger than what our statistics make us believe.

WHO BENEFITS FROM EDUCATION?

Private benefits from education include higher occupational qualifications and lifetime earnings as well as higher social status, the enjoyment derived from student status and other consumption benefits. Most analyses of the rate of return are
strictly limited to monetary investment and expected monetary benefits and this paper is no different in this respect. It is important to realize, however, that non-monetary benefits always do play a significant role in the educational investment of both parents and governments. In Haiti parents who do not send their children to school lose face, moral authority and social
Table 4: Annual primary education costs per child as percent of family income (in 1988 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rur</td>
<td>Urb</td>
<td>Rur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Average pop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental share of unit cost</td>
<td>$28</td>
<td>$39</td>
<td>$44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rural population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rur</th>
<th>Urb</th>
<th>Rur</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>PVO</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm workers</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>$304</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant farmers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>$608</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small freehold.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$912</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural trades and crafts</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$1,459</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium and large farmers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$9,728</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Urban population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rur</th>
<th>Urb</th>
<th>Rur</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>PVO</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban poor</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>$565</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>$1,694</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle class</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$4,236</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$11,296</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$42,360</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Estimates based on IEES (1987: 2-125)
status. Government investments are regularly justified by expected non-monetary benefits such as a reduction in morbidity and mortality rates, a decrease in fertility and an increased openness towards the great values of modern rationality and participatory democracy.

More important than benefits alone are the ratios between costs and benefits, the rates of return which are taken to be good indicators of an education system's external productivity. If individuals and society reap benefits substantially exceeding their respective contributions, then they will see their educational effort as a good investment (Coombs and Hallak, 1987:11). Proponents of rate of return analysis have always claimed that their calculations not only demonstrate the contribution of education to economic growth in the past but that these calculations would also allow the channeling of future investments to those sectors where the highest economic returns could be expected (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985), e.g., primary rather than higher education. Other economists have criticized this approach on various grounds. In the Haitian context one could argue, e.g., that reliable data on educational costs are hard to come by and that data on wages and lifetime earnings are both sketchy and unreliable. In my own view the single most important shortcoming of conventional rate of return analysis in Haiti is the great variation in quality of the education received in various types of schools. Simply to count years spent at school tends to give us no more than the most rudimentary estimate of skills acquired there, hardly ever going beyond the presumption of basic literacy and numeracy. One may want to add that the correlation between schooling and income – underlying such analysis – is further weakened by the numerous ways knowledge can be acquired outside schools, and that market imperfections may be such that the most important determinants of placement in the labor market may be external to the education industry.

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There is value in all these objections, but there is no value at all in ignoring the few elements of competent analysis which do presently exist. Let us, therefore, consider the results of the one study available for Haiti. Volume 1 of that study explains all the assumptions made; our task here is to simply review the results.

Rate of return analysis always concentrates on the incremental increase in income an individual may expect at a given level of education, compared to the next lower level. The data in table 5, therefore, compares individuals with primary schooling to individuals with no schooling at all. The income levels given in the first two columns of the table must appear shockingly low. Graduates of primary schools in 1984 earned less than 2 dollars per day in cities and far less than that in the countryside.

Which educational investment carries the highest private rate of return? According to table 5 rural PVO schools are the most desirable type because of the low level of parental investment and the high level of foreign donor subsidy. In the urban milieu it is the public schools which provide the highest rate of return. However, the most important message of the table may well be that private rates of return are highest for individuals schooled in rural areas but employed in cities. Employment in the urban labor market promises high returns, especially when compared to the low private investment required in rural PVO schools. Rural schooling constitutes a large, quantifiable and convincing incentive for migration to cities.

Social or total rates of return are given in the last three columns of table 5. They are relatively higher for rural than for urban schools and show much less variation between school types than private rates of return. By and large, total rates of return are quite miserable, especially when compared to Third World averages. Their low values are principally due to the internal
Table 5: **Indicative rates of return for primary education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of primary education</th>
<th>Income data</th>
<th>Private rates of return</th>
<th>Total rates of return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietary</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. (low)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. (med)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. (high)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Rates are computed incorporating the likelihood of employment as given in the IEES study (p.134)

**Source:** IEES (1987: 2-137)
inefficiency of Haitian schooling; many cycles are needed in order to produce a singly primary school graduate.

The following major conclusions can be drawn from the rate of return data currently available:

1. The cost of education varies so much between different types of schools that we should use much caution when speaking of a single rate of return. On the benefit side, the income difference according to years of primary schooling is not well documented and probably rather low. It may be that the principle benefit of primary schooling is really its capacity to open the door to urban secondary schools. That is where the significant income differences become visible.

2. The international comparison reveals that private returns to primary education in Haiti are of the same general order as they are in other Third World countries. Social returns in Haiti, however, are well below what has been found elsewhere. Among the explanations for this phenomenon we may want to point to the fact that skills acquired in school mean little if they cannot be used in the labor market. The modern sector of the Haitian economy is too small to absorb even the small number of graduates produced by Haitian primary schools.

3. The more expensive types of primary education appear to provide the lowest private returns. This is almost certainly a statistical artifact due to the assumption of equal lifetime average annual incomes, independent of school type. Private returns on high-cost urban proprietary schools would probably be closer to the returns for urban public schools if more realistic income estimates were substituted for those given in table 5.
But the central issue regarding such schools remains unsolved: we still do not know whether the success of high-cost private schools is due to the skills they teach or rather to the selection they practice among potential clients.

CAN HAITI AFFORD A BETTER SCHOOL SYSTEM?

Let us now turn back to our original question: what is the economic rationale behind the rapid expansion of the primary schools? How can the Haitian economy afford this expansion? I shall start at the most general level and then proceed down the ladder.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC RESOURCES

It is possible that the Haitian Gross National Product might have been underestimated for at least the past 15 years. Underestimates of nearly 25% would partly be due: 1) to the obscurity of national accounting practices designed to hide paramilitary expenses (Lundahl, 1979: 375-386) and 2) to estimation errors in the agricultural part of the GNP (Levitt & Laurent, 1986; USAID, 1987).4

Aggregate statistics such as the GNP, and their expression per capita, conceal disparities in resource distribution. Thus, many researchers use indicators such as school enrollment ratios as measures of a population's well-being. This procedure is acceptable, but can also be misleading.

Table 6: Gross primary enrollment ratios, Haiti and 34 poor countries, 1965 and 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 poorest countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weighted average</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unweighted average</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Source: World Bank, 1988, and calculations based on this source.

The World Bank publishes only averages weighted by population size. China and India alone largely determine these figures. It is true that in such a comparison, Haiti seems to be the "poorest among the poor"; Haiti's ratios for 1965 and 1985 are almost 20 points below the "average". Yet this is a distortion of reality. We usually want to compare Haiti to other distinct countries (not to an amalgamated and largely Asiatic population). In a legitimate international comparison, the Haitian enrollment ratio (78) is actually 8 points above the average of the 34 poorest countries (70).

Our intention is not to embellish the Haitian economic reality. Yet, according to the secondary indicator of primary school enrollment, Haiti should be ranked with countries whose per capita GNP was in the order of $405 in 1988, or 23% above the $330 indicated for Haiti. Thus there is a perfect fit between school enrollment ratios and the corrected per capita GNP value. The national economy appears to have the resources for increasing access to primary schools.

STATE RESOURCES

The conventional approach presents investments in education as equivalent to the opportunity cost of investments elsewhere, for example, in public works or in industrial infrastructure. Thus, it is presumed that investment capital available to the state is limited. If the State builds schools, it cannot build an industrial park. The Haitian reality has been different over the last decades. The quasi-totality of the State investment budget comes from foreign aid, and investments in education have virtually no opportunity cost to the state; they are gifts, a net addition to the part of the economy administered by the State. Despite this
infusion of money from external donors, the State has largely lost terrain in the area of education. The State apparently cannot afford increasing access to primary schools, but State budgets obviously have no impact on enrollment ratios.

CHURCHES AND OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES (NGOS)

Schools sponsored by Protestant missions form the largest category of primary schools. There are an estimated 2,317 (37%) such schools, but this number might be conservative. Collectively, these schools receive substantial financial support, from foreign as well as local sources.

If it is difficult to estimate with precision the official multilateral and bilateral aid, this task becomes impossible when it comes to Missions and NGOs. But empirical fieldwork suggests that the amount must be large, especially since it is believed that a number of foreign donations are directly given to the schools, without ever appearing on NGO national accounts.

Ever since the seventies the Government required of all incoming religious groups to work in the field of education. This requirement does not hurt churches at all; they know that primary schools are among the easiest projects to justify and finance through foreign aid. Furthermore, a school constitutes a favorable nucleus for religious proselytism - a useful argument with donating agencies and countries as well as with the potential clientele.

Thus there are several factors which have together produced a sharp increase in the number of mission schools. The addition of school feeding programs has given the final boost to this trend. More than two thirds of all students (some 700,000 of them) now receive one daily meal at school, and this is often their only complete meal. The attraction of these programs seems so strong that it dominates the strictly educational component of the school. The Churches and NGOs have clearly found the right formula to bring
children to school. Theirs has been the largest contribution to the recent expansion of schooling in Haiti.

ENTREPRENEURS

There are 1,411 lay private schools (22%) which operate on a commercial basis and are the property of entrepreneurial directors with or without pedagogical qualifications. Their investment is sometimes significant, but most often minimal. Generally, these schools are the least organized and the least supervised, and their standards are the lowest.

Since these schools are profit-oriented enterprises, they most often spring up either in Port-au-Prince, or in other cities (59%). Profits can be considerable but are usually limited by the clientele's poverty and the competition of rivalling enterprises. If the irresponsibility of certain directors of "lottery schools" is striking, generalized condemnations should be avoided: firstly, economic motivation is not absent from other types of schools, and secondly, even in mediocre schools there is still an attempt to offer those services so terribly neglected by successive governments.

EDUCATION AND THE PREDATORY STATE

The imperfect predator

In an ideal-typical predatory state such as Zaire, a small elite manages to divert vast resources to their personal use while leaving the country in misery both in social and economic terms. The Haitian state is also centralized, patrimonial and predatory in nature but as an extractive apparatus it is much less impressive than Mobutu's Zaire.

As in any large-scale organization, "autonomy is a necessary prerequisite for effective state action" (Evans, 1989:12). From a purely organizational point of view, the Haitian state is
ineffective; the art of rhetoric and the art of plundering are elevated to astonishing heights. The state organization appears totally incapable of formulating objectives and implementing the necessary actions. There appears to be a paradox in the sense that the state is amazingly free of competing organizations and in this sense, very autonomous, but the state's weak internal organization prevents this autonomy from leading to successful action. We have a case here of imperfect autonomy, incapable of implementing national development, but also incapable of organizing national plunder at a world-class level, i.e., at the level of Mobutu's Zaire or Trujillo's Dominican Republic.

I have presented the Haitian state as still possessing a monopoly on violence and hence control of the population by means of violence, but this control is also far from perfect. There have been dozens of internal revolts since 1957 and four of the major tools of state violence had to be eliminated since 1987, namely, the Volontaires de la sécurité nationale (Tonton-macoutes), the Corps des Léopards, the Casernes Dessalines and the Fort Dimanche prison. There have also been examples recently of localized state violence getting out of hand (Jean-Rabel in 1987), of vigilante action and "democratized violence" (in all major cities since 1986) and of the use of foreign resources to quell domestic disturbance and potential violence.12 The Haitian State is an example of very imperfect control through violence.

The Haitian State sometimes takes on a totalitarian appearance and foreigners are frequently discouraged by a byzantine bureaucratic apparatus apparently designed to guarantee its own immobility. In effect, however, the Haitian bureaucracy is extremely weak. Administrative control is subject to constant interference by outsiders and administrative units are incapable of assuring even their own survival. The expansion of primary schooling through private institutions is a case in point. Control over most schools has been slipping away from the Port-au-Prince
bureaucrats to the point that today the ministry of education does not even have a complete list of its own schools and employees. When the ministry's budget doubled between 1986 and 1989, large pay increases did not result in any pedagogical leverage. Personalism and predatory behavior are so obvious at every level of executive power that administrators have become completely incapable of enforcing rules and governing the behavior of their subordinates. Despite the authoritarian posturing at the top the bureaucratic apparatus is weak.

**Predatory Mechanisms**

Most of the ministry's funds (93% in 1990) are spent on salaries. The control of salaried positions, therefore, is of great importance to the elites running the state as their private enterprise. Privileged positions combining ministry and foreign aid appointments, fictitious positions (*chèque zombie*) and promotions are the principal ways by which loyalties are bought and friends and clients are rewarded. It may be of interest to note that the Minister of Education is of rather minor importance in this operation. All of the important decisions of the last few years have been made by generals and, before that, by the Duvalierist clique in the Palais National.

Other predatory mechanisms can be observed at a lower and more modest level. The School Reform (started in 1979) is a case in point. The distribution of supposedly free books, the enrollment in lucrative teacher training courses, the assignment of inspector positions and vehicles, the construction of overpriced school buildings and many other elements of this school reform have allowed the strong to prey on the weak within and thanks to the protective umbrella of the state apparatus.

Even at the lowest level, predation is an essential aspect of primary schooling. Who gets enrolled in public schools and expensive private schools? No doubt some of the applicants have
academic prerequisites and some of the parents submit to the official entrance procedures and pay schedules. But anthropological studies have shown over and over again how the Tontons macoutes get their children into desirable schools while ordinary people are much less successful in doing so. Payoffs, blackmail and the menace of violence are still used to achieve this highest goal of all Haitian parents. Enrollment in "good" schools is one of the predatory mechanisms of the Haitian state; it allows an easy laundering of the loot of extortion and robbery and its effective transfer to the next generation.

THE WAY OUT: UPGRAILING PRIVATE EDUCATION

One way of escaping the "klepto-patrimonialism" of the Haitian situation is to limit the scope and the budgetary power of the state. This is precisely what progressive forces in Haitian education have been practicing for the last generation. The state today controls no more than one quarter of primary schools and one third of the resources going into primary education. The negative aspect of this trend has of course been curricular chaos low qualification of teachers and general inefficiency of the system. The strategy advocated by progressives today is an even wider use of decentralized structures, a stepwise upgrading of standards and the use of subsidies as leverage for gradually modernizing primary education in order to make it more accessible.

Why use such a strategy contrary to all UNESCO policies of the last 25 years? The answer is that the institution-building strategy of UNESCO has failed miserably in Haiti. Modernizing education through State intervention, State monopoly and State controls presumes the existence of a state willing to be used as a developmental tool. Such a state does not exist in Haiti. Asking for a complete overhaul of the State and the economy as a precondition to educational reform (Jean, 1988) is of course intellectually satisfying. In practice it is no more promising than the UNESCO-sponsored illusions.
Upgrading private education is a third alternative, a strategy which promises a way out of the misery of Haitian education. Why might such a strategy work? It will work because it is, firstly, politically appropriate. Working with private schools means working with thousands of small units and dozens of umbrella organizations and sponsors. This alternative implies a diversification of resources and of risk. Under this strategy there are no large bank accounts under government control, no large warehouses storing furniture, cement and other desirable items and no sinecure positions filled by individuals capable of blocking an entire process by their inactivity.

Secondly, this strategy is socially appropriate. It implies no national standardization, no dream of creating the total revolution and no denial of existing cultural values and organization. Since the aim is to improve existing schools, the policies must respect the preferences of the population in terms of location, style, pedagogical orientation and language of instruction. The implementing agencies of such a program are existing organizations --mainly churches and NGO's-- and successful implementation depends upon existing experiences, loyalties, career orientations and general human resources under the control of these organizations. The better private schools in Haiti appear to have some quality which government money just cannot buy.

Thirdly, this strategy is economically appropriate. The cost of private education is much lower to both individuals and the national economy than the cost of public education. Its rate of return is higher in terms of cycle and graduation costs. In addition, children appear to learn more in private schools than in public institutions. This difference has been proven in several countries of the area and has been confirmed in Haiti by the only study comparing cognitive results in various types of schools (Psacharopoulos, G. et al., 1986; Locher et al., 1987). Besides, a focus on private schools allows certain "economies of small scale".
The Haitian habitat is very dispersed; even established villages are not all that frequent. The cost of a public school in terms of physical infrastructure, supervision, teacher salaries, etc., is much too high for most Haitian localities. Small private schools, especially those combined with churches, are more cost-effective.

Will the strategy work? If past performance is any indication of future potential, the answer can only be affirmative. There have been numerous successes with this decentralized, low level approach. A Catholic school network around Cap-Haitien has significantly upgraded the qualifications of its teachers. The peasant movement of Papaye (MPP) has produced its own programs and Creole textbooks. The methodist school network has an inspection system far superior to that of the ministry - which, by the way, owes all private schools an inspection service. The teachers union (C.N.E.H.) has run teacher training workshops at a small fraction of the cost of such programs under government auspices. Private teacher training colleges presently supply more teachers to schools than do the "Ecoles Normales" of the ministry. Foreign aid is now increasingly focusing upon private institutions as the principle vehicles for upgrading education. Even the mighty World Bank has started to follow the lead of many bilateral aid organizations in this respect. There is, of course, also a hidden agenda underlying all of this. Modernizing private education has become one of the best strategies for undermining the repressive apparatus necessary for regime survival. The Creole literacy programs of the Catholic church were one of the principle factors in ridding the country of the Duvaliers. Students again were on the frontlines when generals Namphy and Avril were forced out. Despite all the ensuing disappointments, Haiti today is in some way fulfilling an educator's dream. Education is producing a more conscious citizenry and empowering a population to take action in its own defense. Keeping the masses ignorant was part of the unavowed credo of Duvalierists and their politics. The negligence and greed of this political class has now produced a vast pool of modest educational
resources in the private sector. Strengthening this sector is one of the most promising strategies for eventual political renewal in Haiti.
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Notes

1. The statistics for 1988/89 are based on an extensive survey of the Republic schools, carried during that year, after correction of obvious underestimates (Locher, 1989).

2. A child can spend a maximum of 19 years in the schools, between the age of 6 and 24 years. The average value for rural girls was 5.8 years, i.e., less than one third of the maximum value.

3. Parts of my analysis as well as all of my rate of return data are based upon the AMESED (1987) study, the only such study ever done in Haiti.

4. We cannot expect to see the publication of corrections in the near future. Estimates are made by government experts and by multilateral agencies who fear that Haiti might lose its status of "poor amongst the poorest" country. The consequence might be that Haiti would no longer receive aid under the most advantageous conditions. Reduced levels of aid might mean real hardship for experts!

5. The 34 "poorest countries" include all of category I - the low income economies - of the World Bank's tables, except for countries for which information is incomplete.

6. Official - conservative - estimates for 1983/84 show that 69.1% of the State development expenses come from international aid and that this proportion increases to 84.2% in the field of education.

7. For example, it is not of much use to know that the NGOs contributed 22.6 millions or 14% of foreign aid in 1983, without knowing what was the proportion going to the schools (UNDP, 1983; IEES, 1987).
8. On the basis of MEN's figures and of calculations produced by IEES (1987/2: 136), we estimate that in 1984 NGOs contributed 18 millions to rural mission schools - 50% more than the whole governmental budget for primary education.

9. The small scale of projects, frequency of contacts and inspections as well as the quality of networks (for example, the Methodist, Baptist and Adventist schools) do play a large role. But this would hardly have an effect if it was not supplemented by the intense informal control of the religious communities.

10. I would be extremely grateful if someone could point out to me the original source of this information which has recurred here and there over the past few years.

11. We documented a case 20km from Port-au-Prince where a clever director pocketed 8300$ in salary and profits in 1989.

12. This is only one aspect of the recent great salary increases in the public sector in general and for public sector teachers in particular.

13. The last example is Fass (1989).

14. Examples are the USAID-sponsored PROBED and FONHEP.
ELECTIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY?
THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
ON POLITICS IN HAITI

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INTRODUCTION

On January 30, 1986 the United States Department of State announced that it would suspend direct economic assistance to the Haitian government. The action would withhold $7 million of aid and was widely interpreted as a withdrawal of support for the Duvalier regime.

Senior State Department officials denied having made a "conscious decision to push Duvalier out." Rather, one official explained, "We are not concerned with specific regimes. We are only concerned with progress on human rights. If Duvalier is able to do that, fine. If not, the people of Haiti will decide." (New York Times, 1986a).

And so they did. One week later, on February 7, 1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haiti’s President-for-Life, fled to France with his family and ended his family’s dictatorship. While the termination of U.S. aid did not cause the fall of the Duvalier regime, the loss of support did, perhaps, allow the fall to happen. The political impact of economic assistance has rarely been so dramatically evident in Haiti before or since, although the United States has often used aid to obtain political goals.

After the fall of the Duvaliers, the United States continued to use aid directly and indirectly to influence Haitian politics. Material aid was used directly to influence Haitian government policies. The United States’ overall economic development strategy for Haiti was designed to effect Haitian politics indirectly by
altering relations between groups in Haitian society.

A frequently stated general political goal of the United States in Haiti was to promote democracy. More specifically, the United States focused on the holding of elections as a transition to democracy. The United States' use of aid to promote Haiti's democratization was sorely tested, and the effectiveness of its approach is in doubt. Measuring the impact of U.S aid is difficult as it is only one of many significant factors shaping political affairs in Haiti. At question is whether, on balance, U.S. aid contributed more to the establishment of democracy or to the reintrenchment "Duvalierism without Duvalier"?

The following pages assess the contribution that U.S. economic assistance made to Haiti's democratization from the fall of the Duvaliers until the elections scheduled for December 16, 1990. The article focuses on the impact of U.S. material aid and on the economic development strategy promoted by the United States. In both aspects, the effectiveness of U.S. aid seems to have been compromised by the United State's having given greater priority to its own foreign policy concerns than to the democratic empowerment of Haitian citizens.

U.S. AID TO HAITIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENTS

Following the 1959 Cuban revolution, U.S. foreign policy toward Haiti became based on the goal of maintaining the Haitian government as an ally against the spread of Communism in the Caribbean (Loescher and Scanlon 1984). So long as the Haitian government has remained loyal to this goal, the United States has been willing to limit its demands for Haiti's democratization.

After Jean-Claude Duvalier became Haiti's President-for-Life in 1973 and promised to carry out democratic reforms, the United States restored economic development assistance. Although the amount of U.S. aid rose annually throughout the 1970s and early
1980s, few permanent reforms were enacted. Under mounting pressure from African-American, human rights, church, and immigration organizations, the U.S. Congress imposed democratic criteria for U.S. aid to continue. These pre-conditions included: ending corruption, respecting human rights, prosecuting human rights violators, and institutionalizing democratic reforms. But, for the administration of President Ronald Reagan, obtaining democratic reforms remained secondary to maintaining the stability of the Haitian government as an anti-Communist ally. As a result, U.S. insistence on democratization was not always taken very seriously and reforms were few and far between.

The United States' decision to end its support for the Duvalier regime in 1986 was made reluctantly, although twelve years of frustrated attempts at obtaining democratic reforms had passed. The Reagan administration only withdrew economic aid when growing Haitian public opposition to the regime had become strong enough to be destabilizing. Even then, Americans in Haiti have reported, the U.S. Department of State only agreed to suspend aid after it received reassurances from the U.S. Ambassador that Communists would be unable to obtain political power. This guarantee was based upon the Haitian Armed Forces, who were expected to dominate an interim government and to maintain order during a transition to a democratically elected civilian government.

Although, after the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier from Haiti, the United States insisted on the holding of democratic elections, this goal was continually undermined by U.S. dependence upon the Haitian military, who had little interest in implementing democratic reforms. So long as the fear of Communism underlay U.S. policy, the United States' attempts at promoting democratic reforms followed a familiar pattern of frustration.

Upon taking over the Haitian government following the Duvalier's departure, the president of the National Government
Council (CNG), General Henri Namphy, announced that,

The National Government Council's task is to assure a transition to democracy. That is the only reason it exists, the only reason for its actions....We want an open, constructive dialogue so we can build a new Haiti based on reason, social justice, tolerance and freedom (Chamberlain 1987: 15).

Impressed by the CNG's declared commitment to democracy, the Reagan administration certified within three weeks that the new government had met the human rights requirements set by the U.S Congress and rushed $470,000 of riot control equipment to the Haitian Armed Forces. Within six months, the Congress approved $1.5 million of additional military assistance and more than doubled annual economic assistance to $102 million.

The United States' support for the CNG and subsequent military-controlled governments was based on the rationalization that the army was the only institution capable of maintaining the political stability necessary to carry out the election of a civilian government. Providing aid was seen as giving the United States the "leverage" it needed to assure that the military would actually hold elections.

The United States' policy of using economic aid to convince the military to keep order and carry out elections was problematic. First, U.S. influence ultimately derived from the threat of withdrawing its aid -- a trump card that the United States was reluctant to play. U.S. officials believed withdrawing aid would not only eliminate their influence over the Haitian government's day-to-day operations and policies but it would also disable the government. As an embassy official explained to Mark Danner before the November, 1987 election massacre left no choice, "Without American aid, the Haitian government collapses -- poof!" (1989 (1): 76). The U.S. State Department officials feared the chaos that
might follow the demise of a military government more than it did the possibility that the military would not carry out elections.

Secondly, in relying upon the military, the United States limited or compromised the support it could otherwise have given to the creation of alternative popular democratic movements and civilian democratic institutions. That the United States hesitated to withdraw its support from the military government when the Haitian Armed Forces participated in or allowed human rights abuses and disrupted the electoral process led many Haitians to doubt the sincerity as well as the effectiveness of the United States' commitment to Haiti's democratization.

MILITARY AID:

The contradiction inherent in the United States' attempt to obtain democratic reforms by providing aid to the military government became evident shortly after the delivery of U.S. riot control equipment in 1986. Haitian civilian political leaders questioned why the army needed riot equipment to control civilians who favored democratic reforms. The U.S. Ambassador explained that the Haitian army had informed him that they confronted a vast network of 300,000 tontons macoutes of which 18,000 to 25,000 were armed (McManaway 1986). But, the army did little to disarm the tontons macoutes and turned its new equipment on civilians.

- In Martissant, an army captain arrested a tap-tap driver who had illegally passed his car. A Leopard unit arrived and dispersed the crowd that had gathered by shooting and killing five unarmed civilians and severely beating nineteen others. The next day the Leopards shot and killed two more civilians at road blocks in Carrefours which were set up in protest of the previous day's killings.

- At Fort Dimanche, army troops shot and killed six people and wounded fifty others who were participating in a peaceful
commemoration of prisoners killed by the Duvalier regime (NCHR 1986).

Although neither the CNG or the Armed Forces took any steps to correct these or many other human rights abuses, only three months later the U.S. Congress sought to increase its "leverage" by providing the Haitian military with even more aid. When the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved the Reagan administration's request for $4 million of military aid (subsequently reduced to $1.5), Congressional supporters explained that the aid package would enable a U.S. military mission to train Haitian Armed soldiers to respect the human rights of civilians. When a U.S. Embassy spokesperson was confronted with the fact that such aid had not been requested by either Haitian government or army officials, he countered, "Maybe the Haitians don't want military aid, but we think they need it" (Haiti Observateur 1986).

Military aid did little to keep the Haitian Armed Forces from interfering with national elections that were scheduled for November 29, 1987. Five months before the elections were to take place and in violation of the Constitution approved in 1987, the CNG took over the management of elections from the independent Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). The army attacked people protesting its intervention, killed at least 59 demonstrators, and wounded well over 100 more. After continuing protest forced the military to restore the CEP, the CNG refused to provide protection to CEP members and permitted the destruction of the CEP's offices, printing presses, and ballots. Although they were implicated in these attacks, General Henri Namphy praised his for not taking partisan measures in the electoral process (NCHR 1987). Finally, on election day army troops deliberately allowed or assisted armed paramilitary bands to attack polling places and massacre civilians lined up to vote (NCHR 1989).

After the election day massacre, the Reagan administration
finally suspended direct economic assistance to both the Haitian government and the Armed Forces as was required by human rights preconditions established by the Congress when it increased economic and military aid to Haiti in 1986. The Haitian government lost $63.6 million of Economic Support Funds, Development Assistance, Food Assistance, and Sugar Quotas and the army lost $1.2 million of aid. Some $40.5 million of assistance to non-governmental development projects was not suspended. Subsequently, in December of 1987, the Congress passed legislation prohibiting the restoration of direct aid to the Haitian government until it generally showed respect for human rights and more specifically adhered to the democratic process as set forth in the 1987 Constitution, including the management of elections by the independent Provisional Electoral Council.

ECONOMIC AID FOR THE GOVERNMENT

Along with military aid, the U.S. government attempted also to use economic development resources to support and gain influence over the military-controlled Haitian governments. Soon after the fall of the Duvalier regime, the Haiti Mission of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) used political rather than economic criteria to make some of its funding decisions. The politicization of economic development assistance caused considerable discomfort for a number of development professionals on the USAID staff. The concern was that the politicization of aid diverted resources away from communities in desperate need of long-term development assistance to short-term projects that would make no lasting contribution to resolving Haiti's severe economic problems.

The day after Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure, Ambassador Clayton E. McManaway reportedly asked the USAID Mission in Haiti to come up with a supplementary economic aid program to support the new government. The Mission proposed that USAID ask the Congress for a new appropriation of $30 million of Economic Support Funds.
that would be used in large measure to stabilize the CNG. In addition to providing balance of payments support for the government's depleted treasury, the funds would also finance short-term employment projects for thousands of unemployed Haitians. By putting Haitians to work cleaning sewage canals, building roads, and repairing irrigation systems, USAID hoped to meet the public's expectations that the new government would improve their economic conditions and cut off potential popular disappointment and opposition to the CNG (Horblitt 1986; USAID 1986).

The proposed public works program did not work out as expected. In April, 1986 the Haitian Ministry of Information announced prematurely that the Ministry of Public Works would offer 20,000 construction jobs. The Public Works Ministry was neither notified of the announcement nor prepared to handle the more than 20,000 applicants who arrived seeking employment. After a long wait, the workers were informed that no jobs were available and troops were called in to disperse the crowd (NCHR 1986: 12). Some public works projects eventually were created on a much smaller scale than originally planned. Employment was short-lived and payment by the Haitian government was at times erratic. Apparently neither USAID nor the Haitian government were well prepared to organize a massive employment program.

The priority of lending support to the military resulted-- in at least one incident reported by USAID employees-- in the agency's diverting to wealthy land holders close to the Haitian government funds intended to help peasants. In the summer of 1986 the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture proposed that USAID's Special Development Activities Project support the irrigation of between 500 and 800 hectares in Thomazeau, a relatively rich agricultural area in the Central Plateau. USAID had created the project to support "grass roots" self-management activities. In evaluating the Haitian government's proposal, USAID discovered problems: the lands were
not owned by peasants, but by large land holders thought to include General Henri Namphy, who was then Haiti's president; the project was technologically not feasible; and, USAID had already rejected the plan when it had been proposed by the Duvalier regime. Nevertheless, USAID approved the proposal because, as some USAID personnel suggested, doing so was expedient in promoting good relations with the military government.

Although, after the November 29, 1987 election day massacre, U.S. economic development assistance directly to the Haitian government was prohibited by Congress' human rights requirements, the Reagan administration continued to seek "leverage" with the military by providing funds that violated the intent of the Congress even though they may not technically have been "economic development assistance."

• In the summer of 1988, for example, the Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture provided a $9 million loan guarantee to U.S. companies exporting wheat and other commodities to the government of President Leslie Manigat. The guarantee allowed the Haitian government to import these commodities and replenish its depleted treasury by selling them at a profit (NCHR 1989: 108).

• In November, 1988 the USAID released approximately $15 million of local currency to General Prosper Avril's government. The funds had accrued from sales of foods that USAID had given to the government prior to the suspension of aid, but they could not be spent without USAID's approval (NCHR 1989: 113).

• In August, 1989, the State Department, with Congressional approval, agreed to deliver $10 million worth of wheat to the Avril government. The Haitian government could obtain badly needed revenues by selling the 45,000 metric tons of wheat on the local market (Americas Watch 1989: 12).

**IMPACT OF U.S. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY**

In 1982, when USAID adopted an export-oriented economic strategy to promote Haiti's development, it justified this approach claiming it would "provide vital support to modernizing forces and institutions in Haiti, and help movement toward a more open and democratic society" (USAID 1982:26). Key provisions of this strategy included eliminating protectionist monopolies awarded by the Duvalier regime to its cronies, opening the economy to international competition, and promoting the growth of agro-industrial and assembly exports. The expectation was that such reforms would allow a new "socially responsible" entrepreneurial elite to spur the economic growth of the nation and to democratize government policy making. "Economic pluralism," predicted USAID director Harlan Hobgood, "will lead to political pluralism" (DeWind and Kinley 1988: 145).

The various military governments that succeeded the Duvalier regime for the most part adopted or acquiesced to the export-oriented development strategy put forward by USAID and other international development agencies. Although political conditions were difficult for the implementation of any economic strategy, the export-orientation backfired with regard to its political goals.

**INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT**

The opening up of the economy to international competition undercut the livelihood of many Haitian farmers and provoked conflict between the farmers and urban dwellers. After Duvalier's fall, the CNG opened the ports of Gonaïve, Petit Goave, and Miragoane to international trade. The country became flooded with a wide variety of consumer goods including processed foods,
appliances, automobiles, chemicals, and petroleum products. Many of the imported goods were not cleared through customs but brought in through informal networks that included members of the Haitian Armed Forces. In 1987 USAID estimated that smuggled goods comprised 30 percent of the rice consumed in Haiti, 28 percent of the flour, and 20 percent of the sugar (NCHR 1989: 111).

"Miami rice" smuggled into Gonaïve undercut the market for rice grown in Haiti's Artibonite region and, according to a U.S. Congressional report, threatened to eliminate the livelihood of as many as 200,000 Haitian workers and farmers. While Miami rice sold at $24 per 100 pound bag, farmers in the Artibonite region had to sell their rice at $28 per 100 pound bag to avoid a financial loss. By December, 1986, it was estimated that farmers were unable to sell 36,000 metric tons of rice or one third of the national production (Fauntroy 1987: 3-6).

In the "rice wars" that broke out in the Artibonite, farmers blocked trucks coming from Gonaïve and spilled smuggled rice on the road. Urban residents of Gonaïve who either participated in the trade or benefited from the low cost of rice fought the farmers. Members of the army shot and killed some farmers.

Smuggled sugar was similarly dumped on the market at between $20 and $24 per 100 pound sack while Haitian sugar was selling at $27 per 100 pound sack. As a result, the Haitian American Sugar Company closed down its sugar mill, put 3,000 workers out of their jobs, and threatened the livelihood of thousands of independent sugarcane farmers who had supplied the mill (Fauntroy 1987).

The conflicts between urban and rural populations created by the military's de facto "open economy" continued unabated. When in January, 1989 General Avril proposed measures to crack down on the smuggling of goods, he was met with strong protest and public demonstrations (NCHR 1989: 112).
ASSEMBLY EXPORTS AND THE REPRESSSION OF UNIONIZATION

To illustrate the democratic inclinations of the "socially responsible" Haitian entrepreneurs of the assembly industry, USAID director Harlan Hobgood once cited a report of the Association of Haitian Industrialists (ADIH) that called for a recognition of independent unions, which had been prohibited from functioning under the Duvalier regime (Hobgood 1983). After the fall of the Duvalier regime, when the time came to bargain over working conditions with the representatives of newly formed unions, the pressures of international competition led the plant owners to react quite differently than had been predicted.

As the 1981 ADIH report had made explicit, Haiti's export-oriented assembly industries depended on keeping Haitian wage levels at internationally competitive levels. In Haiti, this has meant limiting the government-legislated minimum wage to $3.00 per day, the level at which it has been set since 1984. A wage this low does not enable assembly plant workers to support their families above the absolute poverty level recognized by the World Bank (DeWIND and Kinley 1988: 123).

After the fall of the Duvalier regime, workers in the assembly industry quickly began to unionize and demand wage increases. The wage increase was usually of 40 to 60 percent, which would have roughly compensated for reductions in real wages due to inflation since the minimum wage was last revised in 1984. Union leaders and members lost their jobs. For example, workers of Performance Footwear, a subsidiary of Stride-Rite Footwear of Boston, Massachusetts, formed a union and asked for an increase from $.35 to $.50 per case of 12 pairs of machine-sewn shoes. The Stride-Rite factory in Boston was paying its workers $1.60 per case. In Haiti the company fired the leader of the union and three union members. When they went to pick up their last paycheck, they were locked in an office with armed militia members and forced to sign letters of resignation (Ebert 1986: 5-6).
Many export assembly companies responded to unionization efforts similarly. By November, 1986 some 12,000 of an estimated 50,000 assembly plant workers had been laid off. ADIH officials estimated 1,000 to 1,500 had been fired for union activities while labor leaders put the figure at more than 2,500. The Haitian Minister of Social Affairs, who is responsible for labor relations, stated that he was unaware of anyone having been dismissed for union activity (New York Times 1986b)

The U.S. government responded by attempting to moderate the demands of the trade union movement. According to a summary prepared by the White House of a 1986 briefing it organized about Haiti for chief executive officers of U.S. corporations,

Workers demanded radical wage increases....The U.S. government recognized early on the political and economic threat labor unrest posed and...requested the assistance of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Responsible labor union development is essential if Haiti is to maintain its competitive standing among Caribbean countries...AIFLD with USG [U.S. government] backing, expanded its support for the moderate Federation of Union Workers. The thrust of the USG effort with AIFLD is to make available to interested union workers a moderate trade union federation (Labor Link, n.d.: 7).

Despite the intervention of U.S. trade unionists and the threat of firings, Haitian union organizing has continued, but at great cost to the workers.

One of the greatest threats to the union movement came from the Haitian government. By 1987 the largest, independent union confederation, the Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers (CATH) had grown to include 30 member unions in Port-au-Prince and 24 peasant rural cooperatives. In June, 1988, the CNG abolished the CATH and ransacked its headquarters at the same time that it took over the management of the elections from the Provisional Electoral Committee. Massive popular protest forced the CNG to restore recognition to the CATH (Ebert 1987).
In order to be eligible for tariff benefits under the General System of Preference and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which provide incentives that are essential to USAID's export development strategy, Haiti -- like other countries -- is required by U.S. law to respect workers' right to collective bargaining. Although the Haitian government has ignored and interfered with these rights, the United States government has remained silent and failed to invoke appropriate sanctions (Compa 1989: 7, 43-46; NCHR 1987: 87).

STIFLED DEBATE ABOUT "THE AMERICAN PLAN"

Near the end of 1986 a Haitian employee of the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) wrote a paper criticizing the export-led economic development strategy for Haiti supported by USAID and other international development agencies. USAID cut off funding for the CRS project that paid the employee's salary and sought to have the employee fired. In the ensuing controversy, the paper's critique became notorious and the notion of "the American Plan" soon took on a life of its own as the focus of growing nationalist and anti-American sentiment.

When the Finance Minister, Leslie Delatour, began to implement measures that were consistent with USAID's and the World Bank's goal of eliminating monopolies and opening the economy to imports, he provoked nationalist protests and was criticized for carrying out the bidding of the United States. Delatour closed down two state-owned monopolies, an edible oils processing plant (ENAOL) and the country's largest sugar refinery, Darbonne. Both plants were inefficient and had been subject to embezzlement by government officials. The move was protested against vociferously not only because hundreds of workers were laid off and many farmers were left with no place to sell their cane, but also because it left Haiti more dependent on foreign imports (NCHR 1987: 82). Despite the drain that the enterprises had placed on government finances, Delatour's policies were widely seen as an unnecessary divestment of national patrimony and capitulation to "the American Plan."
As a result of the United States' intervention in so many aspects of Haiti's political and economic life both overtly and behind the scenes, Haitians were tempted to interpret their difficult circumstances, large and small, as the result of "the American Plan." The adverse effects of smuggling, for example, became widely seen as intentional on the part of the United States (Fauntroy 1987: 8). As Amy Wilentz recounts, Haitians cited "the American Plan" to explain numerous problems from rashes obtained at the beach (the U.S. Khian Sea did dump toxic wastes on the beach outside Gonaïves) to the spread of the disease AIDS. U.S. Ambassador Brunson McKinley finally felt obliged to deny the existence of "the American Plan" in a public speech, a copy of which he forwarded to all U.S. personnel in Haiti with instructions to use the speech in their conversations with Haitian friends and associates (Wilentz 1989: 269-271).

While the United States may not have had a "plan" in the conspiratorial sense, it certainly adopted a general strategy for promoting Haiti's economic and political development. While the U.S. economic development strategy has been at times more and less coherent and has occasionally shifted in direction over the past decade, its basic thrust has been, as the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) testified to the Congress, to transform Haiti into the "Taiwan of the Caribbean" through the promotion of export-oriented agricultural and assembly industries (McPherson 1982: 3).

More than fostering a higher standard of living or promote political pluralism, as the promoters of export-oriented development predicted, the opening of the economy to international competition stimulated rural-urban conflicts and created a context in which peasant associations and assembly unions were repressed in part because their organizing was seen as a threat to the new economic order.
DISPLACEMENT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

In March, 1990, the United States finally lost its long-standing trust and dependence on the Haitian Armed Forces to provide a stable government and effect a transition to democracy. The change in policy resulted from repeated attempts by the Haitian military government to sabotage democratic elections.

Consistent with American demands for elections, General Prosper Avril appointed a Permanent Electoral Commission to organize elections, as required by the Haitian Constitution, but he attempted to control the electoral process through arrests, violence, and intimidation. In November, 1989, 40 members of the Presidential Guard arrested and severely beat three leaders of opposition groups—the Secretary General of the Autonomous Federation of Haitian Workers (CATH), the head of the Confederation of Democratic Unity (KID), and a leader of the September 17 Popular Organization (OP-17). As a warning to other independent political groups, the disfigured and bloody leaders were exhibited to the nation on television and charged implausibly with plotting to assassinate the entire officer corps of the Haitian Armed Forces.

Two months later, the general declared a state of siege, reestablished the necessity of visas for Haitians wishing to return from abroad—which would have affected prominent human rights and political leaders then visiting the United States—and arrested numerous centrist political leaders and presidential candidates including Hubert de Ronceray of the Mobilization for National Development; Serge Gilles of the National Progressive Revolutionary Party; Dr. Louis Roy, who had played a leading role in drafting Haiti's Constitution; Gerard Emile Brun of KONAKOM; and, Gesner Prudent, a member of Marc Bazin's Movement to Establish Democracy in Haiti (Americas Watch, et al. 1990: 2, 8-10).

Although in 1989, the U.S. State Department had praised the Avril regime as "offering the best, and perhaps the last real
chance for democratic reform in Haiti," the state of siege led the U.S. government to take a more critical stand and ultimately to withdraw support. The Department of State denounced the state of siege as "a blatant assault on civil liberties." The newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Alvin Adams, labeled the Haitian government's actions "indefensible" and "outrageous" and he dismissed Avril's justifications by declaring, "You cannot destroy democracy to save it." The Department of State's annual human rights report on Haiti issued in February, 1990 stated that the imposition of a state of siege "posed serious questions about the intent of the Avril Government to stand by its commitment to a transition to democracy" (Americas Watch et al 1990: 74-76).

The United States began to press General Avril to relinquish his presidency after it became clear that the planned elections had lost legitimacy among the Haitian economic and political elite. Even normally non-political groups such as the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and the Haitian Association of Industrialists issued public statements against the state of siege and the U.S.-favored presidential candidate Marc Bazin withdrew from the presidential campaign. Finally, three members of the Electoral Commission resigned. Isolated from the civilian groups whose assent would be needed to meet American demands for elections, General Avril resigned from the presidency without making an official announcement and, after what the American Ambassador called a hour's "heart-to-heart" talk, the general agreed to retire to Florida and acceded to the appointment of a civilian government (New York Times 1990a).

THE CULMINATION OF U.S. AID: ELECTIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY?

With the appointment of Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot to Haiti's presidency and the establishment of a civilian government, the United States began the to restore direct aid to the Haitian government. Under the Avril regime, the U.S. Ambassador had lamented that, "The United States doesn't have

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leverage [with the Haitian government] because it doesn't have aid to cut off" (Fuller 1990). A major purpose in restoring aid was to reassert a greater influence over the efforts of the government and the Provisional Electoral Council to hold elections, which after some delays were scheduled for December 16, 1990 with run-off elections to be held on January 13, 1991. U.S. policy toward Haiti focused on elections as the means for Haiti to make a transition to democracy — an approach that may have been too single minded.

To help stabilize the new government, which was facing severe balance of payments problems, the Congress approved $10 million of Economic Support Funds to pay for oil and other critical imports. The United States assured its control over the government's use of the funds by placing them in an account upon which the Haitian government could draw only for expenditures approved by USAID according to strict criteria for disbursement.

To promote democratization, the United States agreed to donate $6.3 million to support elections. Some $3.3 million were to be given to the Provisional Electoral Commission while the balance was to be used to fund election-related activities in Haiti by non-Haitian organizations including the National Endowment for Democracy, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, and the Organization of American States (Haiti Insight 1990b).

Although U.S. aid was crucial for sustaining the government and organizing elections, the extent to which it actually promoted Haiti's democratization was not at all certain. The U.S. focus on elections as the means to democracy in Haiti was somewhat myopic and lost sight of the political and economic conditions that would be necessary to establish and sustain popular participation in a democratic electoral process and government. Although the United States eagerly paid the costs of registering and educating voters and of recording and counting their votes, it gave inadequate attention to securing the human rights of voters and candidates and
to strengthening civilian democratic institutions.

Continued Violations of Human Rights

The Armed Forces had withdrawn from the government, but it had not ceased to threaten the democratic activities of civilians through its collaboration with or failure to curb terrorist activities by Duvalierists, surviving groups of the tontons macoutes, and bands of ex-military personnel. While the Provisional Electoral Commission was preparing to hold elections, these groups attacked the civilians and members of the government who attempted to exercise democratic rights. In the countryside, for example, local government officials (Section Chiefs), military commanders, and landowners carried out three separate massacres that took the lives of 25 citizens, mostly peasants who were involved in organizations attempting to secure their rights to land, improve their standard of living, and form peasant associations to represent their interests. In Port-au-Prince, ex-Duvalierists attacked members of the Democratic Unity Confederation (KID) who were staging a peaceful protest outside the presidential palace; but, when the police came to restore order, they severely beat and arrested exclusively two KID members.

A severe political crisis resulted when three men, two wearing military uniforms, attacked the Council of State, a presidential advisory body comprised of representatives from various sectors of Haitian society. The council had been meeting with delegations from democratic organizations when the three men entered with machine guns and shot and killed two people, one of them a council member. The subsequent failure of President Trouillot to protest strongly or take adequate steps to protect the Council of State led to its refusal to cooperate with her government and to the resignation of five out of 15 heads of government ministries (Haiti Insight 1990c, 1990d).

President Trouillot was unable -- or unwilling many Haitians
have suggested -- to curb the political violence. Adding fuel to the fire, she did not halt major Duvalierist figures from returning to Haiti and undertaking open political activities. Most notable among them were Williams Regala, an ex-military commander implicated in the massacre of voters in the cancelled elections of November 29, 1987, and Roger Lafontant, a Mininister of the Interior during part of Jean-Claude Duvalier's presidency and head of the tontons macoutes. Although the Port-au-Prince prosecutor issued an warrant for Lafontant's arrest for past crimes, the Armed Forces refused to carry out the arrest. Lafontant declared himself to be a presidential candidate in the upcoming elections despite a constitutional ban on prominent ex-Duvalierist government officials' running for government office. The Duvalierist press warned there was "more blood to be spilled" if his candidacy were disallowed (New York Times 1990b).

Surprisingly, shortly after Lafontant and Regala returned to Haiti, the Department of Defense proposed to give $1.2 million to the Haitian Armed Forces. The funds would have been given to the military for "non-lethal equipment and training to aid it in preserving internal order during the election period...and preventing a coup against the Trouillot government" (Haiti Insight 1990a). The plan was halted when 10 members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee protested to the Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney, that, "in light of the poor track record of the Haitian military, the virtual absence of professionalism within it ranks, and the overall deterioration in the current situation, to provide assistance would send the wrong signal to the Haitian military at this critical juncture" (Haiti Insight 1990b). But, the Congress did approve $800,000 of military aid for 1991, contingent upon elections.

At the request of the Trouillot government the United Nations agreed to establish an observer group in Haiti to "verify" the elections. Although the U.N. group, which would include as many as
339 observers, monitors, and support staff, was authorized only to observe, its purpose was to help the Haitian government "achieve the peaceful and efficient development of the coming electoral process." The cost to the United Nations was expected to be $9.4 million. The Secretary General of the United Nations justified funding the observer group stating,

After years of political and institutional instability, it is to be feared that Haiti could be in danger of falling deeper into a crisis which has already produced a massive flow of Haitians to countries in the region with a resulting strain on them. Elections conducted with an international presence could accordingly help towards the solution of this crisis (United Nations 1990).

Although the presence of an international observer mission was expected to help protect the elections from disruption, the Armed Forces still cast a shadow over the electoral process. Even if the Armed Forces did not intervene during the elections themselves, there was no certainty that it would allow an unfriendly president to be installed in the national palace. The possible election of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a popular church leader who promised to bring military violators of human rights to justice and who was an outspoken critic of the United States' economic and political role in Haiti, increased speculation about intervention or a coup d'etat by the Armed Forces.

THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS

In order to protect his regime, François Duvalier had systematically destroyed or coopted any independent civilian institution that he believed could become a base of political opposition. Independent political parties, labor unions, peasant groups, newspapers, student organizations, and even the Boy Scouts were shut down and banned (Weil et al. 1973: 109-121; Heinl and Heinl 1978: 592, 603, 610, 628, 645-7). When the Duvalier regime fell in 1986, Haitians faced the formidable task of rebuilding civic organizations on the basis of a weakened economy and in the
context of continuing political repression. Four years later, although many Haitian citizens had become active in political affairs, their organizations were still largely underdeveloped, having suffered from persecution by the Armed Forces and Duvalierist paramilitary groups and from lack of access to adequate resources to support their efforts.

The United States had begun to channel most of its economic development assistance to Haiti through non-profit private voluntary organizations in the early 1980's in order to avoid the extreme corruption and inefficiency of the Duvalier regime (DeWind and Kinley 1988: 68-70). Subsequent military governments provided little reason to alter this strategy. Even when direct aid to the government was suspended after the November 29, 1987 election day massacre, the United States continued to fund the development projects of non-governmental organizations.

Although the United States had been willing to channel large portions of its economic development aid to support projects and activities that would bolster the political strength and participation of Haiti's "socially responsible" entrepreneurial elite, the economic assistance that it targeted toward assisting Haiti's poor majority was not designed to have a strengthening political impact. The United States provided large amounts of economic development assistance to non-governmental economic development and social service organizations in Haiti, but most of these organizations were foreign and their funding did little to strengthen indigenous, community-based groups which could support popular democratic activities. As a result, in 1989, the number of foreign, non-governmental groups with development or social service operations in Haiti was reported to outnumber Haitian groups by a total of 201 to 61 (Mathurin et al. 1989: 54).

The practice of promoting development through the private sector continued after the civilian Trouillot government was
appointed in 1990. During that year $41.4 million was given to non-governmental development groups (Americas Watch et al. 1990: 76). For fiscal year 1991-1992, the Bush administration proposed, and the Congress approved, $66.4 million of economic aid for Haiti of which $22 million would go directly to the Haitian government in the form of Economic Support Funds and Food for Peace commodities. The balance and largest portion of the aid, some $43.6 million of Development Assistance and Food for Peace commodities, was to go to non-governmental organizations. The Congress gave the Bush administration authority to decide how much of the aid that it had approved would actually be delivered, but stipulated that no aid could be given unless democratic elections had been held and a civilian government was in place.

Logical as USAID's diversion of development aid from the government into the private sector may have been in the context of corrupt Duvalierist and military rule, the strategy was problematic with regard to Haiti's potential democratization in two respects. First, the concentration of resources and skilled personnel in the private sector had weakened the very ministries upon which a democratically elected government would rely to establish its legitimacy with Haitian civilians. The autonomy of the private voluntary organizations would potentially compete with the government in its rightful role in coordinating Haiti's economic development. The likelihood of these groups continuing to be loyal to their funders could compromise an elected government's ability to design and implement a development strategy that might differ from the export-oriented strategy promoted by the United States.

A second problem is that so long as the majority of U.S. private sector funds were given largely to foreign rather than Haitian organizations, Haitian organizations could not form an infrastructure to support democratic political activities by the poor majority of the Haitian population. For example, economically successful peasant production and consumption cooperatives could
have become a base for its members to participate in peasant associations. Similarly, urban community development projects could have become the base for neighborhood political organizing. As only a small portion of U.S. funds supported such projects and funding was channeled for the most part through foreign, non-profit organizations, they did little to promote the democratic participation of Haitian citizens in their country's economic and political development.

1. As the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Americas Watch point out, goods smuggled illegally into a country without consent of the government are properly called "contraband". The does not really apply to goods that were smuggled into Haiti as they were brought in with the consent and participation of senior military and government officials. The practice was a de facto government policy although technically it was still illegal (NCHR 1989: 110n).
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COMMENTS

Marc Prou
University of Massachusetts, Boston

I would like to begin my response by commenting on the title of the panel: Education, Economic Development and Rural Mobilization. This panel in fact is a hybrid of two distinct panels. One panelist, former Education Minister of Ertha Trouillot's government, Dr. Charles Tardieu-Dehoux, could not attend the conference, so he informed us that at the very last minute, due to Cabinet reshuffling the same weekend of the conference. Therefore, the Planning Committee was forced to merge the panels on Development and Education with the one on Economic Development and Rural Mobilization.

The plight of the Haitian society relative to primary education, development and rural life has become widely recognized following these three stirring presentations. Much is being said today on the role of formal and informal education in developing human resources for national economic, social, political and cultural development. All three panelists, Uli Locher, Bob Maguire and Josh DeWind made reference to the importance of mass education and mass involvement in the decision-making process. They strongly believe that only through effective participation of the Haitian population and its natural leaders can any meaningful development take place. The questions one may ask at this point are the following:

a) What is the meaning of the concept of development?

b) How does each scholar view development in the Haitian context?

Without attempting to answer these two questions, I will try to frame my response in view of these guiding interrogations. The answers to the first question are somewhat ambiguous in each of the papers. There have been few attempts to resolve this ambiguity in
a working definition of the concept of development in the case of Haiti.

Uli Locher's, "Primary Education in Predatory State: Private Schools Take Over in Haiti" looks at the negative aspects of primary public education in Haiti. He argues that the very failure of the present educational system has led to some of the current problems such as the role of the State and the upsurge in the number of private schools. He suggests that the inability of the Government officials to carry out meaningful initiatives has impeded the possibility for any meaningful development in.

Robert Maguire's essay "Haiti's Emerging Peasant Movement" raises several provocative issues concerning rural mobilization and non-formal education. Maguire's emphasis is more radical: people at the bottom understand better the root cause of their problem. His paper effectively conveys the excitement and enthusiasm that surround promising models of development at the local level and reminds us that peasants' groups are still in their infancy stage. Moreover, he warns us of the prevailing misunderstanding associated with grass roots organizations; persistently, policy makers and development planners fail to recognize these associations as political and powerful groups whose considerable efforts must not be ignored.

Josh DeWinds' paper on "Elections Without Democracy: the Impact of U.S. Economic Assistance on Politics in Haiti" is perhaps the most controversial contribution. He presents a critical view of the impact of foreign aid on Haitian social, cultural, economic and political self-determination. He argues that U.S. foreign aid serves as an impediment toward real political as well as economic development. His criticism of the inefficiencies and weaknesses of currently existing government and PVO's that are supposedly carrying out development initiatives is well documented.

In spite of significant differences among the three papers regarding the historical and potential role of private primary
education, peasants' movements and democratic elections in achieving national development, they indeed share some common characteristics. While two of the scholars appear to view education in Haitian society as a tool for liberation and empowerment, the other one seems to share the traditional view in western educational history promoted by modernization and "human capital" theorists. Unanimously, all three scholars shared the belief that reform initiated from the top or centralized bureaucratic apparatus would contribute minimally to authentic notional development.

The second concern of my response expands upon the first, questioning the kind of development to which the three panelists are referring in their papers. Development is viewed differently when education, economic development and rural mobilization are at issue. Underlying assumptions about development overlap and at times compete. Consequently, the distinctions among the papers are often subtle, sometimes controversial and profound. I shall attempt to summarize below the divergent approaches to these issues as they were presented by each of the scholars.

Uli Locher's view on "development" in his paper centers on the "human capital" theory of increased productivity due to technical skills acquired in school. This view reflects traditional modernization theory based on a functionalist conceptualization of social change which relies upon certain concepts such as structural differentiation and functional prerequisites.

Robert Maguire defines "development" as an evolutionary process, and the mobilization of peasants considered an intermediate stage en route to a bottom up approach. The causes of "underdevelopment", to the extent discussed in the paper, derive from inhibiting economic and social structures. His concept of development is an eclectic mixture of the "World System Theory", "dependency theory" and historical sociology. For Maguire, a
different, more effective development model can be achieved when conflict with the current mode of production is neutralized by social, non-violent "resolution" (not revolution) through the formation of a "higher" mode of grass roots production.

Josh DeWind's analysis of the "peripheral" status of Haiti vis-à-vis the United States led us to the inevitable "dependency theory" model of development. His perspective reflects general issues of international dependency with obvious political implications. The core of his argument is that the "U.S. overall economic development strategy for Haiti was designed to effect Haitian politics indirectly by altering relations between groups in Haitian society". Thus, as DeWind notes, Haiti's political dependency is the result of its economic dependency on U.S. foreign aid which has been doing "very little to promote the democratic participation of Haitian citizens" in the process of renewal.

I believe that the "neo functionalist" position as presented (covertly or overtly) in all three papers is not an automatic, rational response to new social problems in Haiti but rather the result of competition and conflict over values, symbols and ideologies of different groups and social strata in Haitian society. Uli Locher posits that modernizing tendencies in private education will be an item on the Haitian social agenda which might generate group conflict, and suggests as well a "third alternative strategy which promises a way out of the misery of Haitian education". Bob Maguire has argued that local peasant organizations cannot alone solve deeply-rooted problems of poverty; however, they can help set the framework necessary to help sustain regional development. DeWind reminds us that the political and democratic requirements for development publicized by the Haitian government and U.S. agencies (U.S. AID, the World Bank among others) simply reflect the interpretations and agendas of some local or international capitalist elements. Thus, DeWind implies that the precondition for national economic development coincides with the
elimination of political perspectives, policies and economic obstacles created and imposed on Haiti by the U.S. and its allies.

Duvalierism in Haiti during the past 34 years has led to rampant corruption and total failure of the major institutions supported by reactionary policies promoted by certain foreign organizations. During that period, the "upward" development model was touted as possessing the potential for addressing serious issues concerned with the improvement of the country's welfare. Though we know that the "upward" development model has become a symptom causing underdevelopment in many third world countries like Haiti, to date, no attempt has made to search for alternative strategies.

All three panelists referred in part to the ill-effect which theories of traditional "upward development" have had on the labor market, natural resources, land tenure, and political self-determination in Haiti. However, each failed to propose alternative models to this pervasive "upward" development mode.

One final point worth mentioning is that the construction of public education, democratic organizations and social groupings in today's Haiti is a product of colonial legacies, local cultures, economic, geo-political and demographic conditions. Thus, attempts to privatize education, democratic elections and rural mobilization may well obscure social class differentiation, facilitate coordination and integration of emerging institutions and, at the same time, legitimize new hierarchical orders.
FREEDOM BOUND

Jean-Claude Martineau
Poet, Boston, Massachusetts

Since I have been introduced as a poet, and believe me not all agree unanimously with that definition of my role, I am going to begin with one of my poems. Rest assured, it is not one of those hermetic poems whose meaning remains obscure, not the type that you listen to and fail to understand. Given the situation of Haiti right now, and the situation of Haitians trying to find friends within the global community, what we say about our predicament must be clear.

WE ARE ONLY PASSING

I am just passing through; I am not here to stay
Give me a place to sit, a moment to catch my breath
Then I’ll go.
It could be in ten years, it could be tomorrow
And when my time comes I will pack up my cause and
I’ll go.
I’m part of an army that just lost a battle; I am licking
My wounds and gathering my courage.
I’m not here to stay, but I’m not here to rest
And as long as I’m here, I’ll be just one of you.
Give me a slogan to chant, a banner to carry, I’ll
Be one more candle against your darkness; I’ll be
One more degree in your heat; I’ll be limping along in
Your marches
But I’m not here to stay; I’m just passing through.
And long after I’m gone I hope you’ll miss my accent
In your chant.
Because one day I’ll be calling on you; one day when I need
a few more machetes, fencing against the sugar cane leaves,
A few more coffee-picking hands,
And then you’ll come.
To be candles in my darkness, degrees in my heat, and that’s
When we’ll meet again.

There was a French revolutionary whose name was Danton. One day a group of friends came to him and said, Robespierre is after you. It was during the Reign of Terror in France. He said, no, I’m not going anywhere, because one cannot carry one’s own land on the sole of the shoes. He stayed, and he died on the guillotine. But the tragedy was that he stayed and he was wrong, because a person
does indeed carry his own land with him. Granted, not on the sole of the shoes, but in the heart, in the soul. Since I am going to speak about Haitian culture in the diaspora, let's try to figure out exactly what culture is to the emigrant. Is it only songs and paintings and music and dances? No, it is a little bit more than that. It's also what we wear, how we speak, what we eat; it's also the way we deal with one another. Yes, we have come to the United States and the minute we started creating a community, our culture found ground to grow.

When I came to the United States in December 1962 there were very few Haitians in this area. Gerdes Fleurant, this old man here on the panel, was one of them. It was a joy when we could meet a Haitian in the street. It was a joy when people passed you speaking Creole. It was a joy when we could get together to cook our rice and beans and plantains and grillot. It was a joy, but we couldn't say that the culture was there, but the embryo of it certainly was.

The Haitian community grew steadily after two massive repression movements in Haiti in 1969 and in 1973. Haitians left to go to New York first. Since New York was so different from their homeland, they drifted north toward Boston, and the community started growing. Then a lot of little changes started to happen. We used to go and buy our plantains and tropical food in markets owned by Hispanics, and soon after, some Haitians started to have their own little food stores. Barbershops opened; first in somebody's living room, and now in the Haitian community at large. We also needed recreation, and slowly, small musical bands started to appear, because we had to find a place to dance our dances; we had to make a place to be with our own.

Right now the Haitian community, in the Boston metropolitan area, numbers about 60,000 people, although no one agrees exactly on the number of Haitians living here. Nonetheless, we are large enough to have established a cultural life. First, the Lee School
was more or less a cultural center of the Haitian community; then it became the Strand Theater; then we moved to the John Hancock Hall. Little by little artists started coming from Haiti to perform in the community, but more importantly artists emerged from within the Haitian community.

The most important moment for us was 1971 when Duvalier, the father, died and nominated his son, then 19 years old, as president. Haitians, who before that seemed to be completely discouraged, started seeing the possibility of organizing and protesting against the Duvalier dynasty. As a result, we chose our culture, our music, songs, dances, to be part of the struggle, and at the heart of the struggle, our language, Creole. There was a time in Haiti when nobody could speak. Artists had to talk about subjects that you hear every day on the radio: "I love you, you don't love me, the sky is blue, the sky is gray, be mine tonight, dream come true." It seems that there is a collection of sentences in a big hat somewhere; when you want to write a song, you just pull a few of these sentences out, put them in any kind of order, and boom you have a song. But in the 1970s, the emigrant community started saying more. We started talking about the way our people were living, the problems of the Haitian economy, the problem of Haitian culture itself. This was the best tactic that we could have chosen at that time. We became the voice of those who couldn't speak inside Haiti. It was here that the struggle for Creole to be recognized as our national language took place. Most of everything we wrote was in Creole, and slowly filtered toward Haiti. Poems and songs written in the diaspora started to rekindle what we once had in Haiti; artists with talent and courage started protesting, speaking, singing about inevitable changes in the Haitian situation. This effort was, I think, the main contribution of the Haitian diaspora in our struggle as a nation, as a nationality, and as a culture. Still, we do have problems.

A number of Americans have gone to Haiti, and after two weeks
come back and write a book about Haiti, which eventually is published. But very seldom will you see something written by a Haitian author published in the United States. Are publishers afraid of what we might say? Probably, yes, because we cannot commend the ways in which we have been treated in North America. We have used our culture to protest. We will continue to do so. But we know that we have a wall in front of us, which compared to the Berlin Wall is seemingly impenetrable. To be published in the United States is very difficult, and I'm not talking about writing in Creole, because a lot of Haitian authors write in English, even though their soul is still Haitian.

We Haitians must realize that an image of us already exists in American minds. We are not unknown. We are those strange people with a strange religion. We are those people who brought AIDS to the world. Perhaps this latter stereotype is a compliment. Since it is a sexual disease, we may have been making love to the rest of the world (laughter). Don't speak to me of Latin lovers; let's talk now in the present about Haitian lovers. Our image comes from Hollywood, comes from prejudices and fears that others have of us. Are these fears really justified? In my opinion they are. If we were to write and be published in English, we would demystify widely-held misconceptions. Of Christopher Columbus we would say that for us he was not a discoverer, rather he disrupted the lives of people who were living peacefully on our island. When we speak about George Washington, we will remember that he had slaves. When we consider the upheavals in Eastern Europe, we wonder when will our glasnost come. When will they leave us alone so that we can change our society to our benefit, not according to anybody else's interests? Our task is not going to be easy.

I would like to conclude with another poem of mine in English about the boat people, entitled "Freedom Bound."

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Freedom here I come.
Raise your lamp beside the golden door
Welcome my hopes and my dreams ashore
It's for you that I forsake my home.
Freedom, oh Freedom, since I have never seen you before
I don't really know what to look for
But ready or not, here I come.
I set my sail across the dome to take me away from my fears
I turn my face toward the morning sun, so the sunshine can dry up my tears.
There will be nothing to hold me down in my travelling freedom bound.
I'll cross the border of many nations and burn holes in the four horizons.
Freedom, oh Freedom, we are so thirsty for you where I'm from
That some day I'll take you by the hand and invite you to dwell in my land.
But everybody agrees, it seems, to keep me away from their doors
And when I manage to make it ashore, I have no time to come pack my dreams.
I work the cane fields, and I swear I have found no sugar in there.
Although I came begging for liberty, I am jailed in the land of the free.
Freedom, oh Freedom, now I know I can't call you my own 'til the day I build you with my hands with the color and shape of my land.
THREE FICTIONAL VIEWS
OF DUVALIERIST HAITI

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It is not surprising that Haitian writers have periodically inscribed the Duvalier regime, especially that of Papa Doc, in works of fiction. The catalog of novels evoking that regime, or certain aspects of it, is still to be done. This study is a preliminary attempt at an analytical presentation of the more important themes of three novels in which the focus is on the extreme violence of life under Papa Doc. Curiously enough, the three novels were published approximately a decade apart. Marie Vieux Chauvet's *Amour, colère et folie* was published in Paris in 1968. René Depestre's *Le Mat de cocagne* was published in Paris in 1979 (a longer Spanish version in Cuba, 1975). Gérard Etienne's *La Reine Soleil levée* was published in Montreal in 1988.

The goals of this rereading of these three Haitian novels are to show, first, the similarity with which the writers have viewed the Duvalier regime and, second, to set out some of the differences in the detailed treatment of life in Haiti during that era.

* * *

Chauvet, Depestre and Etienne stress the abuse of power by the *tontons macoutes* and, on occasion, evoke Papa Doc himself. In a composite portrait, the *tontons* and lower-level chiefs are brutal, uneducated, and likely to be disguising an uneasy sexual orientation behind their public façade. They impose their will by blackmail, force, threats. At each step up the ladder of power, the *tontons* can order subordinates to do their dirty work. At moments, petty greed and fear lead them to betray one another or to vie with one another for power. The medical and legal professions, the clergy, and Vodoun priests are implicated in
their submissiveness and collaboration with the regime.

A second theme found in all three novels is that of the major colonial power looming behind the Duvalier regime—the United States of America. That ominous influence is present but less explicit in the second and third panels of the Chauvet triptych (Colère and Folie) and in Depestre's The Festival. The Americans are alluded to obsessively in Chauvet's Amour and in Etienne's La Reine. The recollection of the invasion and Marine occupation of Haiti (1915-1934) is a recurring theme of Etienne's La Reine. A filthy, inadequately equipped hospital with non-functional medical equipment is presented as an American legacy persisting into the time of the Duvaliers. Under the Duvaliers, the Americans continue to be present through their involvement in commercial schemes to obtain raw materials and blood through defrauding the Haitian people. The Department of State supports the regime.

The third broad theme to be found in all three novels is that of the psychological impact of colonialist-supported violence against the Haitian people. Each novel shows various segments of the Haitian populace existing in a virtually zombified state. The people live a hand-to-mouth existence. Certain bourgeois stand to lose their property through seizure by the tontons. The citizen may be tortured, killed, or isolated for expressing opposition to the regime. Wives and daughters are subject to the lust and sadism of the tontons. The medical profession offers no cures, and is, in fact, at the command of the President-for-Life. Vodoun priests may collaborate and are, occasionally, tontons themselves. Haitian priests who have risen in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church have done so with the approval of the President.

Revolt by one or more victims of the regime is depicted in each of the novels. Claire Clamont stabs Commandant Calédu in the
back (Amour). Postel (The Festival) wins the competition of the Greasy Pole and uses his prize, a brand new machine gun, to fire on the presidential party. Mathilda and her rebellious band are gunned down by the tontons at the direct order of the "Grand Chief" (La Reine).

All three authors wrote in exile. Chauvet was in Paris or in New York when her novel was published. The fact that Max Chauvet, her brother-in-law, was editor of the Nouvelliste and that her children were still in Haiti may well have been key factors in preventing the novel's distribution. Depestre wrote and revised The Festival in exile in Cuba and its publication in French almost coincides with his departure for France. Etienne had been in Canada for some twenty-four years when La Reine appeared. Not one of the three novels presents any clear ray of hope, unless it be that the brutal exercise of power continues to provoke occasional revolt. All three novels end in death and destruction, with the Papa Doc regime still in place. Marie Chauvet died shortly into the regime of Baby Doc (1973). Depestre returned to Haiti in 1957, but refused a governmental position under Papa Doc and left for Cuba early the following year. Although Etienne became politicized at an early age (first arrested and tortured at the age of fifteen), he survived under the Duvalier regime as a militant until 1964, when he fled to Canada. Both Depestre and Etienne have continued to write in exile without alluding to the Baby Doc regime in their fiction.

*   *   *

Marie Vieux Chauvet portrays characters who are tontons in the three panels of Amour, colère et folie. Claire Clamont, first-person narrator of Amour, is pulled onto the dance floor by Commandant Calédu at her sister's birthday party. When she tries to get away, he tightens his grip. She feels their bodies vibrating hatred in close contact. When she manages to stop him by placing her feet awkwardly, he whispers to her that he knows
about a bloody drama that took place long ago on her family's property. As Claire watches Calédu dance with her younger sister and other young women, she marvels at his mundane grace in dancing the meringue and sees the smiles of the women as Calédu whispers in their ears. "His murderous hands clasped waists and squeezed other hands. We were cajoling him in hopes of being spared!" (62).²

In Colère, Rose Normil is not spared. She accepts the lust of the "gorilla" as the price to be paid for saving part of her family's property. In a suggestive confession, the "man in uniform" (never honored with a name) tells Rose that he can "only be a man" with beautiful, saint-like women of her type. He demands that she assume a martyr's position, arms crossed on her breast, before he rapes her. Before becoming a powerful authority, he says that he had been a flea-ridden beggar (284-85).

The focus shifts by stages in the three parts of Amour, colère et folie. In the first part, the Clamont family continues an apparently normal but uneasy existence while Commandant Calédu swaggers through their lives. In the second part, the Normil family sees the tontons surrounding them and occupying their property. The Commandant blackmails them in order to obtain Rose's acceptance of his sexual lust. In the third part, the focus shifts to the barricaded poets and Commandant Cravache makes only a shadowy appearance to arrest, interrogate, and condemn the rebels.

Depestre's novel begins with a kind of prologue, a conversation between Zachary Zoocrates, the President-for-Life, and Clovis Barbotog, head of NOFES, the National Office for the Electrification of Souls--the fictional version of the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale or tontons macoutes. Zoocrates and Barbotog are debating the fate of ex-Senator Henri
Postel for opposition to the regime. Instead of punishment by torture, being dropped into the sea from a helicopter, or zombification through mystical practices, the President has conceived the fate most likely to induce long-term suffering on the part of his enemy, "auto-zombification" (6/12). Postel's family and associates are massacred and the ex-senator is placed as proprietor of a small store in the most miserable part of "Port-au-Roi," Tête-Boeuf, where he must sell small quantities of foodstuffs and items of hardware. For Depestre, "electrification" alludes doubly to Duvalier's national program of electrification and to his program of mind control through fear, uncertainty, and deprivation.

In *La Reine Soleil levée*, Etienne treats the reader to an emergency session of the *tonton* generals as Mathilda is on her way with a band of supporters to attack the *houngan*, Master Sonson, who has failed to cure her husband of his mysterious paralysis. The "Amazon," a figure representing Rosalie Adolphe, commander of Fort Dimanche, wants to impose martial law immediately. For her, "curfew remained an absolute rule of law." She finds that there is "one sole response to social disorder, the force of arms" (181). Another general finds that the rebels "respect nothing, the flag, the Catechism of the Chief, the Vodoun religion, the history of the gods of our race. Nothing. I would like to kill them. Yes. Those dirty communists" (184). The presiding general's decision is to protect their own: "Don't let the rabble touch one of Master Sonson's hairs. If any misfortune happens to him, raze the entire Sans-Fil neighborhood with cannon fire. By the order of the Great Chief" (185).

Professional persons are generally coopted by the regime, with the exception of two doctors in Chauvet's novel (Dr. Audier, *Amour*; Dr. Valois, *Colère*). In *The Festival*, Postel is subjected to grueling physical and psychiatric examinations. The entire session with Dr. Leo Primas, head psychiatrist of the Pont-Beudet
hospital, is suggestively oriented toward the revelation of sexual aberration. Is Postel aware of the phallic connotations of the greasy pole? Are there any avowed or latent homosexual antecedents in his background? As an adolescent, did he masturbate while dreaming of a greased pole? Did he ever have sweaty dreams while envisioning his mother cuckoldling his father with a greasy pole? Dr. Primas's diagnosis is no less fanciful.

This abrupt desire to climb a tree of phallic nature, in front of a hostile crowd, is characteristic of that type of paranoid delirium in which the political mechanisms no longer function, as in the said Postel's case, and in which the patient attaches himself with the same fanaticism to sports, commerce, art, gambling, or almost any activity. Postel has chosen the most difficult sport of all because he has a kind of pathological obstinacy. This grandiose delusion, which made him believe not long ago that he was the unrecognized champion of democracy, is the very factor that is provoking him now, under the dictates of a singular mutation of delirious impulses, to want to finish the competition of the greasy pole as the victor (37-38/51-52).

In Etienne's La Reine, Mathilda confronts the head doctor of the National Hospital following the absence of a diagnosis from all of their examinations of her paralyzed husband. The head physician is angry, anxious, and frustrated. He knows that only miracles or chance have been effective against certain common illnesses in Haiti. He reflects in his own mind.

Were he to confess his powerlessness to Mathilda, he would risk losing everything—honor, the respect of his staff, the collaboration of certain controlling powers behind the institution who were counting on the type of schemes designed by a colleague in order to shore up the undertakings of the Great Chief (105).

He tries to blame Jo's paralysis on lack of hygiene, over-eating, and superstition in order to distract Mathilda, but she persists in her challenge: "Are you able to cure him...?" The doctor finally confesses: "You are right, woman... A healthy man does not catch this type of disease. Today's apparatuses are powerless. Maybe tomorrow..." (109).
Traditional religion is not treated any more favorably than medicine in these novels. Although Chauvet does not portray any 
houngan or describe Vodoun ceremonies, she alludes to aspects of animist practices and to loas in passing. Depestre, in Jacques 
Roumain's wake, shows some respect for Vodoun as the religion of a large segment of the Haitian people, but he and Etienne both 
portray a houngan intimately involved with the regime in power and they include satirical scenes of Vodoun ceremonies conducted 
for State purposes.

Depestre portrays Monsignor François-Wolf Ligondé, the first Haitian archbishop, as "Monseigneur Wolgondé" in The Festival. 
Following the first day of the Festival of the Greasy Pole, Simeon-Seven-Days, the President's personal sorcerer, organizes a 
ceremony in which the greasy pole will be invested with the spirit of the President himself. During the ceremony, President 
Zachary undresses and is decorated with the symbols of Baron Samedi. Simeon then dances to the rhythms of a funeral chant with 
the naked President on his back. Monsignor Wolgondé, other presidential associates, and members of the President's family 
take turns dancing around the Blue Turquoise Salon with the leader mounted on their backs. Later, President Zachary himself 
is mounted by Baron Samedì.

[He] began to bellow and to draw his head down into his shoulders, with the furious look of a bull about to charge. Simeon then filled his mouth with kimanga.³ He sprayed his Excellency's face, umbilical, and unsheathed organ. Then he ordered Zachary to stretch out stomach down on the pole in order to simulate copulation with it. Zachary complied, but Colonels Boipiraud and Dainmond had to help the President to keep his balance on the pole. The naked little man was, in fact, slipping awkwardly first on one side of his double and then on the other, bellowing and foaming at the mouth (107-108/137).

In La Reine, there are two Vodoun ceremonies—-one led by the sorcerer, Master Sonson (ch. 8) and the other by the houngan, 
Master Ti-Blanc (ch. 10). Neither sorcery nor healing rituals
have any effect on Jo's paralyzed and weakened body. Local
government officials are present and participate in the ritual.
Master Sonson surveys the scene, at first with confidence, then
with growing apprehension.

He needs to accomplish some exploit more striking than
the crisis of possession. Maybe metamorphose into a
brigadier general. Yes, that's it. The Master, a
brigadier general wearing leopard skin boots, a
fearless knight, without sin or reproach. The man to
whom the Great Master has given the attributes of a
god—disappearance into the crowd, reappearance on the
other side of the reeds in the lagoon. With the power
to punish evil beings, to make political enemies grovel
before him. Yes. The perfect incarnation of that black
Christ demanded by the sages of the race for five
centuries. Like a regular army, the crowd forms ranks
beneath the flags of his servants (141-142).

Chauvet, Depestre, and Etienne depict the United States as
an imperialist power lurking behind the Duvalier regime. The
somber presence of the United States is embodied by Mister Long
in Chauvet's Amour. The tonton Calédu accepts the Americans "in
spite of his hatred for the former occupying forces" (26). Jean
Luze, French husband of Felicia Clamont, works for Mister Long
and, thereby, sees the shoddy side of the American enterprise.
Customs inspectors, who have taken American citizenship, look the
other way and pass through, duty-free, goods destined for the
Haitian bourgeois (48). "The American gets rich along with
others. They are all against us" (59). The Americans are afraid
that their influence in Haiti will be supplanted by that of
Europe (107). In 1915, "the government of President Vilbrun
Guillaume Sam held out its hand toward the American and requested
financial aid" (121). At the end of Amour, the peasants are
yelling "Down with Mister Long" (186).

While Depestre's focus is unrelentingly on the caricatural
regime of Papa Doc and on the revolutionary opposition to it,
there are allusions to the United States's dubious Haitian
involvements. Moutamad, the levantine merchant who barely escapes
death at Postel's hands, travels to New York once a year to visit his children, who are studying there. He was on the board of directors of ZAAMCO, the fictional version of "Hemo Caribbean," the blood bank that bought Haitian blood at a ridiculously low price to be sold at great profit in the United States (19/28). Pascal, one of the contestants in the Festival of the Greasy Pole, was once reduced to selling his blood in order to survive (116/148).

Beginning with the medical examination of Mathilda's husband at the National Hospital, Etienne never allows the reader to forget the ignominious heritage of the American invasion or the continued intrusion into Haitian affairs. The hospital, dirty and poorly administered by a head physician who may not even have a degree,4 is equipped with outmoded stethoscopes bequeathed to the Haitians by the Rockefeller Foundation "two months before the end of the American occupation" (72). The officials of the State Department are caught short when they publish a favorable report on the regime's policies right at the moment of revolutionary ferment (97). Prefects make daily reports to the American Embassy (158).

The view of the United States, for all three novelists, is clearly that of a colonialist power aiding and abetting a regime maintained through force and violence and profiting from the cheap extraction of raw materials, including Haitian blood, from the island nation with no benefit to the people.

One or more cases of resistance and revolt against the Duvalier regime are presented in each novel. Claire Clamon assassinates Commandant Calédu at the end of Amour. Louis Normil and his son Paul are both tormented inwardly, while delaying acts of revolt against the terror and abuse of the regime in Colère. Paul's plan to assassinate the "man in uniform" who has raped his sister fails miserably and Louis's plan to send his two children
to study in the United States is thwarted by Rose's death. Folie ends with the arrest and execution of the poets who have barricaded themselves in an abandoned house. Varied abuse of power drives a number of people to revolt. Each revolt fails. Depestre's entire novel is focused on the inhumane zombification of Henri Postel and on the conception and organization of his symbolic exploit on the greasy pole. President Zachary conceives of the greasy pole as an obscene gesture symbolizing the power of his autocratic state, an immense presidential erection. Postel's ascent of the pole, in spite of age and impediments calculated to discourage contestants, constitutes the obscene countersign by which the indignant citizen responds to State abuse. He is shot and dies on the day of his victory. Most of his followers and associates are assassinated within a period of days and months. The ray of hope inscribed in the novel is that Postel's beautiful young lover has become a leader who survives in the mountains of Haiti and prepares the next revolution.

Etienne's La Reine is pitched at an intense level of anger against the Duvalier regime, with its profiteers and collaborators, all indifferent to human suffering. Etienne places, at center stage, a strong, conscious woman, almost unique as a heroine coming from the lower classes. In spite of a lack of formal schooling, Mathilda is at once lucid and has a sense of her own dignity. She does not consider poverty as a reason for accepting abuse and humiliation. Doctors and priests owe the honest application of their best knowledge, skills, and moral succor to the poor as well as to the rich and powerful. When they fail to perform in accordance with explicit social values, Mathilda exercises her moral force to mobilize the entire Saint-Martin neighborhood in a march against Master Sonson. The result is massacre by the tontons.

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The three novels under consideration present representations of the abuse of power in Haiti in more or less lightly disguised form and point transparently toward the regime of François Duvalier. A number of similarities stem from the fact that the authors wrote about the same phenomenon of national power. Deeds ranging from isolated individual gesture to organized insurrection take place. Death, with no assurance that revolt has any value, is the reward of each participant in the resistance. Hope lies not in the individual's existence but in the intensity and recurrence of resistance or revolt.

Each author depicts different segments of society and different types of revolt. In Amour, Chauvet stresses the psychology and interpersonal relationships of her characters. Depestre shows an intellectual who is a professional politician. His hero comes from the bourgeois suburb of Turgeau, although he eventually gains the support of several working class fellow contestants. Etienne places a woman of the people at the center of the novel's action. Chauvet chooses the bourgeois suburb of Pétionville as her scene, while Depestre and Etienne both evoke a popular quarter of Port-au-Prince—Tête-Boeuf in The Festival and Saint-Martin in La Reine.

Chauvet and Etienne wrote with equivalent intensity, but from a different social standpoint and in very different styles. Marie Chauvet focuses on a virtually phenomenological perception of existence under the Duvalier regime. Her style is an impeccably classical French prose style, in which only an occasional word provokes awareness of Creole speech or Vodoun practices. There is an evolution toward the disintegration of traditional nineteenth-century narrative structuration in Amour, colère et folie. Point of view shifts from one segment of the novel to another, and, more tellingly, from one chapter or part to another within each of the three panels of the trilogy. In Folie, the traditional third-person anonymous narrator is almost
completely eclipsed by the introduction of theatrical writing—speeches are designated by the name of the character and, toward the end, simply by the French dash, designating a change of speaker.

Depestre worked from a longer original version with unchanged place names. He inserted parodic place names and created a more economical style that he has characterized as that of the "fable" or "allegory." The result is a short novel in which references to actual people and events of the Duvalier regime are embedded in caricature and condensed into a unified narrative told with ironic economy.

Etienne sought to create a new style in which violence to language is an index of the regime's unspeakable violence and of the victims' anger. His sentences tend to be short, with strongly punctuated rhythms and frequently suppressed main verbs. Poetic, phonic structuring is more apparent than in the classical style of Chauvet or the erotic-ironic narrative of Depestre. Etienne virtually blasts the reader with his opening sentences, in which a series of occlusive consonants are used to suggest the failing vital functions of Mathilda's suddenly stricken husband ("Tempes battantes, bouche baveuse, souffle coupé"—"Beating temples, mouth slobbering, breathless," 11). The insistent occlusive (underlined) are immediate evidence of the violence maintained in Etienne's style throughout the novel.

It has not been my purpose to rank the writing of Marie Vieux Chauvet, René Depestre, and Gérard Etienne. Inevitably, each new vision of Duvalierist Haiti made allusion to some of the same elements of power, but focused on a different segment of the society and placed different stress on the President-for-Life and his Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale. The three novels figure in some way the claims of Haitian citizens to dignity and the inalienable right to life.
LIST OF WORKS CITED


NOTES

1Chauvet's *Amour, colère et folie* is a trilogy that was originally conceived as three separate novels (see Frank Laraque, "Violence et sexualité dans *Colère de Marie Chauvet*" [*Présence haïtienne*, 2 (sept. 1975)], p. 54). I find, however, a good deal of internal evidence suggesting that, at some point, the novelist conceived the three "panels" as a unified work, with thematic and diegetic parallels too numerous to be discussed in summary. Subject to further clarification, I take the work as three close novels closely associated in their status as "trilogy."

2All translations are mine. Page references to Chauvet and Etienne are to the original French text; in Depestre's case, the first number refers to my published translation and the second to the French text (see "List of Works Cited" for publication information).

3A ritual drink in Vodoun ceremonies.

4The suggestion that a mere orderly or nurse might make false claims to possess higher degrees and might arrive at upper levels of administration under Duvalier comes from my conversations with Gérard Etienne.

JOINING A LITERARY COUMBITE
A HAITIAN ENCOUNTER

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My remarks here are of an autobiographical nature; they are clearly not a scholarly presentation. I offer you a personal narrative.

First, consider this. A young black boy growing up in the American South, attending racially segregated schools during the 1950s. A young black boy eagerly looking forward to what was then called "Negro History Week," as if it were as widely celebrated as Christmas; looking forward to class discussions that would be devoted, for the first and only time during the year, to people like himself, like his family, like his friends. A young black boy in the American South discovering heroic figures like W. E. B. DuBois, Mary McLeod Bethune, Booker T. Washington, Marion Anderson, George Washington Carver—all of whose photographs Ms. Boyd, Mr. Randolph, or Ms. Newman would bring out of storage and hang on the walls of their classrooms during Negro History Week.

A young black boy in the American South seeing one other time yet another picture of a black hero—not a picture really but a drawing of what seemed to him a little man, but a strong and powerful little man like his maternal grandfather, Lewis Heard. A powerful little man—perhaps constructed in a particular way in this black boy's own mind, but whose image (that of this strong, powerful black man) appeared clearly in pen and ink on the classroom wall. This black man was not from the United States. He was from another country. He was from Haiti. His name was Toussaint Louverture. A man who became a guiding symbol for this young black boy in Alabama, in the Heart of Dixie, the Deepest American South. Toussaint Louverture who became to this Southern black boy a sign
of the potentialities he perceived in himself, his sisters and brothers, his schoolmates, and his playmates in racially segregated Alabama. Toussaint Louverture, for this black boy in Alabama, was liberty, self-determination, human dignity, and the will to prevail!

Consider further this same young black boy--now a man--in March during the late 1980s in Paris--in France for the first time in his life. Yes, in Paris, the city that angers and exhausts him the first days he's there. But Paris, the city that allows him to meet francophone black writers he could not see on his earlier January-February Caribbean tour. Other black writers, "exiles" he calls them, a name many of them resist. In France, this black boy from Alabama now a man thinks, the nation that held Haiti in bondage--the white enslavers and colonists who were defeated by black people in Haiti. Black people, he stands facing Notre Dame, black people who dared defeat Napoleon for their freedom! Black people, he repeats over and over to himself, walking down Rue St. Germaine. Monsieur Louverture eye to eye with Napoleon Bonaparte thinks this Alabama black boy now a man as he enters the Pompidou in Paris. Paris--the economic power of all France, for that matter--built, in part, on the backs of enslaved and colonized black people in Africa and the Caribbean. In Haiti. Yes, Haiti, which was the jewel of French colonies. Haitians, like many other people of color, who were forced to help fill the coffers of France. Toussaint Louverture and his armed Haitians who, for their freedom and dignity and self determination, would defeat France in 1804. But France--and the rest of the white world, especially in the United States--would isolate Haiti and punish it into now. A black republic that would dare assert its humanity in the face of the powerful white world! Haiti would be punished, forced over 180 years into desperate circumstances, external and internal, creating a second diaspora--a diaspora that would scatter some of its best minds thousands of miles afar.

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And this young black boy now a man in Paris would meet some of those minds in the person of writers. He would find himself at UNESCO interviewing René Depestre, with Édouard Maunick from Mauritius serving as translator. This Alabama man, interviewing, at the Salon du Livre, Jean Metellus through another translator, a member of the Diop family from Sénégal. Yes, interviewing these Haitian writers, but never realizing at the time that these efforts would lead to special Haitian issues of Callaloo, the literary journal this black man, once a boy in Alabama, founded in 1976.

Never realizing the Haitian issues of Callaloo until one spring morning in 1988, when he is driving to his office at the University of Virginia. That morning he remembered the words of Maryse Condé, the question she asked him at her home in Guadeloupe: "When are you going to talk with Haitian writers? You've interviewed Dominican, Jamaican, Martinican, Trinidadian, and Guadeloupean writers. When are you going to interview Haitian writers?" This Alabama man thinks again of Toussaint Louverture, too, that spring morning as he drives to the University. An image of Mister Toussaint, this Southern black man in his youth constructed. An image with which he continues to live. And then that spring morning on the way to his office he thinks of the contemporary strife in Haiti. There waiting at the traffic light at Emmett and Main Streets this black boy now man from Alabama says aloud to himself: "There will be a Haitian issue of Callaloo." Says this aloud to himself and to his staff two weeks before Manigat is driven out of Haiti.

A few weeks later during the summer the Editor of Callaloo, that Alabama black man, plans his trip to Haiti—his friends thinking him mad for daring to travel to that strife ridden country only a few weeks after its elected President had been deposed. The Editor insists on beginning work on the Haitian issue of Callaloo by going to Port-au-Prince, where he met and interviewed Mona Guérin, Marie-Thérèse Colimon, Ji-Ji Dominique, and Georges
Castera. But it is not until the summer of 1989, when Vève Clark kindly agrees to accompany him, that the Editor returns to Haiti and interviews a broad array of writers, many of whom had recently returned home after long exiles. This once young black Alabama man, now graying [laughter], would now interview René Bélance, Jean Bierre, Syto Cavé, Frankétienne, Anthony Phelps, Jean-Claude Fignolé, René Philoctète, Erma Sainte-Grégoire, Lyonel Trouillot and Roger Dorsinville. The graying Editor of Callaloo would also meet and interview the great Haitian historian and bibliophile Jean Fouchard. It is during that same summer, too, that the Editor would select three Haitians to serve with him as Co-Editors of the Special Haitian Issues of Callaloo. He would ask a Haitian living in Canada, Maximilien Laroche, and two Haitians residing in Haiti, Yanique Lahens and Ji-Ji Dominique—the latter two of them women. For political reasons he would deliberately select them: because they are women! [Applause].

If you consider this foregoing sketching oral chronicle you will get an idea of the origin of the two planned Haitian Issues of Callaloo—issues which must be bilingual, in Creole and English, or in French and English, depending on the original language of each author's text.

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The first number of the Special Haitian Issue of Callaloo will be devoted to creative writers with excerpts from their interviews and selections from their works. I have not given you all of the names of the writers. There will be anywhere from 15 to 25 represented in the first number. The second number will consist of studies of Haitian literature, Creole language, cultural, visual arts, music, religion, and architecture. But, you may ask, why such a comprehensive approach? Perhaps my southern impulse to reveal silences is behind that impulse, because I think that we in this country need to hear the Haitians themselves talk about Haiti. We
need to hear the Haitians tell us about what they see as the U.S.A.'s relationship with their country, however brutal our country has been to Haiti. Perhaps, my Pan-African background from the 1960s is also responsible for my being interested in putting together Haitian Issues of Callaloo. Clearly, the Issues are inspired by my desire for black writers throughout the world to somehow connect up with each other, and to talk to each other in some kind of dialogue, however indirect---which is the central purpose of Callaloo. Callaloo is directed toward scholars and general readers, black and white, wherever they are in the world; persons who are writing about or who are interested in peoples of African descent, their literature, their culture, so that they might sustain a dialogue, conversations with each other. In other words, the black writing community in Chicago, should know about the contemporary writing scene in Port-au-Prince. In Lagos, Nigeria, the writers should know what is happening in Brazil. The black writers in London should know the black literary scene in San Francisco. In Amsterdam they should know what is happening in Costa Rica. That is the purpose of Callaloo. Therefore, the two special Haitian Issues fall directly within that framework.

A more important reason for mounting two such issues of Callaloo is, first, to inform my homefront, the USA, about Haitian literature and Haitian culture. Haiti, as we know the country in the United States (and we don't admit it) is a stereotypical construct. People assume that the only art produced in Haiti is "primitive," intuitive, art. There are many people in the USA who do not know there are Haitian writers. I want to educate such Americans through Callaloo. Generally speaking, Americans in the USA do not know that Haiti has a very long literary tradition extending into the 18th century; that the visual art of Haiti is both self-conscious and intuitive; and that Creole is a language, not a patois, in which literary works are created and published. More specifically, the writing in the first Haitian number of Callaloo will demonstrate to the reading public the status of the
literary scene among Haitian writers inside Haiti and outside Haiti. In fact, these forthcoming issues of Callaloo may, surprisingly enough, inform Haitians themselves as to who are their new--and established--writers scattered all over the globe.

Before I go on, I would like to read very brief excerpts from some of my interviews just to let you hear what some of these Haitian writers have been saying. First I'll start with the issue of exile and the writer in the words of Gérard Etienne and René Depestre.

When I asked him about exile, Gérard Etienne said: "Exile makes the process of doing and that of becoming probable in my literary enterprises. First, there's the critical distance. A novelist's vision is influenced by the relationships he has with a given social environment. In other words, the mirror is broken by fear of provoking the anger of the dramatized social group." On that impact, one critic said of one of his novels, "It is fortunate that Etienne lives in Montant." Meaning that, it is fortunate that he does not live in Montreal. Etienne continued: "Without this critical distance, my fiction would have revealed the same flaws at the roots of Haitian anthropology. On the one hand, and I'm still speaking for myself, my books owe their publication and diffusion to the literary institutions of French Canada, France and Switzerland. Unfortunately my Haitian readers are very few compared to the substantial number of those who read my books in other countries."

And René Depestre, when I asked him about exile and the writer, he answered: "Personally I don't consider myself to be in exile," and he speaks these words in Paris. "This might be a paradox because traditionally exile is associated with sadness, nostalgia and mourning. Fortunately I don't live my exile in those conditions. I left Haiti at an early age, but I decided to bring my roots with me. Instead of being a man with a simple root, I have a
whole system of roots. I have multiple roots, and so I have multiple identities. My central root, of course, is Haiti, and I have accumulated other roots over the years—Brazilian, Chilean, Argentinean, and Cuban, because I lived in Cuba for 20 years. Naturally there are also the French and African components of my identity. Therefore I don't feel that I'm an exile; whenever I start writing, my working table is always symbolically Haiti. I write from Jacmel and I don't really feel that I've ever left Haiti. Right now I'm talking to you from Haiti." [Applause].

I was going to give you a substantial quote from Frankétienne; the time is moving so fast, and since we heard him speak yesterday, I'll simply summarize. I asked him a question about why Haiti has so much creativity? Coming from the USA, this vast land area, and when I look at Haiti, this small land area, suddenly I see an explosion of creativity, first obviously in the visual arts and then in creative literature. And he answers me, "That it is, in fact, a phenomenon" (and I'm summarizing what he says) "because it's a small territory, because of its poverty, and because 75% of its people are unlettered. Yet it still has that creativity. Yet the miracle took place here. Haiti is a land of rich creativity. Every Haitian is potentially an artist. And from potentiality to reality, there's never been more than the space of a gesture or the time of an utterance." The quote continues in that vein, and you all know how Franketienne speaks in eloquence.

As I was trying to plan the issues, I became concerned that I did not meet as many women writers as I had assumed there might have been, so I inquired, and stated that Haiti is not like Guadeloupe, which is unusual in the Caribbean because the two most popular writers there are women --- Simone Schwarz-Bart and Maryse Condé. The various responses I received were political signals letting me know the position of women in the writing community. Ji-Ji Dominique responded: "I think it is because we belong to a small minority group, a small elite to which I belong, both as a
writer and as a journalist. There is no sexism within that small
group at the professional level, but it exists, however, on the
level of personal relationships between men and women in Haiti.
There is still inequality, and there is domination, but it shows
less within the small minority group that I am a part of. I think
that sexism in general is a secondary issue here, because people
have more urgent problems to deal with." I ceased asking any more
questions about that issue once she provided that cogent analysis.
Erma Sainte-Grégoire, the nom de plume of Marie Chauvet's daughter,
talks about her mother, saying that she began writing at an early
age of 11. Chauvet's family used to make fun of her, but "she was
very strong and nothing else than writing mattered to her. Writing,
in her case, was a kind of fatality. It was her destiny. She went
on writing and came perfectly to terms with herself. She was
predetermined. There are things, I believe, which sometimes are
predetermined." And, of course, in the interview, Sainte-Grégoire
also talks about her own work.

There is the comment about Creole from Jean-Claude Fignolé. It
was only yesterday, here at this conference, that I realized the
intensity of the politics surrounding the subject of Creole, or
créolité as Patrick Chamoiseau would say, further supported by
Marie-José's remarks about how children were punished in the
schools for speaking Creole at one time. All of these responses
have helped me to understand what Jean-Claude Fignolé was saying
about Creole in his interview: "I believe that Haitian Creole
writers will contribute to change the range of literary expression.
There is, however, a problem. It is not enough to write in Creole;
one should keep the spirit of the language, the imaginary in the
language. It is useless to write in Creole if one continues to
speak French, or to use the same forms of expression as do French
writers. On the level of images, for example, when you read
Creolophone poets you often meet Creole images translated from
French images, but sometimes you meet the same images expressed
differently in popular speech. The popular imaginary is so rich

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that one wonders whether one is dealing with the same language." He goes on to talk about the use of Creole during the political upheavals of 1986, in the streets and in the media. Fignolé's comments reminds me of positions on language assumed by black writers in the USA who argued for the use of African-American speech in literature. You are not merely to represent the language in the raw, not simply to translate or transcribe it into "standard" American English, but instead you are to maintain the spirit of that language, capture the metaphors, images and the texture of African-American English, if you are going to use it in your texts.

At any rate, these two issues of Callaloo to be co-edited with two writers in Haiti and one Haitian scholar in Canada along with this young Alabama Black man growing old in Virginia, would also include younger writers. You've heard me mention mainly older writers, excluding of course, younger people like Ji-Ji Dominique and Georges Castéra. But then there are other younger writers to be included - for example, Joël des Rosiers, Stanley Péan, Michel-Ange Hyppolite.

The scholars writing on Haitian literature and culture would be Gerdes Fleurant; Philippe Lerebours, who will write an essay on Haitian art and its history; Michael Dash, VèVè Clark, Léon-François Hoffmann, Carroll Coates. In other words, there will be a wide array of critics as well, including our co-editor, Yannick Lahens.

In conclusion, I hope that all of you will join in supporting this project, which, as I've tried to tell you from the beginning, is for me a very personal project going back to my childhood, when I discovered certain facts about Haiti's history from books, and later in life discovered other aspects first-hand in the country itself. I remember being deeply moved during an interview with Jean Fouchard,* who talked about the early history of Haiti, being introduced to Boukman and discovering that it was not only
Toussaint Louverture, but also the people in the mountainsides, the slaves, the poor people, who liberated Haiti. I trust that these issues of Callaloo will constitute at once a modest and a significant effort among many others toward exposing to Americans in the USA the genius that you already know exists among Haitians. I hope this Callaloo will do so.

*Historian Jean Fouchard died in Haiti on September 30, 1990.